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I.

Introduction

“In our personal lives, we are increasingly connected to the internet and dependent on the conveniences that [it] can
offer. We use mapping functions to find our way, we have phones that respond to voice commands, and we [have]
internet connected personal assistants in our homes that perform a variety of functions. All of these collect data about
us which can be widely shared. In addition, the increase in the capacity of data management allows the aggregation of
data which can paint a detailed picture of our habits, interests, our wants and our needs. Indeed, it is now possible for
companies to make personal identification from otherwise anonymous data points.”11
“We now live in an age of personal information. Such personal information drives the economy and can be used to
influence policy, our elections, our identities,' and even our moods.”12
There is not one facet of our lives that does not, on some level implicate data. Corporations use
data which, in turn, implicates everything from how and when we shop, how and when we sleep, to
our ability to access financial information and credit cards. In fact, data itself has become a form of
currency, it is no wonder then that businesses are spending a significant amount to try and control as
much this currency as possible. As technology advances there are higher risks associated with what
type of information, we – either wittingly or unwittingly – allow businesses to use, often times to our
detriment. As awareness of these risks increases among consumers, there is a commensurate rise in
call for a legislative response to this issue.
This white paper was commissioned by the Center for Consumer Law and Education, a joint
initiative launched by West Virginia University and Marshall University to “coordinate[] the
development of consumer law, policy, and education research to support and serve consumers.”13 As
such, this paper has a dual purpose: in addition to providing a comprehensive overview of the many
different legal issues that affect data privacy concerns (both nationally and in WV) this paper will
document and discuss the result of a survey and specific focus groups that were undertaken
throughout the fall of 2019 into January 2020 where individuals within the state provided valuable
feedback regarding what they felt were the most pressing data privacy issues and what they would like
in a law. These responses (along with the extensive research that was undertaken regarding other
statutes, cases and responses across the nation and the world) were used to formulate best practices
for legislative recommendations. My recommendations are informed by both qualitative research
(information and comments made by our survey respondents and focus groups participants) and deskbased research regarding what other jurisdictions and experts in the field have done.
While the focus of this white paper is on businesses, there is a significant overlap between the
work that businesses undertake, which implicates data privacy and the work of governmental officials
(particularly law enforcement).14 The harms to consumers can be both direct and indirect.15 At a
foundational level there are issues with the basic privacy of consumer data. For instance, there are
numerous studies which show that, in certain instances, data that was collected under the providence
of being anonymized, can in fact be used to “re-identify” individuals who participated in the studies
on conditions of anonymity.16
In addition, the use of algorithms, including some fueled by machine learning, have continued to
gain prominence in corporate business models. While, in the strictest sense, these practices do not
specifically fall within the ambit of data privacy issues, a discussion of these issues is nonetheless
important and relevant. Specifically, many of the issues involving data privacy arise from the data sets
3

that companies now have access to and that machine learning algorithms now are trained on a routine
basis. Scholars have found that these issues, if left unchecked, can lead to incredibly harmful results
for individuals.17 That being the case, limiting access to such data sets can benefit both data privacy
challenges and discriminatory practices. As a result, many of the best practices18 that are examined
here also implicate machine learning formulas.
A Note on the Organizational Structure:
While we have tried to create an organizational structure that relates to the relevant
issues as flagged in our table of contents, we should note that much of this is
interconnected: for instance, health insurance information relates to biometric data as
well as credit scores; companies’ use of AI can implicate a number of things, including
issues related to discrimination, privacy and data brokers. In those instances, we have
attempted to guide the reader by indicating other places in the white paper that may
be relevant.
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What’s at Stake
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II.

History of Data Privacy Issues

It is easy to think of data privacy – particularly the means by which others use your personal
information – as something that has developed only recently. In fact, however, the issues surrounding
data privacy have been present almost since the founding of the nation itself. 19 The idea of keeping
personal information private has been at the heart of debates of representatives,20 judicial opinions21
and laws and regulations on both the federal22 and the state level.23 For instance, in West Virginia a
wiretap law, making it illegal for someone to monitor telephone conversations except under very
limited circumstances, has been on the books since 1987.24
So what’s different now? In short, the quantity of data that companies can collect about you, the
amount of companies that are collecting the data, and what they do with it once they have it. This has
occurred in a system where the amount of information collected about you has become known as the
system of Big Data.
A. The Era of Big Data
“There is no question that organizations are swimming in an expanding sea of data that is either too voluminous or
too unstructured to be managed and analyzed through traditional means.”25
One of the biggest changes that impacted privacy in the last few decades has been businesses’
ability to collect, keep and utilize data digitally. While collecting an individual’s data records has been
requested and used by corporations for decades, what a company was able to keep indefinitely was
limited by the sheer physical space needed to house all the information. The volume of documents
that needed to be stored resulted in corporations destroying files and developing document retention
practices to delete older information. In addition, prior to the use of computer programs, any
information that a corporation wanted to collate and categorize had to be done by a human being –
usually by hand. So, for instance, if an insurance company wanted to check what type of information
a claimant had previously disclosed in another claim, it would require an individual to do research to
see what, if any claims a claimant had previously filed, spend some time checking to make sure that
the two claims were filed by the same individual (and not just two people with the same names) and
then request the relevant box (or boxes) from whatever storage facility held that information. Then,
depending on how many boxes of information were generated by the claim, the individual claims
adjuster would have to go through all that information (almost certainly paper files) and see if there
was any relevant information that would impact the current claim. With so much time and effort
involved, many companies rightly concluded that whatever information an adjuster might glean was

The Difference between Data and Big Data
In the era before “big data” … a Starbucks co-founder “explained how they used to write down
the order of every single person who came into the store and add it to a filing system. That way,
when the customer came back, they were able to tell them what they ordered the previous time to
better cater to their needs when they came back for a repeat purchase. Data collection like this
was helpful to customers and positively received.” Now, however, the volume of data has
removed the personal connection and replaced it with automation.
From Forbes Magazine, The Rising Concern Around Data and Privacy.
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not worth the time and expense to get. And so, the information would remain within the domain of
that initial claim and that initial claim only.
Now however, documents that previously required thousands of square feet of space to store
can be placed on a storage card that is the size of a thumb.26 Similarly, data that required thousands
of hours to organize, collate, and sort can now all be done with the press of the button that activates
a machine-learning algorithm. The effects of this switch are profound. Now, in theory, there are few
limits to the amount of information that a business can acquire about you – leading some leading
scholars to proclaim that many businesses know more about you then you know about yourself. 27
As the business, SAS, noted:
The importance of big data doesn’t revolve around how much data you have, but what
you do with it. You can take data from any source and analyze it to find answers that
enable 1) cost reductions, 2) time reductions, 3) new product development and
optimized offerings, and 4) smart decision making. When you combine big data with
high-powered analytics, you can accomplish business-related tasks such as:
•
•
•
•

Determining root causes of failures, issues and defects in near-real time.
Generating coupons at the point of sale based on the customer’s buying habits.
Recalculating entire risk portfolios in minutes.
Detecting fraudulent behavior before it affects your organization.28

A succinct definition of big data is “data that is so large, fast or complex that it’s difficult or
impossible to process using traditional methods.”29 Under this definition, the key hallmarks for big
data involved what has now become known as the “3 Vs.” As SAS states:
Volume: Organizations collect data from a variety of sources, including business
transactions, smart (IoT) devices, industrial equipment, videos, social media and more.
In the past, storing it would have been a problem – but cheaper storage on platforms
like data lakes … have eased the burden.
Velocity: With the growth in the Internet of Things,[30] data streams in to [sic]
businesses at an unprecedented speed and must be handled in a timely manner. RFID
tags, sensors and smart meters are driving the need to deal with these torrents of data
in near-real time.
Variety: Data comes in all types of formats – from structured, numeric data in
traditional databases to unstructured text documents, emails, videos, audios, stock
ticker data and financial transactions.31
As with many developments, the law has not kept pace with the change in technology.
1.

Industry Practice
How Companies Use Your Data
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Origination: Creation &
Capture

Storage, Retention,
Deletion
Processed data is stored
for later use or deleted.
High risk for personal
information hacking,
breach, exposure, theft.

Raw data created,
captured, sent to data
lakes from internet
activity, point of sale,
apps, previously
processed and stored
data, etc. High risk of
card information
exposure or theft.

Collection
Raw data gathered
from origination,
extracted from data
lakes, warehouses. Risk
of breach, information
may or may not be
encrypted or otherwise
unidentifiable.
Cleaning

Output & Interpretation

Unnecessary or
innacurate data
removed, remaining
data classified and
organized. Vulnerable if
not adequately secured,
may still be encrypted.

Translated into readable
forms, charts, graphs,
tables. Interpreted. High
risk of exposure of
personal data.

Processing

Input

Algorithms applied, data
processed depending on
type and intended use.
Becomes unencrypted.
Personally identifiable
information is vulnerable.

Transfer to CRM
programs or data
warehouses, converted to
machine-readable form.
Personal information may
be vulnerable.

Industry practice, in the form of self-regulation, is another means by which data privacy
initiatives have moved forward. For instance, the Fair Information Practice Principles are an evolving
framework that has been adopted as guidelines to address consumer privacy.32 This trend has become
accelerated in the wake of the European Union’s passage of the General Data Privacy Regulation
(GDPR).33 Specifically, the GDPR requires corporations to develop codes of conduct relating to how
they handle consumers’ data. While the GDPR allows corporations flexibility regarding what is in
each specific code, it does require some minimal discussion regarding how the corporation handles
data processing.34
However, for many corporations, there are limits to what a data privacy code of conduct can
do. For instance, many corporations’ entire business models are based upon the use of consumers’
data.35 As a result, any framework that would require a business to stop using data altogether would
not be feasible because consumer data has rapidly become the primary way that these corporations
generate a profit.
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In addition, many consumers (including West Virginia residents) recognize the benefit that
can come from businesses using your data. For example, during our focus groups, WV residents cited
the ease, convenience, and access that comes from having corporations know and remember certain
aspects of your data – such as marketing preferences and order history.
As such, most people seem to agree that the solution isn’t banning the collection and use of
consumer data altogether, rather it is finding solutions that allow for corporations to use consumer
information responsibly.
2.

Recent Federal Initiatives

There have been calls for the federal government to enact a national law on the issue of data
privacy.36 These calls have accelerated in recent years. For instance, in November 2019 competing
bills related to data privacy were introduced in Congress: the Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act
(COPRA) and the Consumer Data Privacy Act (CDPA). Each law was an attempt to expand data
privacy protection. Specifically, the laws each attempted to regulate corporations’ use of consumer
data, including by: (1) requiring companies to provide transparent privacy policies; (2) develop and
maintain policies that are reasonably designed to prevent cybersecurity attacks; (3) conduct privacy
risk assessments, and (4) “provide consumers a right to access, correct, and delete personal data.”37
However, neither of these initiatives resulted in federal legislation. It’s worth noting that, if a federal
law were to be adopted, it would largely pre-empt the work that many states are undertaking in this
area. To that end, some are urging federal lawmakers to allow states to tackle the issue first – instead
of passing a federal law.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also been involved in the data privacy space.
Specifically, they are the primary38 federal agency examining data privacy issues, using their authority
under Section 5 of the FTC Act to do so. The agency has used two legal theories to advance their
arguments: (1) that the relevant company’s actions with regard to data privacy amounted to fraud and,
(2) that the relevant corporation’s
Barriers to Federal Lawsuits for Data Privacy
conduct amounted to an unfair
practice.39
According to one researcher one of the biggest barriers to lawsuits
moving forward, particularly in federal court, is the ability for
plaintiffs to show that they had an actual injury.
Why?
Since most companies will refund the money for any economic harm
that was suffered by the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, any other harm would not be addressed in the courts.
Fadja Tassey, Current Topics in Internet Law Data Breach Law School
Student Scholarship at 14 (2018)

issues, releasing a number of COVID-19 privacy related actions.40

In addition to lawmaking
efforts, the President’s Council of
Advisors
on
Science
and
Technology (PCAST) has been
actively involved in the issue of
data privacy. Examining their
position on these issues offers a
crucial perspective regarding where
the federal government’s position
might be.
Finally, the Department of health
and Human Services has been
actively involved in data privacy
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In December 2020, then President
Trump signed into law the

Internet of Things
Cybersecurity Improvement
Act.
The Act, which relates to IoT
Technology requires that federal
agencies address cybersecurity
issues “throughout the
acquisition and operation of
Internet of Things devices by the
Federal Government.”1 The Act
requires that the Director of the
National Institute of Standards
and Technology develop rules
regarding the “appropriate use
and management by agencies of
Internet of Things devices” The
Act also requires that guidelines
be developed that relate to “the
reporting, coordinating,
publishing, and receiving of
information about— (A) a security
vulnerability relating to
information systems owned or
controlled by an agency
(including Internet of Things
devices owned or controlled by an
agency); and (B) the resolution
of such security vulnerability;
and (2) for a contractor
providing to an agency an
information system (including an
Internet of Things device).”

Current Notice and Consent Framework Cannot
Effectively Protect Privacy41
•
PCAST argues that the current privacy consent
and notice framework is no longer feasible because
of the constant and vast amounts of data that are
gathered from every available source.42 It is
unreasonable to believe that consumers are able or
even willing to read every website or company’s
terms of service, and to understand the legal
ramifications of a user agreement or for consumers
to do this every time they visit new websites.43 The
Council “believes that the responsibility for using
personal data in accordance with the user’s
preferences should rest with the provider rather than
with the user.”44 To achieve this, “third parties
chosen by the consumer (e.g., consumer‐protection
organizations, or large app stores) could
intermediate” where “a consumer might choose one
of several ‘privacy protection profiles’ offered by the
intermediary, which in turn would vet apps against
these profiles.”45

Regulation and Privacy Protection Should Focus
on Use Rather than Collection
•
PCAST also states that “it is the use of a
product of analysis, whether in commerce, by
government, by the press, or by individuals, that can
cause adverse consequences to individuals,” that this
“is the most feasible place to protect privacy,” and
where regulation efforts should be focused.46 Further, “notice and consent fundamentally
places the burden of privacy protection on the individual” which “creates a non‐level playing
field in the implicit privacy negotiation between provider and user.”47 Arguing that this nonlevel playing field is a sort of “market failure,” PCAST states that “in other contexts, market
failures like this can be mitigated by the intervention of third parties who are able to represent
significant numbers of users and negotiate on their behalf.”48 This third-party intervention
could be implemented by allowing consumers “to associate themselves with one of a standard
set of privacy preference profiles (that is, settings or choices) voluntarily offered by third
parties.”49

•

Additionally, “by vetting apps, the third‐party organizations would automatically create a
marketplace for the negotiation of community standards for privacy” and “the Federal
government (e.g., through the National Institute of Standards and Technology) could
encourage the development of standard, machine‐readable interfaces for the communication
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of privacy implications and settings between providers and assessors.” 50 However, PCAST
also stated that
To implement in a meaningful way the application of privacy policies
to the use of personal data for a particular purpose (i.e., in context),
those policies need to be associated both with data and with the code
that operates on the data. For example, it must be possible to ensure
that only apps with particular properties can be applied to certain data.
The policies might be expressed in what computer scientists call
natural language (plain English or the equivalent) and the association
done by the user, or the policies might be stated formally, and their
association and enforcement done automatically. In either case, there
must also be policies associated with the outputs of the computation,
since they are data as well. The privacy policies of the output data must
be computed from the policies associated with the inputs, the policies
associated with the code, and the intended use of the outputs (i.e., the
context). These privacy properties are a kind of metadata. To achieve
a reasonable level of reliability, their implementation must be tamper‐
proof and “sticky” when data are copied.51
•

Finally, PCAST points out that “privacy policies and the control of use in context are only
effective to the extent that they are realized and enforced” and “technical measures that
increase the probability that a violator is caught can be effective only when there are
regulations and laws with civil or criminal penalties to deter the violators.” 52 If that happens,
“then there is both deterrence of harmful actions and incentive to deploy privacy‐protecting
technologies.”53

The Consumer Bill of Rights
• For the commercial or private sector, the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights (CPBR) was
introduced in 2012 to address “obligations for data holders, analyzers, and commercial users”
and “consumer empowerments.”54 PCAST believes this is a valid start, but “discussions [were]
focused on the collection, storage, and retention of data, with an emphasis on the ‘small‐data’
contexts that motivated CPBR development,” and this will not be adequate to address a
framework focused on regulation of usage rather than collection.55 Instead, “PCAST believes
that such a focus will not provide a technologically robust foundation on which to base future
policy that also applies to big data,” and “the increasing complexity of applications and uses
of data undermines even a simple concept like ‘notice and consent.’”56
•

These are framed in terms of consumer rights, including the “right to expect that companies
will collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the context in
which consumers provide the data:” the “right to reasonable limits on the personal data that
companies collect and retain;” the “right to secure and responsible handling of personal data;”
and the “right to have personal data handled by companies with appropriate measures in place
to assure they adhere to the Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights.”57
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Consumer Empowerments
• Under the CPBR, consumer empowerments are framed in terms of “a right to exercise control
over what personal data companies collect from them and how they use it,” “a right to easily
understandable and accessible information about privacy and security practices,” and “a right
to access and correct personal data in usable formats, in a manner that is appropriate to the
sensitivity of the data and the risk of adverse consequences to consumers if the data are
inaccurate.”58 Because these “empowerments have become practically impossible for the
consumer to exercise meaningfully, they need to be recast as obligations of the commercial
entity that actually uses the data or products of data analysis.”59 To make notice and consent
or other privacy empowerments workable, “the burden should no longer fall on the consumer
to manage privacy for each company with which the consumer interacts by a framework like
‘notice and consent,’” but “rather, each company should take responsibility for conforming its
uses of personal data to a personal privacy profile designated by the consumer and made
available to that company (including from a third party designated by the consumer).” 60 In
other words, “the burden of conforming to a consumer’s stated personal‐privacy profile
should fall on the company, with notification to the consumers by a company if their profile
precludes that company’s accepting their business.”61 The Council states that “since companies
do not like to lose business, a positive market dynamic for competing privacy practices would
thus be created.”62
Notice and Consent Going Forward
• Besides recommending that data privacy policy be focused on use rather than collection,
PCAST also recommended “policies and regulation, at all levels of government, should not
embed particular technological solutions, but rather should be stated in terms of intended
outcomes.”63 In other words, “policy should address the purpose (the ‘what’) rather than the
mechanism (the ‘how’)” because “regulating control” of “inappropriate disclosures…no
matter how the data are acquired, is more robust” in protecting data than the traditional notice
and consent framework.64
•

PCAST also recommended that, “with coordination and encouragement from OSTP [Office
of Science and Technology Policy], the NITRD [Networking and Information Technology
Research and Development] agencies should strengthen U.S. research in privacy‐related
technologies and in the relevant areas of social science that inform the successful application
of those technologies.”65 It points out that much of this technology is currently present,
however, further research is necessary “in the technologies that help to protect privacy, in the
social mechanisms that influence privacy‐preserving behavior, and in the legal options that are
robust to changes in technology and create appropriate balance among economic opportunity,
other national priorities, and privacy protection.”66 Additionally, “investment is needed not
only in privacy topics ancillary to security, but also in automating privacy protection for the
broadest aspects of use of data from all sources” because “the creation of tools that analyze
the panoply of National, state, regional, and international rules and regulations for
inconsistencies and differences will be helpful for the definition of new rules and regulations,
as well as for those software developers that need to customize their services for different
markets.”67

•

Another recommendation stated, “the United States should take the lead both in the
international arena and at home by adopting policies that stimulate the use of practical privacy‐
12

protecting technologies that exist today,” that “this country can exhibit leadership both by its
convening power (for instance, by promoting the creation and adoption of standards) and also
by its own procurement practices (such as its own use of privacy‐preserving cloud services).”68
This can have a positive impact on data use and privacy because “by requiring privacy‐
enhancing services from cloud‐service providers contracting with the U. S. government, the
government should encourage those providers to make available sophisticated privacy
enhancing technologies to small businesses and their customers, beyond what the small
business might be able to do on its own.”69
Taken together, these policies and initiatives highlight much of the current thinking regarding how
data privacy should be managed nationally. However, while these initiatives have been developing
nationally, momentum has also been gathering within states around the country to find ways to address
data privacy concerns.
III.

Current State Landscape

There has been a range of reactions amongst the states with regard to how each is addressing data
privacy issues. Most of the momentum has been around a push for the state legislatures to pass laws
to address the issues. 70 However, in some states, courts have been actively involved in shaping what
each consumer may already avail themselves of in connection with their data.71 This is consistent with
the general types of remedies that consumers currently have access to, namely: “common law of torts,
statutory rights, and regulatory law.”72 There are challenges to each particular category of remedy.
For instance, for those consumers wishing to access the courts, the current legal theories that have (or
can be used) were originally developed before the rise of big data. As such, the current causes of
actions (either ones that sound in
Another Limitation of Data Notification Laws contract or sound in tort) can be
stymied. One researcher noted, “with
data being transferred through multiple
While much of the earliest regulatory focus was
relationships, it is difficult for courts to
on requiring companies to notify consumers
determine who is obligated to whom.
whenever it was collecting consumer data, more
Therefore, the lack of traceability in data
recent initiatives have moved beyond this.
breach cases can create an almost
insurmountable burden of proof for
Why?
plaintiffs due to the fact that privity can
potentially exist between multiple
Because, as researchers have pointed out, a major relationships.”73
flaw of the data notification system currently in
place in most states is that “it reacts to data
A.
Overview of the States
breaches rather than prevents them which, in
To some extent, each state in the
effect, circumvents the legislative purpose of
U.S.
has
been working to address data
‘allow[ing] consumers to protect themselves
privacy concerns. For instance, all 50
against identity theft’ and ‘mitigat[e] damages
states have passed laws that require
1
resulting’ from data breaches.”
businesses to notify individuals if the
corporation has been affected by a data
Fadja Tassey, Current Topics in Internet Law
breach.74 Many of these laws pre-dated
Data Breach Law School Student Scholarship
(2018)
13

the era of big data. There is also a patchwork of state laws regulating the collection of information by
individuals.75 In addition, judicial opinions in various states around the nation have contributed to the
development of law regarding what corporations can and cannot do with consumer data. While a
comprehensive discussion of case law in each of the 50 states is beyond our scope, 76 the map (found
in Appendix G) does provide an overview regarding our assessment of how each state is handling
issues surrounding data privacy. As the map shows, in most jurisdictions there is some basic
protection for various ways that consumers and businesses interact around the issue of data privacy.
However, many argue that states need to go beyond that and, instead, enact laws that provide a more
comprehensive framework for data privacy. In that regard, the state of California has taken the lead
with regard to this issue, enacting the California Consumer Privacy Act in 2018.
B. California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA)
The CCPA is the most comprehensive state law on the issue of data privacy. The law, which
came into effect in January 2020, gives consumers rights as outlined below77:
(1) the right to be aware of the types of personal information being collected,
(2) the right to be aware of whether personal information is being shared and/or sold and to
whom,
(3) the right to opt out of having personal information sold,
(4) the right to access the personal information that has been collected,
(5) the right to service free of discrimination if one chooses to exercise the rights outlined
above78.
Another key characteristic of the CCPA is its expansive definition of personal information.
Under the law, personal information includes any information that “identifies, relates to, describes, is
capable of being associated with, or could be reasonably linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular
consumer or household.”79 As such, things such as “IP addresses, browsing history, internet search
information, geolocation data, biometric data, work history” and “education information” are all
included under personal information.
In order to comply with the law, businesses must give consumers methods to request
information about their personal information and request information about their personal
information if it’s being sold to a third party. In an instance where an individual has made this request,
businesses have 45 days to comply.
C. West Virginia
While West Virginia has not enacted a comprehensive data privacy law, some statutes within
the state touch on current data privacy issues. As indicated above, West Virginia passed data breach
notification legislation in 2008.80 The law provides that any entity that has been subject to an
unauthorized acquisition of a consumer’s personal data must notify the affected consumer. Although
the statute does not provide a specific timeline, it does say that notification must occur “without
unreasonable delay.”81 In addition to West Virginia’s data breach law, the state has also passed a law
that limits the ability of businesses to access voter registration (a significant data source for many
corporations) for commercial use. However, the law, in the words of one commentator, provides
only “minimal statutory protection for voter data.” 82 As he notes, while “the state does restrict access
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Why you should worry about your voter
registration data being used by businesses
According to the FTC, “[data brokers] obtain the
information from other data brokers that either hire
people to visit local offices to compile the
information or that have relationships with these
offices that allow them to acquire this information
automatically (e.g., through an online portal). The
data brokers identified nearly twenty-five other data
brokers from which they obtain state and local
government information.”
However, if you live in West Virginia …
The state does restrict the use of this information to
“noncommercial use.”
Specifically, Under WV Code § 3-2-20 (c):
“Lists of registered voters may be obtained for
noncommercial purposes in data format on disk or
as a printed list provided by the clerk of the county
commission at a cost of one cent per name. No data
file prepared under this subsection may include the
registrant's telephone number, email address, Social
Security number or driver's license number or
nonoperator's identification number issued by the
Division of Motor Vehicles.”

to telephone numbers, email addresses,
and identification numbers (including
Social Security numbers). … names,
addresses, political parties, and
registration status are all publicly
available.”83
D.
The Uniform Law
Commission’s Work
In addition to laws that have
already been enacted in various states,
there is an effort underway to create a
uniform state law on the issue of data
privacy. The benefit of having a uniform
law across states is that it allows
businesses, individuals and lawyers to
operate under generally the same
framework while at the same time
providing some discretion for particular
legislatures if they would like to address
needs that are more specific to their
state. In addition, the process of
drafting a uniform law is comprehensive,
allowing many different stakeholders to
participate in the process and give voice
to any concerns that may arise.

The Uniform Law Commission
(ULC) is the oldest and largest
organization in the country to gather
these different stakeholders for the
purposes of drafting uniform laws. In
2018, the ULC turned its sights on the issue of data privacy. First, it convened a study committee to
determine whether a uniform law should be drafted to address data privacy issues. More recently,
after the ULC decided that a uniform law was appropriate, they organized a drafting committee to
begin the process of developing such a law. Keep in mind, that even when a law is successfully drafted,
it is still up to each individual state to enact the law in their jurisdiction. They can do so as-is or with
modifications. Either way, examining the current drafting act is another way for legislators, policy
makers, individuals and industry to understand the concerns of stakeholders regarding the use of data
and how lawmakers are hoping to regulate these issues.
The ULC calls its current law-making effort on the subject the Collection and Use of
Personally Identifiable Data (“CUPID”) Act. The law is meant to regulate commercial enterprises
that collect and use personal data from their consumers. While the drafting process has undergone
several phases, the committee hopes that a vote on CUPID will occur in the summer of 2021.
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The drafting process has not been without controversy. Indeed, the committee members seem
split regarding how expansive to make the protections of CUPID. The majority approach (which is
the main draft that the drafting committee is working on) currently provides an expansive approach
to data privacy. However, Commissioner Larry Metz created an “alternative draft” for the committee
to consider. As Commissioner James Bopp, Jr. notes, this alternative draft provides for a much
narrower view of regulation both in terms of which businesses were subject to regulation and what
specific types of data was protected.84 In addition, this alternate draft allows a business to comply
with CUPID by complying with other, similar privacy regimes.
Many of the issues highlighted in CUPID are ones that should be considered by lawmakers in
any instance where data privacy is enacted. The issues flagged include the following:
How Do you Define Data?
• The current draft’s definition of what is considered “personally identifiable information” has
led both to arguments that the definition is too narrow and too expansive. These arguments
don’t seem to align neatly between industry and privacy advocates. For instance, Microsoft
has stated that the latest CUPID draft defined personal data much too narrowly to benefit
consumer privacy; specifically, “it would cover only data associated with direct identifiers, and
not the broader category of data that is ‘identifiable.’” Additionally, (according to the
company) some of the definitions added to the draft “when combined with the narrow
definition of ‘personal data,’ would mean that the bill fails to cover vast categories of modern
data sets with serious privacy impacts.”85
How States Define your Data
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What Data to Regulate?
• One of the areas of debate is whether publicly available data should fall under this law. In
addition, if the data at issue also falls within the ambit of other regulated laws and statutes
(such as HIPAA, FCRA and others), then many commentators have asked that this type of
data be exempt from CUPID.
What Businesses to Regulate?
• Similarly, there has been a split regarding what industries need to comply with CUPID. In
April, a banking coalition submitted a comment to the ULC arguing that the financial industry
is already subject to extensive regulation,86 and “in recognition of the robust legal and
regulatory privacy framework financial institutions are subject to, we strongly urge the
Drafting Committee to adopt the proposed language revising the Draft Act’s Gramm Leach
Bliley Act (GLBA) exception so that it is not limited to information subject to the GLBA, but
instead exempts financial institutions subject to the GLBA.”87 However, not all industry
groups favor this approach. Main Street Privacy Coalition, a business trade association that
includes retailers, builders and hotels, submitted a comment arguing that the law should not
include exemptions for those sectors seeking them because that would put the heaviest and
most disproportionate burden on “consumer-facing businesses” like those represented by the
Coalition.
Who has the Right to a Remedy?
• One of the longest running debates regarding any new major regulatory initiative is how to
enforce it if businesses fail to comply. One way is to grant a state (or federal) agency the
exclusive right to enforce the law. Another way is to give consumers an exclusive right to sue.
A third option is to provide complementary powers – where both the agency and the
consumer are able to pursue against a business that violates the law. Based on our survey
results, for West Virginians, a combined approach is the one that is generally preferred by the
state’s residents (see Section VI for a detailed analysis regarding state residents). In contrast, at
least some industry commentators are not in favor of allowing consumers to have a private
right of action in any form. For instance, the American Property Casual Insurance Company
submitted a comment in April 2020 stating that it “strongly opposes” a private cause of action,
arguing that it “serves only as a gotcha exercise and not as a tool to correct and punish
egregious corporate behavior,”88 and “will only create a patchwork of legal opinions, which
will erode the uniformity objectives of [the] Discussion Draft.”89 Further, it argued that a
private cause of action may not “provide consumers any tangible benefits in the event of a
concrete violation.”90 Another insurance company coalition submitted a comment with similar
arguments.91
Who Should Police the Industry?
• Another question that has been raised regarding the current draft of the CUPID Act is how
compliance should be policed. One possible framework would be to have businesses submit
information regarding their policies and privacy assessments to the relevant regulatory agency
for review and comment. Another structure would, instead, rely on the industry to police
itself. For instance, a business could comply with the law by submitting a statement stating
that it was in compliance with CUPID without providing any additional information. To the
extent that the CUPID Act leans in that direction, privacy advocates and consumer groups
have expressed concern that a self-policing framework would not provide adequate protection.
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Other Issues at Stake in the CUPID Act
• In addition to the issues flagged above, the current draft of the CUPID Act has implications
for the following issues that affect data privacy: (1) how much data a data processor is allowed
to keep and collect; (2) whether businesses need consumer consent for the use of any
personally identifiable data (as opposed to just specific categories of data), and; (3) the method
by which consumers can opt-in or opt-out for having their data used. For a current copy of
the ULC’s draft CUPID law see Appendix D.
One of the things that regulators often overlook is that, in many instances, businesses would
welcome regulation if it would lead to a more streamlined process. Rather than having to tackle a
myriad of various legislative frameworks, businesses would just have to tackle one. 92 In that regard,
some industry insiders have stated that they would ultimately prefer to have a uniform regulatory
standard (allowing them to comply with one standard rather than countless frameworks).93
E. Other initiatives – Regulating Data Brokers
Legislatures have also taken other tacks to regulate data privacy. For instance, in January 2019,
Vermont became the first state to regulate data brokers directly. The law requires all data brokers
operating in the state to register with the state, shining a spotlight on an industry that many people
depict as murky.94 In addition, the law “requires companies to spell out whether there’s any way for
consumers to opt out of their data collections, to specify whether they restrict who can buy their data,
and to indicate whether they’ve had any data breaches within the past year.”95 The hope is that, by
requiring these businesses to register, states can help consumers become more informed regarding
what happens to their data.96 California has since passed similar legislation, with other states (including
Washington and Hawaii) also considering bills. However, none of the state laws require companies to
disclose what consumer information they possess; instead they are only required to explain what
policies they have in effect for consumers who wish to know.
Registering data brokers, in turn, seems to be part of a larger trend in 2020 97 for states to
consider many different aspects of data privacy regulation.
IV.

Overview of Data Privacy Around the World

The issue of data privacy is a universal one. Because of its implication to the world-wide economy,
countries around the world have taken steps to address the issue – using various regulatory
frameworks at their disposal. In this section we provide a brief overview, highlighting laws that have
gone into effect on this issue. For a complete examination of what each country has enacted, we would
recommend this database by DLA Piper for further research.98
A. Overall View
Generally speaking, countries have focused on several key categories in the development of a data
privacy law. They include: (1) the definition of personal information; (2) the level of
comprehensiveness that each country has chosen to engage in – with some countries developing data
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privacy laws that are broad in scope and others enacting laws that are narrower in nature; (3) whether
to create a governmental agency to oversee these issues; (4) collection, disclosure, and use protocols
for relevant companies. For instance, in 2019, Hong Kong began deliberations on potential
amendments to its data privacy ordinance consistent with the themes listed above.99 Similarly, when
the European Union developed the General Data Privacy Directive (the GDPR) it examined all of
these parameters and their impact on consumers and companies.100 Many of the issues that countries
confront stem from their pre-existing use of technology and the data generated by these uses. For
example, Hong Kong is a hub of international business operations for many multi-national
corporations doing business in Asia, and as a result, any data privacy law enacted would have a
significant
impact
on
these
The GDPR in a Nutshell
corporations. In China, an estimated 20
million surveillance cameras operate in
The General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR) is a
the country - some of these are capable
law enacted in the EU that dictates how companies
of facial recognition technologies.101
can use your data.
According to Forbes Magazine:

B.

Spotlight on the GDPR

The General Data Protection
Regulation (“GDPR”) came into effect
users the right to access their data, the right May 2019 and applies to all members of
for them to take that data and use it the European Union. It is largely viewed
elsewhere, as well as the right for consumers as a world leader in effective data privacy
to request that you erase their personal data legislation. The GDPR replaces the
more than 20-year-old “data protection
completely from your records. … The penalties directive” that was the EU’s previous
for breaking the GDPR’s guidelines are harsh, data protection framework. The EU
with fines of up to 20 million euros, or up to 4% considers protection of personal data a
of your annual revenue, whichever is greater”
fundamental right. In addition to
outlining the rights of individuals and
the obligations on businesses and
organizations covered by the regulation,
the GDPR also addresses “controllers” and “processors” specifically. Moreover, it differentiates
personal data from sensitive personal data, both of which are covered under the regulation.
“GDPR also forces companies to allow their

As a general matter, the GDPR is effective at providing an over-arching regulatory framework
on data privacy. However, there are some aspects related to data privacy that are outside the purview
of the GDPR. For instance, Article 2 of the GDPR makes clear that the regulation only applies to
activities that fall with the scope of EU law.102 In addition, States that are engaging in otherwise
relevant activities are exempt from GDPR application if the aim of the State activity is related to
national security. 103
The GDPR also addresses genetic and biometric data. Specifically, the law clearly defines and
categorizes genetic and biometric data as “sensitive personal data,” allowing for stricter scrutiny of
this type of data. 104 Genetic data is defined as “personal data relating to the inherited or acquired
genetic characteristics of a natural person which give unique information about the physiology or the
health of that natural person, in particular, from an analysis of a biological sample from the natural
person in question.” 105 Biometric data, in turn, is defined as “personal data resulting from specific
technical processing relating to the physical, physiological or behavioral characteristics of a natural
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person, which allow or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images
or dactyloscopy data.” 106 Any information that falls within these “special category of personal data,” 107
cannot, with limited exceptions be processed.108 As such, the GDPR has narrowed the types of
processing that can be done with sensitive data.
Comparing the US regulatory approach to
data privacy with the European Union
Jennifer Bauer, WVU Law Class of 2016, has
written extensively on issues related to data privacy.
For instance, in an article she wrote while at WVU
Law, Bauer identified six key differences between
data privacy frameworks in the U.S. and in Europe
at the time:
I.

There is a fundamental presumption in the
EU that data cannot be processed in the EU
without a legal basis. In the US, Bauer
notes, “it is presumed permissible … unless
limited by law.”

II.

There are significant more contractual limits
in the EU, a person cannot contract away
their right to privacy. In the US, they can.

In addition, the GDPR established the
European Data Protection Board (the
Protection Board).109 The Protection
Board is a separate agency with
supervisory authority over issues related
to the GDPR.110 Its specific duties extend
to both supervising the implementation
of the GDPR as well as enforcing the
regulation for Member States.111 The
Protection Board sets guidelines,
recommendations and best practices to
promote compliance with the Articles of
the GDPR. The Board will also monitor
the supervisory authorities of member
countries to ensure the regulation is being
correctly applied.112 Finally, the Board
will create reports on the protection of
personal data and advise the EU on
proposed amendments.

Under Article 51 of the GDPR, every
III.
The EU has a comprehensive data protection Member State must create at least one
independent public authority to oversee
coverage framework. The US has
the application of this regulation. It is
approached it sector by sector.
expected that these authorities, although
independent, would cooperate with a lead
IV.
Bauer also states that “Privacy is a
supervisory authority.113 The GDPR lays
fundamental right on par to freedom of
out conditions, establishment rules, tasks,
expression in the EU; whereas it is an
and powers for these supervisory
interest that is often secondary to more
authorities in Articles 53-58.114 Some of
explicit constitutional rights, like freedom of
these tasks include overseeing and
speech in the United Sates.”
enforcing the application of this
regulation, ensuring controllers and
V.
The EU has a much broader definitional
processors understand their obligations,
scope regarding what is personal data than
providing data subjects with information
in the US.
of their rights under this regulation, and
handling complaints from data subjects.115
VI.
Finally, Bauer writes that, In the EU, “each
Supervisory authorities also have the
member-state has an independent authority
power to carry out investigations, order
dedicated to data protection.” The US
the controllers or processors to provide
doesn’t.
information, issue “reprimands, impose
temporary or definitive limitations” or bans, and “impose fines.”116
Jennifer Bauer, Playing Off-Key: Trans-Atlantic
Data Regulation in a Discordant World, 119 W.V.
L. Rev. 793, 798 -799 (2016)
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The CCPA and the GDPR are considered among the two most expansive enactments on data
privacy. As such, it’s worth comparing what each law regulates.
Both the GDPR and CCPA want to give individuals data protection. Each are very similar on the
rights they create for individuals. Articles 12-22 of the GDPR establish the rights of the data
subject. Similarly to the CCPA, these rights include: 1) right to access, 2) right to be forgotten, 3)
right to rectify inaccurate personal data, 4) right to object, and 5) the
right to bring an action. Although the names of the rights may be different, they mainly share the
same concept and give the same rights.
However, the GDPR and the CCPA do differ. The GDPR is being performed on a much
larger scale. Unlike the CCPA, which only applies to California citizens, the GDPR protects all
individuals regardless of nationality or citizenship. Rules are also established for controllers and
processors that operate in the EU to abide by the regulation even when processing data outside
of the EU. The GDPR is also much larger in content and depth. The GDPR is almost 5 times
larger than the CCPA. This allows the GDPR to be more specific and create a better framework
for application.

*****
V.

Special Issues for Consideration

The particular challenges and obstacles to a robust data privacy framework will depend
substantially on the specific industry where the issue arises. For instance, data privacy issues for the
health care industry will be different than the issues faced by the financial industry. While there may
some overlap in the challenges that each industry faces, examining the specific issues that are facing
particular industries will help provide a comprehensive understanding regarding what’s at stake for
businesses and communities.
A. Algorithms and Data Privacy
One of the biggest changes in the use of technology has been the advent of machine learning
(Artificial Intelligence, or AI) algorithms. This, combined with the unprecedented amount of data now
available, has resulted in the automation of tasks and decisions that were previously relegated to
individuals.117
In the words of Amy Cyphert, a data privacy expert at West Virginia University:
Machine learning is an umbrella term to describe a special subset of algorithms wherein
a computer is programmed to revise the code it is using as it works, based on the
results it is generating. Frequently in machine learning, the algorithm works to identify
patterns in the data it is examining, develop certain rules from those patterns (or
“learns” from them), and then uses those rules to categorize the next set of data it
looks at.118
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AI algorithms can perform “data mining” by processing data from an almost unlimited
number of sources, including user interaction with websites and email accounts, social media, location
data on smartphones, online financial activity, data sensors, and data entry by humans into databases.119
Algorithms that utilize machine learning can “learn” by incorporating each piece of successive data,
building on what it has already learned from previous data sets. Based on the data collected, algorithms
can be programmed and trained to produce an output that a business then uses, for example, to assist
with marketing or to target specific areas. In addition, the algorithm may be asked to provide a
recommended ‘best’ course of action (or choice) for a new piece of data given all the previous data it
has ‘seen.’ A business can choose to follow this choice and charge higher interest rates and insurance
premiums, hire certain candidates for employment, terminate employment based on results from
algorithmic formulas, or determine where resources should be utilized. Many businesses who choose
to deploy these tactics do so in the name of efficiency and cost-reduction, but often without realizing
the biases that may be programmed into the algorithm as well.
AI algorithms can and do produce results that disproportionately discriminate based on race,
sex, gender, or socioeconomic status, whether such discrimination originates at the program’s data
processing levels or from human data entry and “teaching” contributions. This can result in lawsuits
alleging discrimination.120 One challenge in litigating these claims arises because software and
computer algorithms are made up of unique source codes, formulas, and processes, and are therefore
subject to trade secret protection under federal and state trade secret protection laws.121
Computer programs, algorithms, and the data sets they use are protected as trade secrets, and
under both state and federal law this protection is extremely broad.122 Under state law and the Uniform
Trade Secret Act, a trade secret is defined as
information including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process that derives independent economic value, actual or potential,
from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use,
and is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain
its secrecy.123
Under federal law and the Defend Trade Secrets Act, a trade secret is defined as
all forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical, economic, or
engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations, program devices,
formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs,
or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret;
and (B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from
not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper
means by, another person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use
of the information.124
Forty-seven states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secret Act.125 The Act requires a court to
“preserve the secrecy of an alleged trade secret by reasonable means.” Similarly, the Defend Trade
Secret Act protects trade secrets and requires courts to issue orders to preserve confidentiality in
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litigation.126 It also provides “immunity from liability for confidential disclosure of a trade secret to
the government” or “if made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding,
if such filing is made under seal.”127
Algorithmic calculations which result in disparate impact or discrimination can give rise to
causes of action under anti-discrimination laws. However, as a result (at least in part) of trade secret
protection, litigating these claims presents a challenge. While courts have allowed discovery of trade
secret information under certain conditions and subject to protective orders to preserve confidentiality
of the information, a lack of an overall law on data privacy and its intersection with machine learning
Spotlight on a Proposed law: the Algorithmic Accountability Act
In the wake of increasing recognition of the role that AI and algorithms Congress
has begun to consider their impact. Specifically, In 2019, The Algorithmic Accountability
Act was proposed. The bill requires businesses generating more than $50 million in annual
revenue to conduct an impact assessment of high-risk systems. These systems would
include any system that: “ (1) raises security or privacy concerns, (2) involves the personal
information of a significant number of people, or (3) systematically monitors a large,
publicly accessible physical location.”
The Federal Trade Commission would be tasked with promulgating related rules.
and overseeing compliance.
The Bill has not been passed into law and is still pending.
can lead to incalculable harm for individuals. At least one scholar has proposed this “whistle-blower
provision” as one method to hold companies accountable for the use of algorithms and discriminatory
results arising from their use.128 Other scholars have argued that businesses should be transparent
regarding the information being inputted into these algorithms to minimize bias or discriminatory
outcomes129
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How Computers Learn
The idea of machine learning was largely regulated to science fictions even a generation
ago. However, thanks to advances in technology and the advent of big data, Artificial Intelligence
(AI) seems here to stay.
But how does AI actually work?
Computer technology has developed to the point where formulas can now “learn” and “teach”
themselves by incorporating each piece of successive data, building on what it has already learned
through algorithmic processes from previous data. For example, one type of machine learning is
“classification.”
According to one Pedro Domingos, A “classifier is a system that inputs (typically) a vector of
discrete and/or continuous feature values and outputs a single discrete value, the class.” As a result,
the algorithm eventually becomes capable of taking in unlimited data, processing it, and returning
specific results. Based on this mined data and its processing, machine learning algorithms then can
calculate what a business, non-profit entity, or government agency should do, such as market and
advertise to target areas, charge higher interest rates and insurance premiums, hire certain
candidates for employment, terminate employment based on results from algorithmic. formulas, or
determine where resources should be utilized.
Machine learning algorithms receive this mined data from an almost unlimited number of
sources, including user interaction with websites and email accounts, social media, GPS services on
smartphones, online financial activity, and data entry by humans into databases serving numerous
entities and industries. Essentially, each time an individual logs into an email account, performs
internet searches, browses web pages, shops or pays bills online, or uses a phone app, data is
generated and disseminated across online platforms and databases to be gathered and used by AI
machine learning algorithms. In fact, simply carrying a cell phone allows a constant stream of location
data to be accessed, essentially allowing a computer to track not only location, but length of travel.

*****
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B. Finance and Banking Institutions
For many consumers, banking and financial institutions represent the lifeblood of their
economic world. Credit cards are used to buy every day and essential items, banking institutions
examine a consumer’s credit history to decide whether to extend a mortgage, and most consumers
buy cars and other major purchases with credit. All of these interactions with the banking industry
allow these institutions to collect an enormous amount of data from consumers. Many of the practices
surrounding how they collect and use this data implicates data privacy.
Banks and credit card companies (collectively the “institutions”), using the consumer’s online
presence, create account profiles of individual customers outside of those created for the customer’s
dashboard.130 These profiles are used internally by the banks and credit card companies to “rank” their
clients. 131 This ranking is then used by its employees to not only decide how much time and effort to
devote to that customer, but to also make instantaneous decisions regarding which credit score
category to place the customer in for loan interest rates. 132
Because of the amount of data they collect over a wide swath of customer behavior, banking
and credit institutions have developed highly sophisticated tools for profiling. These institutions
profile and evaluate their customers, and then label each individual on the basis of such information
to allow them to make fast decisions. These decisions extend beyond what type of interest rate to
charge or whether to accept or deny your loan application. It can also extend to the level of customer
service you receive. Moreover, the speed with which bankers can access this information allows them
to “retrieve detailed information on a customer as they wait on the phone” or wait for an online
application to finish processing.133 Indeed, some banks have expanded their profile to such an extent
that they can “determine whether, for example, you are left on hold with your bank for a lengthy five
minutes or a mere five seconds.”134
This control by banks and other institutions over human finances has a number of implications
for AI. As we mentioned before, in many ways, the internet – through AI formulas – is developing
a “mind” of its own. Specifically, the information collected on the web allows “commercial decisionmakers to manipulate technology in such a way as to identify persons according to a multitude of
variables and categories.”135 The profiling of individuals happens without that individual’s knowledge.
Online profiling results in the individual being marked with an “identity tag” through an array of
methods “such as ‘cookies,’ web bugs, and personal data input such as zip codes.”136
For the banking industry and financial institutions this has resulted in online profiling to
determine what type of product to sell to these consumers. Online profiling happens on many
different levels. On one level, banks engage in “information steering [which] includes activities that
have traditionally been deemed problematic-because of their discriminatory potential-such as steering
certain categories of persons to opportunities for financial discounts, lending opportunities, and
preferential low-interest rates.”137
1. Alternative Credit Scoring
Alternative credit scoring arose as a method of assessing consumers who lacked a traditional
credit score and uses behavioral or other non-financial data to examine creditworthiness. In theory,
this gives consumers more opportunities to access credit. According to a report by the Obama
administration in 2016, “many Americans lack access to affordable credit due to thin or non-existent
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credit files.”138 Big data offered an opportunity to use alternative data in assigning scores to those with
inadequate financial histories, giving them a better chance to access credit and loans. The initial goal
was to generate credit scores for consumers having little to no credit history who were being left
behind in gaining credit and other opportunities, paving the way to making credit widely available
despite a lack of traditional credit scoring metrics for the “credit underserved” or “credit invisible.” 139
However, now, this alternative credit scoring model has led to many unintended consequences.
Alternative credit scoring uses data that may be unrelated to individual creditworthiness to flag
credit applicants or existing customers as higher credit risks.140 Data is mined from every available
source, machine learning algorithms generate data sets for credit scoring, and this data often has little
to do with traditional financial credit-scoring variables and creditworthiness. For example, Facebook
has become a “huge repository of data” which “has strong indicators of users’ socioeconomic status
- where they attend school, where they work, who their friends are, and more.”141 Additionally, factors
like where people shop, their internet browsing history, where they live, other social media activity,
and any data gathered electronically can be used to generate these scores,142 and that carries
risks of disparate impact on certain consumers.143
While the initial intent was to expand credit opportunities for a larger number of consumers,
and to expand lenders’ business opportunities, scholars and experts have raised alarms about the
danger inherent in using big data to generate credit scores based on behavioral and other alternative
factors, particularly the risk of digital redlining or “weblining.”
2. What is Weblining?
A Hypothetical on Weblining
Klara and Kara are twins who graduated with JD/MBA Degrees from West Virginia University. Upon graduation
they moved to separate parts of the country. Klara accepted a job at a law firm in a wealthy suburb of New York
while Kara landed an associate position with a firm in Southern West Virginia.
Settled into their new positions, each found time to make their first big purchases since graduation, a new vehicle.
Klara found a Land Rover Discovery, which was luxurious but still affordable and Kara found a Subaru Legacy
that she thought would be perfect for her area. Both women, having almost identical credit history, applied for
financing for their prospective new vehicles. When the offers came back, they called each other so to discuss
their financing options. They were shocked to find out that the interest rates offered to them were drastically
different. Klara was offered a 3% interest rate while Kara was offered a 6% rate.
Why would these rates be so different if the twins had almost identical credit history, were the same age, had the
Weblining
takes
name employed?
from the term redlining, the illegal and discriminatory practice of
same JD degree,
and were
bothits
gainfully

classifying applicants and consumers based on zip codes rather than individual creditworthiness.144
The vast amount of data generated by consumers using smartphones and other technology allows
companies to amass and analyze all of this data to use in a consumer’s profile,145 with many data points
having the potential to be used as proxies for race.146 At its most pernicious, weblining often results
in customers in one category paying more for the same services “or [denying] some customers service
based on [a] presumed behavior.”147 This is aggravated by the use of alternative credit scoring factors
and opaque algorithms that make determinations without the consumer, or even the institution,
knowing why.
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The operating business models of many companies is to mine, purchase, and otherwise acquire
vast amounts of data from an almost unlimited number of sources to either sell as data sets or to
develop scoring algorithms. For example, a European company offers a data algorithm which claims
to
develop and deploy custom scoring models that combine a lender’s internal data with
thousands of pieces of external data such as location-based information, web search
results, behavioural tracking, device technical details, mobile app data and much more.
This enables lenders to accurately predict borrower payment behavior, helping them
make informed and more profitable credit decisions in real time. We work with lenders
of all kinds – some of the largest banks in the world, payday lenders, P2P lending
platforms, microfinance providers, leasing companies, insurance providers, ecommerce platforms and telecoms. In the field of consumer lending and where online
channels play an important role in client acquisition, we can improve credit quality and
loan acceptance rates.148
Cosmos, another website, also lists companies offering alternative data sets for credit scoring
and ad targeting, including one which states, “Cosmos includes an extensive collection of consumer
audiences that include demographics, past purchases, life events, household income and more.” 149 A
company named MGI Geodata offers a data set titled “Consumer Styles,” which purports that its
“approach makes use of the principle that people with similar backgrounds and ages normally settle
down in the same neighborhood.”150 The company also claims this data set is “available for 51
countries on five continents.”151 Gravy Analytics is a U.S. company offering a data set called “Personas
Data” which purports to be “based on the verified, real-world visits of over 150 million mobile devices
to millions of commercial places of interest, 2,000+ leading brand locations, and over 1 million events
each month.”152 It further claims “companies use Gravy Personas in a wide range of applications
including consumer psychographic analysis, competitive and cross-shopper insights, to enhance
customer intelligence, personalize targeting, and more.”153 These are only a few examples of
companies offering this type of service and data sets, indicating a high demand for these data and
algorithms for alternative credit scoring.
For many years banks and credit card companies have used their customers’ zip codes as
part of their “customer profile.” Now that these institutions are gaining more of an online presence,
this process has become opaque, and thus more difficult for a consumer to determine all the reasons
why the bank took any negative action that it did. 154
There are, however, some remedies currently available to customers who believe that they
have been discriminated against. For instance, “the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) asserted
companies must correct for biases that could be incorporated into automated processes at both the
collection and analytic stages, and ‘balance the predictive value of the model with fairness
considerations.’ ”155 When institutions decide to censor “offensive content and prejudiced results” that
occur through its data collection processes, it “must provide transparency into [its] decisions and
actions.”156
There has also been additional scrutiny on this practice by Congress. In testimony before the
U.S. House of Representatives Task Force on Financial Technology, a number of issues were raised
regarding the impact in the financial industry for data privacy concerns. Among the issues raised were:
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the discriminatory aspects of targeted advertising; the use of social media in lending decisions; the use
of consumer behavioral data.
For instance, during testimony, the sub-committee examined the use of behavioral or other
alternative data to assess which consumers should see certain ads or receive certain offers and interest
rates for credit and borrowing. As one staff attorney stated, “educational data can be inherently
discriminatory because there are “obvious racial disparities in educational and occupational
attainment.”157
Social media data is also problematic because “the use of social media profiles, particularly
friend networks, raises serious concerns about racial disparities” 158 and “although not yet widely used
in the United States, one company, Lenddo, which operates in twenty different countries, may deem
a consumer to be less creditworthy if he or she is friends on Facebook with someone who was late
paying a loan back to Lenddo.” 159 Further, “neighborhood is another way that creditors have based
creditworthiness by association [and] given the degree of residential housing segregation that exists in
the U.S., location can function as a proxy for race and income, and its use by creditors would reflect
racial and socio-economic disparities.” 160 Additionally, “most people’s friends and family are likely to
be of the same race, class, and cultural background.”161
Finally, according to the same testimony, behavioral data is problematic because it “includes
information about how consumers interact with a web interface or answer specific questions, or data
about how they shop, browse, use devices, or move about their daily lives.”162 Moreover, “the use of
behavioral data has also shown indications of racial bias, despite relying on seemingly racially neutral
algorithms.” 163 For example, “in 2013, Latanya Sweeney, a professor of government at Harvard
University, led a research project that concluded that Google searches of names more likely associated
with black people often yielded advertisements for a criminal records in that person’s name.” 164
3. The Rise of Alternative Financial Institutions
Many issues regarding weblining and its resulting discriminatory practices has been
exacerbated by the rise of other financial institutions that may not be subject to the same level of
scrutiny as traditional banks. For example, technological advances allowed “financial technology
firms,” also referred to as “fintech companies” or “marketplace lenders,” to emerge, and “these new
algorithmic lenders are usually non-bank financial companies that operate mostly online and use
financial technology to market themselves to prospective borrowers, evaluate borrower
creditworthiness, and match prospective borrowers to sources of credit.” 165 These companies have
evolved into what one scholar calls “algorithmic lending 2.0” companies, which use every source and
every piece of available data in scoring consumers for credit and lending. 166 For example, Merrill
Lynch owns a company named “ZestFinance,” and that company’s “CEO has proudly stated that ‘all
data is credit data’ – that is, predictive analytics can take virtually any scrap of information about a
person, analyse whether it corresponds to a characteristic of known-to-be-creditworthy people, and
extrapolate accordingly.” 167 However, using non-financial behavioral or demographic data carries a
risk of digital redlining because “even an algorithm that has been specifically constructed to avoid
considering a prospective borrower’s race might nevertheless discriminate against a prospective
borrower by using proxies for race.” 168 These proxies may include “zip code, surname, and college
attendance data.” 169 In one well-known and often-cited case, a credit card customer in 2008
discovered that American Express had unexpectedly lowered his credit limit because, according to the
company, “[o]ther customers who ha[d] used their card at establishments where [Kevin] recently
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shopped have a poor repayment history with American Express.”170 This customer was not the only
one to have American Express lower a credit limit based on an algorithm, and the company only
stopped doing it out of public embarrassment.
In 2014, the FTC released a comment it received relating to issues of price discrimination.
According to the comment, certain companies had been targeting people for subprime mortgage
advertising based on racial and economic profiling and exploiting “financially distressed households,”
with targeted advertising for sub-prime payday loans and scam “mortgage modification” programs.
The comment points out that
companies like Wells Fargo listing houses for sale have collected zip codes of online
browsers and directed those buyers towards neighborhoods of similar racial makeup.
This online discrimination parallels the broader reality of companies like Wells Fargo
illegally steering an estimated 30,000 black and Hispanic lenders [the author likely
meant borrowers] from 2004 to 2009 into more costly subprime mortgages or charging
them higher fees than comparable white borrowers.171
Further, leading up to the subprime mortgage and financial crisis of 2008,
online companies would…sell information about users identified as likely prospects to
mortgage companies, which in turn would contact them. Customers targeted through these
online leads for subprime mortgages were disproportionately low income, black and Latino.
Usually unaware that better deals existed, studies showed that people of color offered these
subprime mortgages were 30% more likely to be charged higher interest rates compared to
white borrowers with similar credit ratings. 172
Additionally, as these subprime mortgages’ low introductory interest rates expired, “many
families saw their mortgages balloon above the value of their homes” 173 and “illegal scam ‘mortgage
modification’ firms emerged promising to help homeowners in advertisements appearing when people
searched for keywords such as ‘stop foreclosure,’ then took money from those families without
helping them at all.” 174 The Treasury Department stepped in, ordered Google to stop soliciting ads
from abusive lenders, and “[used] its TARP authority to shut down ads from 85 of the companies.”175
Payday lenders were particularly predatory in using big data information to “offer extremely
high-interest loans in exchange for a commitment for repayment from a person’s next paycheck.” 176
These companies and loans were “banned or severely restricted as exploitative in multiple states and
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) has held hearings specifically on abuses in the
industry, with CFPB head Richard Cordray saying ‘some payday lenders [are] engaged in practices that
present an immediate risk to consumers and are clearly illegal.’ ”177
While regulators have stepped in to stop these types of egregious and obvious instances of
discrimination and consumer exploitation by companies targeting ads based on internet activity, the
problem of digital redlining evidently persists. Some of the world’s largest companies have been
involved in weblining, in the past few years. For example, findings from a 2016 Bloomberg report
indicated that Amazon Prime’s algorithm often excluded from same day delivery many consumers
who lived in communities of color. 178 Indeed, African Americans in some cities were much less likely
to have access to same-day delivery services.179 Even when locations were within close proximity, the
availability of Prime’s services seemed to be tied to race: for instance, “in NYC, same-day delivery
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included many surrounding suburbs but entirely excluded the predominantly minority borough of the
‘Bronx and some majority-black neighborhoods in Queens.’ ” 180 Amazon denied any discriminatory
intent and instead blamed the results on how data was being used by its formulas.181
Facebook has also been involved in digital redlining. For instance, in 2019, Facebook settled
a number of lawsuits brought by individuals alleging that it allowed various companies to place
targeted advertisements on its platform.182 According to the allegations, these ads often disbarred
those “with a certain ‘ethnic affinity’” from being presented housing ads and women from being
presented job listings in male dominated industries.183 It was further alleged that in order to provide
this service, Facebook placed individuals into over “50,000 categories such as ‘English as a second
language,’ ‘disabled parking permit,’ or ‘Telemundo.’ ” 184 Following settlements, Facebook’s
advertisers are no longer permitted to use characteristics such as race and gender for targeted
advertisements. However, a study found that, even after the settlement, advertising discrimination on
Facebook persists.185 In addition, Facebook’s practices were the subject of an investigation and action
by the Housing and Urban Development agency (HUD). Specifically, the agency charged Facebook
with housing discrimination based on their practices. 186 HUD officials had stated in 2018 that “ ‘[t]he
Fair Housing Act prohibits housing discrimination including those who might limit or deny housing
options with a click of a mouse,’ and ‘[w]hen Facebook uses the vast amount of personal data it collects
to help advertisers to discriminate, it’s the same as slamming the door in someone’s face.’ ”187
As mentioned above, government agencies will use their powers to stop and prohibit abusive
consumer targeting and lending when it is evident. As noted earlier, data privacy is not regulated on a
federal level, except to the extent that it intersects other federal laws. For instance, the Equal
Opportunity Credit Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the FTC Act’s unfair or deceptive acts
prohibition, among others, offers some protection against alternative credit scoring data.188 However,
at least one source has pointed out gaps in these laws which may allow credit companies and other
lenders to target certain customers, or even engage in violations, if they are targeting demographics
and neighborhoods rather than individuals. 189 For example, according to a recent study, “ ‘[i]t is highly
unlikely, given the size of the data set and the sources of information, that the companies that provide
big data analytics and the users of that data are meeting … FCRA obligations.”190 In addition, if
companies that provide alternate credit scoring, rather than providing personalized assessments of an
individual, aggregate data within an individual’s neighborhood or use other indicators such as an IP
address used by multiple people, then they are likely outside of the ambit of the law.191 Finally, the law
does not expressly prohibit companies from considering other data points that, while seemingly
unrelated, can be used as proxies for a consumer’s race or other immutable characteristics. 192
Another law that is used within the context of the banking industry is the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act (ECOA). This law “prohibits credit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, or because a person receives public assistance.” 193
Plaintiffs can show violations of ECOA either by showing (1) disparate treatment – that they were
intentionally discriminated against because of their race or other protected factor, or (2) disparate
impact – that the alleged practice disproportionately affects a particular protected group.194
However, proving violations of ECOA is often challenging. The FTC has pointed out that
“in most cases, a company’s advertisement to a particular community for a credit offer that is open to
all to apply is unlikely, by itself, to violate ECOA, absent disparate treatment or an unjustified disparate
impact in subsequent lending.”195 Further, it may be difficult to impossible for consumers to prove
disparate impact or treatment, because
30

to the extent that a lender wishes to implement a lending policy that deliberately singles
out members of a particular racial, ethnic, or other group, the lender likely can employ
facially-neutral proxy variables in its scoring model as stand-ins for characteristics like
race. Second, to the extent that lending decisions accord less favorable treatment to a
protected class, the lender may be able to claim that its “objective,” data- driven,
modeling processes are proof that the disparate impact is grounded in business
necessity. 196
Finally, the FTC has some jurisdiction over the banking industry, to the extent that the
industry’s practices violate the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Act, “prohibits unfair or
deceptive acts or practices,”197 even within the context of big data. For instance, the FTC requires
that “at a minimum, companies must not sell their big data analytics products to customers if they
know or have reason to know that those customers will use the products for fraudulent or
discriminatory purposes.”198 However, as one scholar points out, while “some FTC investigations
have resulted in consent orders in which companies agree to implement measures to prevent future
violations … this is a reactive, rather than proactive stance, and it is further hobbled by limited
firepower, with only forty full-time employees working on privacy issues.” 199 Further, the FTC’s
enforcement power is limited: the agency can only issue fines if a company violates a consent order.200
Moreover, some believe that the amount of fines currently levied are “ ‘small in relation to the gravity
of the violations.’ ” 201
Moreover, “to establish that an act or practice is unfair, a … Regulator must first prove that
the algorithmic lender’s act or practice causes a substantial injury.” Here, “substantial injury means
any sort of non-speculative and non-trivial harm” 202 which is sometimes difficult to adequately prove
because of the “opaque nature of algorithms.” 203 Unfortunately, there is currently no way for an
individual to view the personal information being held by these institutions or to correct any
inaccuracies in their data profile. As such, there is limited accountability into the process or data points
that lead to either weblining or steering consumers to particular markets. 204 This runs the risk that
consumers are being denied credit or being charged higher interest rates based on outdated or false
information.205 Moreover, even if the information used by banks was entirely accurate (regarding, for
instance, what zip code a consumer lives in) the particular algorithm used by that bank may draw
general conclusions (i.e., people in that zip code tend to default on their loans) that ends up
discriminating against a particular consumer, because that conclusion does not apply to her specific
situation (i.e., that consumer has outstanding credit).206
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Ever wonder how banks can approve you for a loan within seconds without
checking your credit?
By using neural networks, defined by Marcy Peck as “information processors that mimic human
brain behavior to predict a consumer’s future online behavior based on past behavior,” banks can
gather information (such as all available data that’s out there) that they use to make predictions
regarding whether you’ll repay your loan. Specifically, in the words of researchers, Hernandez,
Eddy, and Muchmore, companies “subscribe to ‘neural networks’ ” and use “them to instantly
access profiles of existing and potential customers,” allowing them “to make a snap decision about
who qualifies as a low-risk or high-risk potential customer.”
Gary Hernandez, Katherine J. Eddy, Joel Muchmore, Insurance Weblining and Unfair Discrimination in
Cyberspace, 54 SMU L. Rev. 1953 at 1968-71 (2001).
Marcy Peek, Passing Beyond Identity on the Internet: Espionage & Counterespionage in the Internet Age, 28 Vt.
L. Rev. 91 at 98 (2003).
Additionally, institutions routinely share their customer’s personal data with other
institutions.207 This can be problematic because those institutions not only share the data that has been
collected but also any profiles that have already been created for the individual. 208 Moreover, given
the level of sensitivity regarding the type209 of data that financial institutions, in particular, collect, any
breach of a financial institution’s systems can result in untold harm to the consumer. 210
C. Big Tech and Data Privacy
“Big Tech” companies is one way of referencing those companies whose business model is
primarily (or exclusively) derived from using technological innovations.211 There are only a handful
of companies that fall within this category and their names are ubiquitous to most consumers:
Alphabet (Google’s parent company), Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft.212 And, due to their
size and influence,213 the decisions they make regarding how to use a consumer’s digital data have
significant reverberations around the world.
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For much of their lifespan, companies that fell within the Big Tech category were often viewed
favorably by consumers and the media. Many of these companies have popular origin stories – often
started by college dropouts in their dorm rooms or garages – that pit their founders as outsiders and
upstarts against the establishment.214 However, this popular narrative has frayed over time. For
instance, since Facebook’s data sharing practices with Cambridge Analytica (a political data analytics
firm that “used data improperly obtained from Facebook to build voter profiles” )215 emerged,
legislators as well as consumers have questioned the ways in which Big Tech uses data. An
investigation into the underlying strategies of Big Tech companies began in June 2019 which gave the
public a first look at Big Tech’s real approach toward data privacy.216 In July 2020, CEOs from four
of the Big Tech companies appeared before Congress to discuss their role in this anti-competition
framework.217
1.

How Big Tech Companies Gather Consumer Information

There are several ways in which Big Tech companies obtain users’ information: asking for it,
tracking them indirectly, and obtaining it from third-parties.218 Companies ask consumers directly for
their data, usually when signing up for an account or making a purchase. Big Tech companies pull
consumer data from various sources on the internet using cookies. Cookies allow companies to track
what their users are looking at on the internet and which sites they have visited. Companies also
purchase data from third-parties that collect, analyze, and sell consumer and business data for targeted
advertising campaigns.219 Some people consider the sale of data as the harvesting and commercializing
by third parties (typically through data brokers).
In 2012, Apple created its own tracking software known as “Identifier for Advertisers”
(IDFA). Every consumer who uses an Apple device is assigned a unique IDFA in order to facilitate
targeted advertising.220 The IDFA has been used by Facebook and other developers to learn a
consumer’s particular patterns and habits, including what apps they use, what purchases they make
within those apps and which websites they visit.221
How Companies Encrypt Your Data
Although each of these Big Tech corporations are different, they each share a key
characteristic that impacts data privacy, the use of encryption. As Sunny Keon Kang notes,
there are three different types of encryption methods that are being used today: encryption
at-rest, encryption in-transit, and encryption in-use. Encryption at-rest is the method used to
protect the information that is stored in your phone, while encryption in-transit is the method
used to protect emails and texts while they are being sent. Encryption in-use allows companies
to perform analytics on users’ data while in an encrypted format. This gives them the insight
they need without being able to view any private data.
Sunny Seon Kang, Don’t Blame Privacy for Big Tech’s Monopoly on Information, Just Security
(Sept. 18, 2020),
Facebook is one of the largest tech companies that gathers and stores a vast amount of
consumer data. Indeed, Facebook’s business model centers around the data it gathers from mobile
apps that people “share” on Facebook’s site. In addition, “more than 85,000 iOS apps had installed
Facebook code that relays data back to the company as of December 2020, according to analytics firm
MightySignal.”222 The tech giant uses algorithms to determine what information each user sees when
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they log into their account each time. Over the years, the algorithms have gotten more complex and
narrowly targeted to each user based on the data that has been collected about the individual.
Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook, claims “that the disinformation perpetuated by social [media]
companies using algorithms is damaging society.”223 He has also stated in the past that “some
companies had ‘weaponized’ users’ personal information in what he described as a ‘data-industrial
complex.’”224 Because of this and the stricter laws coming into effect in the EU, Apple plans to update
its data privacy policy in the spring of 2021.
The chart below provides an overview of the different ways that these corporations use your
data. For a deeper dive into the data privacy of two specific companies, Alphabet (Google) and Apple,
see Appendix F.

225

2.

Spotlight on the Big Four and Concerns of Competition

“[Google search logs in 2001 were] like a continuous poll of public interests and preferences, a rolling picture of what
people worried about, lusted after, and what kind of flu was spreading in their communities.”226
Big Tech companies, like Facebook, Google, Apple, and Microsoft currently dominate their
specific sectors of the tech industry. These companies are capitalizing on consumer data that is
obtained at little to no cost and using it as a commodity for their business model. For many, this is
problematic. As Makan Delrahim, current chief of the Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division
notes, “without competition, a dominant firm can more easily reduce quality – such as by decreasing
privacy protections – without losing a significant number of users.227 More and more, litigators are
linking these issues (such anti-competition practices) to a data privacy framework. As Delrahim
claims, “[a]lthough privacy fits primarily within the realm of consumer protection law, it would be a
grave mistake to believe that privacy concerns can never play a role in antitrust analysis.” 228 As such,
the House Antitrust subcommittee’s questioning of each of the four tech companies can provide some
insight regarding concerns Congress has with these monopolies and their impact on the larger issues
of data privacy, as well as the specific legal challenges that each company might face.
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Google
• The House Antitrust subcommittee questioned Google about its dominance in web searches
and the digital advertising industry. The subcommittee also challenged Google on how it
controls its search verticals so that it can traffic its ad business. Later, the Justice Department
filed an “antitrust lawsuit against Google alleging that the tactics Google uses to preserve a
monopoly for its search engine are anticompetitive”229 and that the company uses unlawful
business agreements with its partners to limit its competitors market share.230
•

Google currently handles approximately 90% of all web searches in the United States. It also
brings in around $160 billion in annual sales just in its advertising businesses.231 As such, the
subcommittee’s concerns regarding Google’s monopoly seems well-founded: this gives
Google control over the data of many Americans (approximately 90% according to the
percentage of web searches it currently processes each year).

•

Google was also questioned as to why they were using their “dominance as the most popular
mobile software”232 to force their partners to bundle Google apps.

Apple
• The House subcommittee questioned Apple on its in-app “sales tax.” Apple refers to this tax
as a commission. Currently, Apple collects a 30% commission on all transactions made within
its app store. Companies are losing revenue from this because there is no alternative platform
for companies to get their apps to Apple users, other than the Apple Store.233
Facebook
• The key theme of the subcommittee’s questioning of Facebook revolved around competition
and acquisitions. For instance, Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook CEO, could not answer the
question “who is your biggest competitor?” when asked by the Senate Judiciary and Commerce
Committees in 2018.234 Facebook has faced scrutiny from Congress for consistently buying
out competitors in its market, most notably Instagram and WhatsApp. This has been viewed
as anticompetitive and possibly illegal.235
•

Facebook consistently continues to absorb its competitors and with that, consolidates more
user data.236 For instance, the access to more user data gives Facebook greater possibilities to
generate revenue. The acquisition of Instagram and WhatsApp “generated profitable insights
on targeting ads to a greater population, and created valuable feedback data for Facebook’s
services and technologies.”237
3.

Stricter Federal Privacy Laws and the Impact they will have on Big Tech

Because of the lack of federal regulation, companies must abide by more than 100 different
privacy laws to be compliant.238 As many have argued one advantage for corporations of a national
data privacy law is the clarity and consistency it could create among the states. For instance, Google
Chief Privacy Officer Keith Enright has stated that “tech companies have to work to ensure any
legislation passed provides as much clarity for organizations and citizens as possible.”239 More recently,
tech executives have expressed their interest in stricter data privacy regulations in the U.S., asking that
it be similar to the new privacy law in the EU.240 However, there is speculation regarding how any
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new law may impact the practices for Big Tech. One theory argues that Big Tech companies that are
able to spend more money on becoming legally compliant will benefit from the stricter rules and
firmer legal enforcement, since these companies have the ability to access vast amounts of consumer
information that they will not lose once the new laws come into effect.241 Another theory holds that
if new laws are strictly applied, like in the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), it will
alter the ways in which Big Tech companies obtain, store, and use consumers’ personal data. This
would then cause a chain reaction in the advertising business for these companies “weakening their
advantage over existing or potential new competitors.”242
Regardless of the future regarding Big Tech and data privacy regulation – the system that these
companies have created has unwittingly brought a new sector into the spotlight: data brokers. These
data brokers are now commanding increased scrutiny from regulators, in part because their practices
have been largely unregulated and under the radar.
D. Data Brokers243
Data brokers obtain consumer information directly and indirectly and then compile that data
into data sets for each individual. Data brokers then sell the consumer information to companies,
individuals, and other data brokers. Most people don’t know that data brokers exist or who they are
because these brokers have an indirect relationship with the consumers from whom they obtain
information.244 As William Chalk notes, they typically avoid “all things consumer-facing and opt
instead to harvest information on people in secret, trading it amongst themselves like the valuable
asset it has become.”245
For instance, most Americans don’t realize that when they use their digital devices, data
brokers collect their personal information and store that data to “compile exhaustive dossiers about
them.”246 Each dossier contains a data set
Big Tech under Regulator spotlight
of information on each individual person
In addition to data privacy laws big tech has also that has been collected over time from
faced scrutiny for the content that they allow on various sources. As one source notes, “data
their platforms. For instance, according to CNBC, brokers collect information from public
in December 2020, the British government records, 247online activity, … purchase
announced a plan to allow regulators more power history,” brand loyalty cards, and many
other places. It is specifically the collection
regarding the posting of “illegal or toxic content.”
and use of this information that has led
many laws to focus on the definition of
personally identifiable information (PII) within the framework of data privacy.248 As researchers Jamie
Pinchot, Adman Chawdhry, and Karen Paullet note: “data privacy is the concept that personally
identifiable information (PII) and other data about an individual should only be accessible to
authorized parties.”249
1.

How Data Brokers Collect Consumer Data

There are many data broker companies currently operating in the United States, using various
tactics for accumulating information. For instance, some information is knowingly released by
consumers, through their participation in various initiatives and studies. 250 However, as noted by
Pinchot, Chawdhry, and Paullet:
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the majority of this data is being generated behind the scenes as metadata [not readily
apparent to the user] that is captured when users interact with mobile apps and
websites, and from sensors embedded in smartphones, smartwatches, fitness trackers,
home assistant devices such as Amazon Echo or Google Home, and other electronic
devices.251
Data brokers then “infuse that data into machine-learning algorithms and build segmented
profiles of similar groups of people.”252 These profiles are then compiled into lists that are sorted by
interest. For example, if you were to browse the internet looking at baby products, you most likely will
be placed onto a list of people who are pregnant or recently had a baby. If you search fitness articles
and workouts, you may be placed on a list for fitness enthusiasts.
Currently, there aren’t any federal laws regulating data brokers or how they collect and use
consumer information. As such, there is no federal remedy for individuals to opt-out of having their
information collected and their location tracked.253 This creates a paradox: companies that are
regulated under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) must provide consumers with a report of their
personal data and correct any information that is incorrect. However, because data brokers are not
subject to federal regulation, they are not subject to the FCRA. As a result, much of the data that is
now used to judge a consumer’s economic stature and credit worthiness falls outside of the ambit of
the FCRA.254 Moreover, under the current regulatory structure, if consumers wish to know what’s in
their “data set” file, these data brokers are under no obligation to show them. 255 And, while (as
discussed in Section II.E.) there are currently some state laws now requiring data brokers to register,
the vast majority of states do not. And, because these companies tend to remain in the shadows, it
makes it that much more difficult for consumers to understand the process they need to under-take
to opt-out;256 there is not a “opt-out of all” button that allows consumers to remove themselves from
being monitored by all data broker companies. Therefore, individuals would need to contact each
brokerage company to find out what their opt-out options are.257
2.

Types of Data Collected by Data Brokers

Data brokers collect two types of data from consumers – raw data and derived data. Raw data
is the data that is collected directly from a wide array of sources including social media, public records,
and loyalty cards. Derived data is the information that these companies infer about customers by
obtaining their browser history, location, demographic data, and more.
Data brokers collect a wide variety of information on individuals, including name, alias
names, social security number, date of birth, and telephone numbers. This information is often
referred to as personally identifiable information (PII). But digital dossiers of individuals do
not stop with PII. Dossiers collected by data brokers also contain a wealth of information
about an individual’s demographic data, employment history, court and public records history,
social media data, financial data, travel data, purchase behavior and real estate and vehicle
ownership (Mirani & Nisen, 2014). This includes current and past employers, vehicles, driver’s
license information, professional licenses, concealed weapons permits, liens, legal judgments,
arrest and court records, lawsuits, marriages, divorces, and worker’s compensation claims
(Hoofnagle, 2003). This larger set of data contained in a digital dossier is often referred to as
sensitive personal information (SPI) and can be used on its own or in combination with PII
to identify, locate, or contact an individual.258
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3.

Ways that Data Brokers Use Data

There are generally three categories of data brokerage firms: (1) firms that generate marketing
and advertising campaigns; (2) risk mitigation firms; and (3) people-searching firms.259 Firms that focus
on marketing develop dossiers on consumers that are then used for targeted advertising campaigns.
Risk mitigation firms provide products that are designed to prevent fraud.260 Lastly, people-searching
firms use data that has been collected to provide individuals with information on other individuals.
Marketing Products
• Data brokers collect consumers’ data in order to sell it to customers for advertising purposes.
Ad spaces on websites and social media platforms are sold on a real-time auction where the
advertiser with the highest bid wins and their ad is shown.261
• As the Wall Street Journal reports:
The auction—called real-time bidding or RTB—is handled automatically by
computers in mere milliseconds as a website loads or an app opens. Data gets passed
between the ad exchange offering the ad space and the bidders trying to win the
auction, which can contain sensitive information about consumers. To conduct the
auction, the ad exchange shares whatever data it has on the consumer with the bidders.
That data can sometimes include the exact location of the phone if the display ad is in
a mobile application where the consumer has enabled location tracking. It can also
include any demographic information that the ad exchange has on the consumer. …
[M]ost ad exchanges allow even the losers of the auction to keep the data on the
consumer which can then be sold to data brokers who collect and sell such
information. Ad-tech firms, such as IQM Corp., “listen” to these auctions to gather
data from the bidstream to resell it. IQM works with political campaigns.262
Risk Mitigation Products
• Risk mitigation brokerage firms sell data to insurance providers, businesses looking to
complete employee background checks, and other instances where risk mitigation comes into
play.263
People Searching Products
• People search brokerage firms provide information to websites that allow individuals to search
for other individuals such as truthfinder.com, the white pages, and Spokeo.com. These
practices, in particular, can raise privacy concerns. As Pinchot, Chawdry and Paullet note:
“[P]eople-search websites can provide a wealth of information ready to be exploited by
doxxers, stalkers and abusers.”264
4.

Why Consumers are at Risk

Data brokers mostly operate in relative anonymity.265 Consumers are generally unaware that
most of their digital information is being tracked, collected, and sold. As such, they are unaware of
their increased risk of data breaches, discrimination and stereotyping, and inaccurate consumer digital
dossiers being generated about them. If a major data broker were to suffer a data breach it could
potentially expose the information of hundreds of millions of people.266 Moreover, even though data
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brokers can claim that the data they collect is anonymous, “recent studies have proven just how quickly
re-identification can occur with only a few data points.”267
Besides the inherent risk of the aggregation and storage of the data that is collected, consumer
profiling through the creation of data sets can lead to racial, religious and income discrimination. 268
This type of discrimination is referred to as technological redlining.269 If digital dossiers are misused
in a negative way, it could drastically impact consumers’ lives.270 “Digital dossiers could have major
impacts on job seekers, educational program applicants, politicians, and others.” 271 Digital dossier
inaccuracies are another risk that consumers face when it comes to how data brokers collect and store
information. As Pinchot, Chawdry and Paullet note: “if there is inaccurate information in a person’s
digital dossier, it could severely impact that person’s business, education, retail, health, and
government-related transactions. Data brokers are using what is called ‘consumer scores.’ ” 272
Data brokers collect information directly and indirectly about consumers, compile that data
into data sets for each individual, and then sell the information to companies, individuals, and other
data brokers. Most consumers are unaware of what data brokers are and what they do. In addition,
with the advent of “the Internet of Things” (discussed below) the availability of the type of
information for data brokers to mine has increased exponentially.
E. The Internet of Things: Biometrics, Wearables, and Smart Cars
In addition to tests measuring indicators like blood pressure, wellness programs often involve taking
detailed online health assessments that can include questions on alcohol consumption and pregnancy
plans. Many programs employ wearable devices that track step counts, sleep and heart rates. Some
privacy experts fear that by opting in, individuals may put their data at risk. Wellness programs
that are run as part of group health plans are covered by HIPAA, the nation’s main health-privacy
law. However, many others aren’t, leaving protection for employee data more porous.273
As technology has moved forward even more, the ability of businesses to apply traditional
software and data collection to everything from cars, watches, and appliances, this type of data
collection has all become bundled into a term inelegantly discussed as the internet of things (IOT). In
this section, we discuss some of the special issues that arise with this type of technology.
The Internet of Things (“IoT”) is a phrase that encompasses all smart objects that use sensors
to relay information back to systems that collect data. Smart objects include wearables (FitBit,
AppleWatch, etc.), smart phones, smart automobiles, smart home products (GoogleHome, Alexa,
etc.), as well as other devices. The world of IoT is expanding everyday into an integrated global
network leading some to believe that it will eventually connect everything with everyone. As one
scholar notes:
People, machines, natural resources, production lines, logistics networks, consumption
habits, recycling flows, and virtually every other aspect of economic and social life will
be linked via sensors and software to the IoT platform, continually feeding Big Data
to every node - businesses, homes, vehicles - moment to moment, in real time.274
IoT devices present a two-fold issue. On one hand, the development of IoT has helped law
enforcement solve cases more efficiently. However, with the expansion of IoT comes an increased
concern about privacy and security, particularly as it will rely increasingly on the data gathered by
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corporations. Because law enforcement efforts would have to rely on businesses that interact with
these consumers directly, constitutional amendments may be present that would not otherwise arise.275
Given the rise of IoT devices and their ability to produce almost incalculable data on people,
scholars, activists and policy makers have become increasingly vocal regarding the need for protections
related to a consumer’s data privacy. In the wake of limited protections under statute for consumers
concerned about these privacy implications, some have looked to constitutional law to see if there are
any protections naturally embedded there.
1. Constitutional Law and IoT Devices
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”276 When this amendment was written,
its drafters did not imagine a digital world like the one we live in today. Because there have been so
many technological advancements since the drafting of the Fourth Amendment, lawmakers and courts
must look at the issues that come with these advancements to determine if the privacy and security
issues raised within these technologies are covered under the Fourth Amendment, or if new laws need
to be developed to protect individuals.277 Fourth Amendment protections are particularly applicable
to claims involving IoT devices because given the level of privacy accorded to things that surround
your home or your person, Fourth Amendment issues are more likely to apply.
The courts have developed two approaches to determining a violation under the Fourth
Amendment – the reasonable expectation of privacy theory and the physical intrusion theory. The
physical intrusion theory was the first theory to be developed in Kyllo v. United States in 2001. The
reasonable expectation of privacy theory was developed in 2012 by Justice Harlan in the Jones v. United
States case. After the Jones case, the courts must now analyze both theories to determine if a search
under the Fourth Amendment has occurred. “Neither theory has been fully developed to reflect the
digital world, and the Court's most recent Fourth Amendment and technology case, Riley v. California,
only adds to the uncertainty.”278
Understanding how the constitutional law implications in this area intersects with a particular
technological advancement can also help lawmakers craft policies that are tailored to a specific
consumer use or need. As such, in the next section, we tackle some of the most widely-used
technologies that are currently on the market and examine how these technologies may implicate the
Fourth Amendment.
Smart Homes
• One of the larger components of smart devices are those that encompass the realm of a “smart
home.” These devices include smart lightbulbs, smart appliances, smart faucets, smart
televisions, as well as the devices that allow them to work via voice command. All of these
devices are capable of revealing “a data trail of your daily habits, patterns, and preferences.”279
Ultimately, this reveals the personal lifestyle details about the privacies inside of individuals’
homes; even revealing intimate details of their daily patterns.
•

An individual’s most private space, their home, has been guarded with special protections via
the Fourth Amendment. “In no quarter does the Fourth Amendment apply with greater force
than in our homes.”280 How far does the Fourth Amendment extend into the digital world? If
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Who’s Watching Whom? Your Television and Data
Privacy
Like many other devices around your house, your
television has become smart – most of these devices
are now connected to the internet, allowing
consumers to access programming through apps (like
Hulu and Netflix) as well as through more traditional
networks. But, with these new smart T.V.’s just as
you are watching T.V. your T.V. is watching you:
collecting data on your viewing preferences. This can
result in customized T.V. advertisements that would
have been unheard of a generation ago. As Marck
Andrejevic notes: “Mass advertising (like mass
politics) accords a degree of anonymity to the ‘general
public” toward whom advertising appeals are
directed. The promise of mass customization, by
contrast, shatters this anonymity: messages can be
addressed not just to particular groups or subcultures
but to specific individuals.” For some, this may be a
benefit (for instance, participants in the Morgantown
focus group felt that customized ads were a plus). For
others, this is a privacy concern. Either way, it is
something that should be considered in any policy
decision going forward.
For further discussion of the customization of ads, see
Marck Andrejevic, iSpy: Surveillance and Power in
the Interactive Era (2007).

data trails are streaming from our homes, is
that data protected under the Fourth
Amendment? Right now, the status of the
amendment’s protection to data privacy issues
within the house is unclear.281
Wearables
•
Wearable technology, often referred to
as wearables, is a component of smart devices
that are worn by an individual. The most
popular wearables are devices that track
various information related to health and
fitness. There are also other wearables that take
photos and can even reorder your shopping list
(i.e. Amazon Echo Frames). Wearable devices
connect with the users’ smart phones to track
information more seamlessly. As with other
smart devices, these are also subject to
snooping, hacking, and violating the users’
privacy.
•
Do wearables fall within the category
of “effects” under the protection of the Fourth
Amendment? The courts have not fully
addressed this issue to-date, thus, giving
lawmakers a reason to develop privacy and
security protections for users of these devices.

Smart Automobiles (smart car)
•
Smart car is an umbrella term for a
vehicle with advanced electronics, such as GPS navigation, Web and email access, voice
controls, keyless entry and activation, and systems that control the vehicles distance to other
vehicles. Other key features of smart cars include WiFi capabilities and OnStar road assistance.
There are also some smart cars that “record speed and distance, and will literally call the police
on you when you leave the scene of a hit and run.”282 There have been instances where hackers
have demonstrated an ability to take control of smart cars from across the world, establishing
cause for security concerns.
Smartphones
• Smartphones are essentially tiny handheld computers with internet access and the capability
of running applications. There are currently 3.8 billion people in the world who own a
smartphone.283 These numbers are increasing every year. Not only do adults carry around
smartphones but their children do as well. In addition, smartphones can easily be tracked via
cell-site data information and the GPS information housed inside of the device. Since the
Fourth Amendment provides protection over the security of a consumer’s papers, one issue
that has arisen is whether the Fourth Amendment will protect the electronic equivalent of this
within the context of data stored on an individual’s phone.
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2.

Biometric Data & Data Privacy

Biometric data identifiers are comprised of various personal traits, such as fingerprints, voice,
facial features, and walking gait. According to some scholars, the data privacy implications for
biometric data are among the most crucial to protect. As one article notes, “because biometric
identifiers cannot be changed if compromised, it is increasingly crucial that this data be protected by
law.”284 There are currently no federal laws or regulations which protect biometric information of
individuals. Some states have taken into their own hands to develop privacy laws regulating the use
and storage of biometric data.285 Illinois, Texas, and Washington are the only states that have enacted
biometric privacy statutes. 286 There have been seven other states that have attempted to pass
legislation on the subject matter but have been unsuccessful. 287
According to at least one commentator, Illinois is considered to have the most protective
biometric data privacy law in the nation.288 Its stringent because (1) it provides for a private right of
action, even when no actual harm has occurred; and (2) it touches many business who work outside
of Illinois, so long as “they conduct any operations that involve the collection or use of biometric data
in Illinois.”289
As technology advances, more devices are using biometrics as a “security” feature. But as this
advance gains in popularity, the risk of personal identifiers becoming exploited or stolen also increases.
“Experts have warned that hackers can use this biometric data for leverage, leaving those affected by
a breach dealing with the fallouts for years.”290
Because the widespread use of biometrics is still fairly new, there is a lack of knowledge among
the public regarding the collection and use of biometric data. For instance, most people may not realize
that biometric data is currently being obtained by the government, and private companies, including
third parties. Companies, such as Facebook, have created a “climate favorable to their use of
customers’ biometric data, largely without their knowledge or consent.”291 Both private companies
and the government have been collecting biometric data for longer than many people realize.
The FBI claims to hold the “world’s largest and most efficient repository of biometric and
criminal history information”292 within its Next Generation Identification program (NGI). It began its
national fingerprint collection in 1924 and founded the Biometric Center of Excellence in 2007. Other
government agencies, such as the Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, Defense, State and
other agencies work collectively to send biometric data to the Office of Biometric Identity
Management (OBIM).
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A Hypothetical on Genetic Information and Law Enforcement
Q:
Jackie purchased an ancestry kit through Ancestry.com. She was so excited to finally learn her
heritage and family background. She completed the kit as instructed and sent her DNA sample using the
packaging that came with the kit. She waited a few weeks and then finally received her results. A month
later, she received an email update from Ancestry that stated her DNA was being sent to the FBI to be
used for research. Jackie never signed anything to consent to the use of her DNA being used for research.
Does she have a claim against Ancestry.com?
A: Currently, law enforcement is only allowed to access a consumer’s genetic information in the U.S. if
it is requested pursuant to a valid warrant, or other legal order (such as a grand jury subpoena). However,
given the nature of DNA, the effect of a valid warrant is vast: even if you had not used a genetic testing
kit, you could still fall within law enforcement’s radar if any of your relatives had submitted this
information to a genetic testing company. Moreover, given how much information is willingly being
submitted by consumers, the amount of information that law enforcement can now access is vast.
See Eric Rosenbaum, 5 Biggest Risks of Sharing Your DNA with Consumer Genetic Testing
Companies, CNBC (June 16, 2018)
See more here (Why Your Ancestors May Haunt You)
Moreover, just as is the case with data collection surrounding other technologies, what
information is being collected about an individual has become increasingly opaque. For instance, as
of August 2017, the NGI’s program has been exempt from the Privacy Act of 1974, meaning that
“the FBI will no longer have to disclose whether an individual’s biometrics are included in the NGI
database, and no longer needs consent to amend an individual’s profile within the program.”293 The
federal government has launched several pilot programs for the collection of biometric data within
airports. These programs monitor travelers leaving the U.S. using facial recognition software to verify
the identity of travelers through the comparison of live scans and the individuals passport photo.
Because there are no federal regulations on biometric data, there is no guarantee that the data collected
by the government will be destroyed in a timely manner, or at all.
Private companies typically use a person’s smartphone to collect biometric data. “Whether a
phone uses the increasingly ubiquitous fingerprint to unlock, iris scans, or an advanced technology
like the new iPhone X and Samsung Pass 3D facial screening, each one records a user’s biometric data
and stores that information on the phone.”294 Technology giants are not the only private companies
monitoring and storying biometric data. Biometric data is also collected within newer video games to
create personal profiles, amusement parks to prevent ticket fraud, and wearable fitness trackers to
collect health data. Most users are unaware that they have no legal protection from their biometric
data being collected and stored.
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Why your ancestors may haunt you
Recently, genetic testing has recently become very popular. They are used for a variety
of different purposes. For instance, some over-the-counter test kits allow individuals to
submit their DNA and in return receive their ancestral background (such as Ancestry).
Other tests, such as 23andMe) use your DNA to report your risks for certain health
predispositions. Both companies allow its users to participate in clinical research.
Like biometric data, data based on your DNA is considered particularly important.
As one scholar notes “genetic information may be particularly sensitive because it is
immutable and uniquely identifiable. Genetic information, because it is hereditary, may
also implicate genetically related family members, as well as a racial or ethnic group.” As
such, concerns have been raised as to whether consumers of these products could be
exploited not just by the commercial transactions between the consumer and company,
but also by research conducted by the companies. As __ notes, when consumers sign
up for an account with either company, they consent to the transaction but “the
transaction can still be problematically exploitative.”

3.

Biometric Data & Data Privacy – Spotlight on West Virginia

West Virginia University (WVU) has taken a leadership role in the state over its response to
the coronavirus pandemic. For instance, when the COVID-19 pandemic hit, researchers at the
Rockefeller Neuroscience Institute (RNI) switched gears and refocused their efforts on detecting
COVID-19 symptoms. As a result, they produced a new digital platform that can detect COVID-19
symptoms up to three days before a patient experiences any symptoms. According to Dr. Ali Rezai,
“the holistic and integrated neuroscience platform developed by the RNI continuously monitors the
human operating system, which allows for the accurate prediction of the onset of viral infection
symptoms associated with COVID-19.”295
In order to collect data on the disease, researchers are using the RNI app, wearable technology
(mainly the Oura Ring – a ring that user’s wear that captures relevant information), and artificial
intelligence (AI) guided models. With the use of these, researchers are able to predict the onset of
symptoms with over 90 percent accuracy. “The neuroscience-based study monitors individuals
holistically – integrating physiologic measures with psychological, cognitive, and behavioral
biometrics.”296 Participates are tasked with monitoring various indicators like stress, anxiety, memory
issues, and other “human resilience and recovery functions.” The Oura Ring monitors the patient’s
physiological data, including “onset of increased body temperature, heart rate variability, resting heart
rate, respiratory rate, sleep and activity patterns, and ‘readiness,’ [which is] a health metric combining
long-term sleep and activity trends with short-term behaviors. The following includes a list of
functions recorded within the RNI platform:
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AUTONOMIC &
SENSORY NERVOUS
SYSTEM
Heart Rate Variability
Respiratory
Temperature

SLEEP
Quantity
Quality
Circadian Rhythms

COGNITIVE
Fatigue
Attention
Memory

BEHAVIORAL &
PSYCHOSOCIAL
Symptoms
Exposure Questions
Stress Questions

FUNCTIONAL
Movement
Physical Activity

Recovery Questions
Wellness Questions
Nutrition
Sense of Smell

The patients are undergoing continuous real-time “non-intrusive, secure, and safe” monitoring
in order to allow the RNI researchers to predict the onset of COVID-19 as well as their recovery.
The use of this data by researchers highlights the challenges that legislatures may face in
crafting a workable data privacy framework. For instance, although, as a research institution, WVU is
required to undertake strict standards to protect participants’ data and privacy, voluntary opt-in
programs created by corporations may not face the same level of scrutiny. In addition, there is always
a risk of that data making it into the hands of a third-party or a chance of the data being hacked.
Finally, if the health information is voluntarily shared by the consumer with her insurance company,
then a whole host of other issues implicating data privacy may arise.
F.

Data Privacy and the Insurance Industry

The insurance industry interacts with just about every aspect of a consumers’ life. We have
health insurance for when we’re sick, car insurance for when we drive and home or renter’s insurance
for our home and possessions. All of these transactions involve the collection of data which, by its
nature, implicates data privacy. Examining how insurance companies use data in some key areas can
help shed light on issues that may need to be addressed.
1.

Data Privacy and Health Insurance

Unlike many other industries that intersect with data privacy, the health care industry is already
a significantly regulated industry. Federal laws that touch on records kept by hospital and medical
providers are heavily regulated and enforced. Nevertheless, data privacy issues in this industry are still
ongoing – particularly in regard to: (1) whether the data that is generated falls within the definition of
“personal health information” and (2) whether the data has been collected by players, other than
covered medical providers who may not be subject to these legal structures and yet whose impact in
this area might cause significant damage to individuals.
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Playing in the Shadows of Health Care

The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) governs
privacy of medical records and information,
and state laws are required to adhere to its
requirements unless those state laws and
regulations are more stringent.297 HIPPA
protects “personally identifiable health
information” (also known as personal health
information, or “PHI”) from disclosure under
the HIPPA Privacy Rule, which governs
medical record privacy.298 In an informational
document published online, the HHS Office of
Civil Rights explicitly stated that “you have
privacy rights whether your information is
stored as a paper record or stored in an
electronic form [Electronic Health Records
(EHRs)]. The same federal laws that already
protect your health information also apply to
information in EHRs.”299 It does allow states to
implement and enforce mandatory reporting
requirements.300

For decades, individuals who were
concerned about how their health
information was being used could find
solace in HIPAA – the Health Insurance
Portability Act. Under HIPAA, covered
providers were prohibited from sharing
your health information without your
consent. But now, with the advent of big
data, many other companies are using
public and semi-public sources to create
a medical profile for you that they can
then sell to interested businesses.
Because of the way that these
companies collect their data, they do not
fall within the ambit of the law.
While HIPPA offers significant protections, due to gaps in the law, and the ability of entities
not covered by the law to share information with those that are, a cottage industry of third-party apps
have recently begun collecting information about consumers indirectly related to their health and
aggregating that information to offer new services or even discounts for good behavior. Unfortunately,
some of that information has also been used to detrimentally affect everything from premium costs
to employment opportunities, creating a vast data privacy concern that remains unresolved.

Regulations promulgated under HIPPA define “protected health information” as “individually
identifiable health information” transported or stored in “electronic media” or “any other form or
medium.”301 Under these regulations, “individually identifiable health information” means “health
information that (1) ‘identifies’ or can reasonably ‘be used to identify’ an individual; (2) is ‘created or
received by a health care provider, health plan, employer or health care clearinghouse’; and (3) relates
to an individual’s physical or mental health, healthcare provision, or payment for provision of health
care.” 302 Data can be de-identified and not considered “individually identifiable health information”
under circumstances where an expert concludes that there is minimal risk that such information could
be used to re-identify an individual or the entity lacks “actual knowledge” that the information could
be used to identify an individual.303
The HIPPA Privacy Rule only applies to “covered entities;” which are defined as “health
plans,”304 “health care providers,”305 and health care clearinghouses; “hybrid entities,” which operate
using health and non-health related information; and “business associates” which are third party users
of the data who are bound to adhere to the requirements of the Privacy Rule as if they were covered
entities.306
But the “social determinants of health,” such as information an individual might post about
themselves on social media websites which is subsequently collected by other third parties would not
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be covered under the Privacy rule. To illustrate this problem, a group of scientists in 2018 took large
sets of health data, removed protected health information, and reverse-engineered the information to
identify 95 percent of individuals.307 With many people willingly identifying minor details about
themselves in this manner, companies (including insurance companies) can use that information in
manner that would not fall under the protections provided by HIPPA or the Privacy Rule, since it is
not considered personal health information.
In addition, other laws that would seem, at first glance, provide supplemental protection for
consumer’s health-related information also have gaps. For instance, the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA) does not require entities to provide notice to consumers before sharing that data with third
parties, as its primary purpose is to ensure accuracy of consumer information and how that
information is to be used. 308 It permits this through the use of “consumer reports” which are
communications by a credit reporting agency that is “ ‘used or expected to be used’ to evaluate a
consumer for credit, insurance, employment or another permissible purpose under the Act.”309 When
a consumer report is used to take an “adverse action” against a consumer based on information in the
consumer report, users of that information must notify the consumer. Adverse actions include
refusing to grant credit, reducing insurance coverage, and denying employment. 310
Under this framework, insurance companies can leverage data in full compliance with both
HIPPA and the FCRA to sell products that rely on de-identified personal information sold to or
purchased from a third-party data broker. For example, Optum—a company under the ownership of
UnitedHealth Group—has amassed the “medical diagnoses, tests, prescriptions, costs and
socioeconomic data of 150 million Americans going all the way back to 1993.”311 The company has
stated on its marketing materials that it uses information such as education, net worth, family structure,
and race in tandem with this historical information for patient medical outcomes and costs, but does
not use it for pricing health plans.312 IBM Watson Health also utilizes information about social and
economic factors to assess potential markets by surveying 80,000 Americans a year, asking questions
such as whether participants “trust their doctors, have financial problems, go online, or own a
Fitbit.”313 This allows IBM Watson Health to determine whether a particular region might be a good
investment for insurers in the future, but this aggregate data is also subject to errors and inaccuracies. 314
On March 9, 2020, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of
the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology issued a final rule dealing with patient
access to data and information blocking, among other things.315 Information blocking, a new concept
developed by provisions of the 21 st Century Cures Act, prevents access to electronic health
information about an individual’s medical treatment history.316 Notably, despite privacy concerns
related to non-HIPPA protected information obtained from third parties, CMS stated that it lacks the
authority to regulate this type of information and that the FTC must take up that mantle. 317 Further,
CMS emphasized that health plans must educate any new customers on the risks of sharing health
information with third parties by posting resources on a public website.318
West Virginia has already experienced a similar ordeal with non-informed consumers suffering
real-world consequences as a result of sharing voluntary non-HIPPA protected data as part of health
care services and insurance benefits. In 2018, the West Virginia Public Employee Insurance Agency
(“PEIA”) launched a new initiative in partnership with Human called Go365.319 The program required
workers to participate in routine medical screenings in exchange for “wellness points” that would
lower rates.320 But in addition to awarding points for wearing a Fitbit and tracking steps, the program
also included personal questions in its screening such as “How much sexual activity do you perform
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in a week? Is it vigorous?”321 Individuals who did not want to participate in the program were charged
an additional $25 per month for their insurance plan, and the program was discontinued on March
30, 2018, following demands by the teachers’ strike in Charleston, West Virginia.
In addition, the current legal framework for addressing the pandemic has highlighted
significant issues with regard to data privacy and health-related issues. For instance, as one article
notes “(HIPAA) provides some protections for health-related information in the United States, but it
applies only to health care providers [and other included by contract].”322 As such, to the extent that
information related to Covid-19 is being collected and used by companies outside of HIPAA’s ambit,
there is currently no specific protection with regard to how the information is protected from a privacy
standpoint. This issue is exacerbated by the fact that most of the information currently being used by
the state and federal government to address the pandemic is not being collected by providers covered
under HIPAA but rather by technology companies such as Google.323
The use of algorithms has also resulted in discriminatory practices in the healthcare industry,
some of which could be avoided with more stringent data privacy laws. For instance, a healthcare
algorithm owned by United Health returned results that disparately impacted black patients, flagging
more white patients for extra treatment even though the black patients were equally ill and needed the
same level of care.324 In addition, insurance industry algorithms are used often in pricing and
administering insurance policies, and also often result in disparate or discriminatory treatment for nonwhite consumers.325 Typically, while it is obvious these outcomes do occur, it is often unclear how or
why they occur. However, in the case of the United Health algorithm, the researchers were able to
analyze the process and determined that “bias does not emerge from the particulars of the algorithm,
but from [the] outcome the algorithm was asked to predict (also known as its ‘label’).”326 Further, this
happens because something as commonplace as cost is used as the “label,” while factors such as white
patients having better access to care and being more financially able to seek it than equally ill black
patients are not used in the data sets as labels.327 The algorithm simply did not have data indicating
who was financially able to seek treatment and who was not, or who needed treatment and did not
seek it for whatever reason, and could therefore not calculate an accurate or fair result. 328
The researchers also point out that they “heard from many organizations concerned that the
algorithms they rely on are similarly biased. Most aren’t sure how to identify bias, and even more
uncertain of what to do about it.”329 This indicates that most, if not all, instances of disparate impact
and discrimination from the use of AI algorithms likely occur inadvertently, simply the result of
missing pieces of key data needed to calculate accurate and equal results.
2.

Spotlight on West Virginia – Laws related to Insurance Companies and Medical Records

As mentioned before, right now for consumers and companies alike, our data is a form of
currency. It is no wonder then that corporations are spending significant efforts to hold onto that
currency as much as possible. Insurance companies’ fight over medical record data is one example of
the lengths to which these companies will go to hold onto this valuable information.
In many ways, West Virginia law is at the forefront of data privacy within medical record
retention practices. This is largely thanks to the work of the Romano Law Office, 330 which has been
active in litigating issues concerning insurance companies’ use of data in their claim handling decisions.
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While these cases developed before the era of Big Data, many of the resulting court opinions that
could be applied to our modern framework. Indeed, part of the particular challenges of data collection
and data privacy is that businesses now use the data that they have collected in ways that were not
initially considered when the data was first captured.331 As such, it is worth examining West Virginia’s
approach to these issues under state common law to determine if there are any best practices that can
be used for future data privacy laws.
The rise of big data heightens the risk of data security breaches and inadvertent dissemination
of private medical information. Generally speaking, HIPPA preempts state law except when the state
law offers greater protections for health information. To that end, the West Virginia Supreme Court
and Northern District of West Virginia have upheld privacy policies for medical records. Medical
records privacy is protected under federal law, West Virginia Insurance Commission (WVIC)
regulations, and West Virginia court opinions. West Virginia recognizes individuals’ privacy interests
in their own medical records and upholds this policy to the extent permitted by law. Medical protective
orders are generally issued to preserve this privacy interest, and so long as the orders allowed for good
cause, state and federal required retention periods, reporting requirements, and other statutory or
regulatory law, they have been upheld by the West Virginia Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of West Virginia. This suggests that big data practices could violate this
policy and law if private medical information is being stored indefinitely, on an unnecessarily large
scale, and at significant risk of accidental or uncontrolled dissemination caused by inadequate
safeguards. Therefore, studying the law in WV could provide some guidance regarding what legislators
should consider codifying into law.
While West Virginia has no code section explicitly outlining a blanket protection for medical
records, provisions in other code sections require it. For example, West Virginia law332 authorizes the
creation of the West Virginia Health Information Network “under the oversight of the Health Care
Authority to promote the design, implementation, operation and maintenance of a fully interoperable
statewide network to facilitate public and private use of health care information in the state.”333 Other
laws restrict disclosure except with the patient’s authorization or the “best interest to those having a
need to know, in compliance with state confidentiality laws and [HIPPA].”334 In addition, the law
provides that “health information, data and records of the network shall be exempt” from Freedom
of Information Act disclosures.335
HIPPA and corresponding state code sections address privacy of medical records related to
healthcare providers and health insurers, and WVIC provides regulations to protect the privacy of
medical records related to all insurance companies doing business in West Virginia. Under W. Va.
C.S.R. 114-57-15.1, “a licensee shall not disclose nonpublic personal health information about a
consumer or customer unless an authorization is obtained from the consumer or customer whose
nonpublic personal health information is sought to be disclosed.”336 This regulation is based on the
federal law, which obligates financial institutions,337 to enact safety measures to prevent disclosure of
non-public consumer information.338 However, West Virginia regulations do not require authorization
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or prohibit disclosure for “insurance functions performed by or on behalf of the licensee,”339 including
but not limited to disclosures permitted under HIPPA, claims administration and management, or
fraud and other reporting requirements.340
Additionally, the WVIC requires insurers to implement “a comprehensive written information
security program that includes administrative, technical and physical safeguards for the protection of
consumer information. The …safeguards included in the …program shall be appropriate to the size
and complexity of the licensee and the nature and scope of its activities.”341 Insurers are also required
to retain all records related to liability claims for “(1) the current calendar year plus five (5) calendar
years” or “(2) from the closing date of the period of review for the most recent examination by the
commissioner; or (3) a period otherwise specified by statute as the examination cycle for the
insurer.”342
Guiding Hypothetical
Mary and Jeri were involved in a car accident near Elkins, Randolph County WV. Jeri
was at fault and Mary sustained life-threatening injuries which required a long
hospitalization and rehabilitation period. Mary filed a lawsuit against Jeri and Jeri’s
automobile liability insurer, Nationwide, to recover medical expenses and lost wages
resulting from the accident and her injuries. Nationwide seeks discovery of Mary’s
medical records to use in defending this litigation. Mary is concerned about how her
private medical records and information will be used, stored, and disseminated to
entities other than Nationwide and its counsel. She is also worried about what happens
to her medical records and information after the end of the litigation. She does not
want to simply release all of her medical records to Nationwide and allow the company
to wrongly disclose them or keep them forever in its computer database. Mary wonders
if she has any legal recourse to ensure her private medical information stays protected
while in Nationwide’s possession during and after this lawsuit ends, or if her records
are disclosed without her permission.
As discussed in the following sections, West Virginia courts have recognized and enforced
HIPP’s mandate to keep individuals’ non-public medical information private to the extent permitted
by law. The primary method of upholding an individual’s privacy interest against unauthorized
dissemination and excessive retention periods is the issuance of appropriate Medical Protective Orders
(MPOs) at a trial court’s discretion. The West Virginia Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of WV have upheld MPOs as a matter of policy and law, so long as (1) good
cause was established and (2) the orders accommodated requisite retention and fraud reporting
requirements under state and federal law.343
MPOs are issued by courts to protect the confidentiality of medical information obtained in
discovery and to regulate how the information may be used.344 Appropriate MPOs generally require
(1) destruction and return of medical records, information, copies, or summaries, after required state
and federal retention periods; (2) certification of destruction from a defendant’s counsel or other
authorized person; (3) a prohibition on disclosing information, restricting it to those necessary for
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claims handling and litigation; and (4) a signed acknowledgement of the order by anyone receiving
disclosure of information.345 West Virginia courts have broad discretion to manage discovery and
regulate how medical records and information may be used by issuing appropriate MPOs, and an
abuse of discretion standard is used in reviewing these orders.346 Protective orders must comply with
state and federal law regarding mandatory retention periods and reporting requirements. 347 In our
hypothetical, Mary could request that the Circuit Court of Randolph County issue an MPO with these
terms and provisions to uphold her protected privacy interest in her medical records as a matter of
policy. Based on West Virginia common law, the Court would likely grant her request and issue an
appropriate MPO.
For example, in State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Bedell (Bedell I), a plaintiff sued State
Farm for failing to pay an underinsured motorist claim and sought damages for injuries and emotional
distress caused by her husband’s death.348 State Farm requested authorization to obtain her and her
husband’s medical records.349 The Circuit Court of Harrison County issued a MPO prohibiting
electronic scanning of the records and required they be destroyed or returned at the end of litigation. 350
The order did not address good cause or allow for retention periods required by WVIC regulations,
and the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to uphold it on those grounds.351
A second MPO was issued in the same case, this time addressing good cause and allowing for
WVIC regulations, and the insurance companies again opposed plaintiff’s request.352 In its ruling, the
judge sided with the plaintiff, reasoning that “’a person’s medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely
more intimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already judicially recognized and
protected.’”353 The Court observed that all parties “agreed and conceded that a protective order is an
appropriate means of protecting the privacy interests [plaintiffs] have in their confidential medical
records” and “fundamental to the privacy of medical information is the ability to control [its]
circulation.”354 The Court also cited federal law in its policy reasoning, stating “as the parties have
acknowledged before this Court, federal law requires the entry of protective orders to protect litigants
whose medical records will be disclosed during the course of legal proceedings.”355 Further, the Court
observed that Congress had enacted that legislation “to promote a strong federal policy in favor of
protecting the privacy of patient medical records.”356 Because good cause had been established and
the MPO allowed for statutory and regulatory retention periods, the Court upheld the second
protective order by denying the writ,357 indicating they were also upholding state common law and
federal privacy policies.
State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marks encompassed two consolidated personal
injury actions.358 Each plaintiff requested MPOs against State Farm and Nationwide Mutual, and the
insurers objected to the entry of the orders.359 The Circuit Court of Harrison County consolidated the
cases and affirmed both orders, holding that they were consistent with West Virginia law and public
policy, and entered a Combined Order Affirming Medical Protective Orders Entered in These Civil
Actions.360 The Circuit Court also explicitly included medical records and information obtained before
the MPO was entered.361 On appeal, the WV Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s orders.
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In Small v. Ramsey, a federal court in WV was asked to determine whether a proposed MPO
was proper.362 The Court reasoned that the insurers admitted that the plaintiff had a right to privacy
of his medical records, and WVIC regulations “construed by the West Virginia Supreme Court”
prohibit insurers from “disclosing non-public personal health information without authorization by
the individual.”363 Although the Court found no language in HIPAA which would extend privacy
requirements to liability insurers, it concluded that “the patchwork of laws and regulations are not
adequate to protect the privacy interest of the individual in his medical records recognized by the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.”364 It then entered a MPO which required destruction, return,
certification, and restrictions on dissemination.365
The District Court in Marks also pointed out the West Virginia Supreme Court’s policy
reasoning in Child Protection Group v. Cline which stated “West Virginia recognizes the individual’s right
to privacy with respect to his or her medical records” and “’there is no question that disclosure would
cause an invasion of privacy’” because “an individual’s medical records are classically a private
interest.”366 The Court also quoted Crump v. Beckley Newspapers Inc., observing that this privacy interest
“appears to be a common law recognition” under West Virginia law, and invasion of privacy can
include “(1) an unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (2) an appropriation of another’s
name or likeness; (3) unreasonable publicity given to another’s private life; and (4) publicity that
unreasonably places another in a false light before the public.”367 This suggests that under West
Virginia common law, a plaintiff may have a cause of action for invasion of privacy if medical
information is misused or disclosed without authorization. In our hypothetical, if Nationwide discloses
or disseminates Mary’s medical records without her permission, she may be able to bring suit for
invasion of privacy under Child Protection Group v. Cline and Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc.
As outlined below, from 2010-2012 State Farm and Nationwide Insurance appealed MPOs
and sought writs of prohibition against their enforcement, raising numerous issues in both the WV
Supreme Court of Appeals and the US District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia. The
primary MPO term appealed was destruction and return of medical records, information, summaries,
and copies. Even after MPO orders accommodating retention periods were entered, these companies
presented the same arguments in an attempt to have that term eliminated or modified to allow
indefinite retention and dissemination at their discretion. The following sections list each of these
arguments and how the court decided. Given the rise of Big Data and the incentives that companies
have to use and monetize this information, the data privacy issues are significant.
Good Cause
•
For any protective order to be issued, W. Va. R. Civ. P. 26(c) requires “particular and specific
demonstration of fact” and not “vague fears articulated by [a plaintiff],” and a plaintiff bears
the burden of showing this.368 A protective order will not be given “simply because a party
possesses a protected interest in the information sought to be discovered.”369
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•

The defendant insurers in Bedell I argued that good cause was not shown because medical
records are protected by state insurance regulations and internal insurance company practices,
and the plaintiff could not demonstrate particular and specific facts concerning electronic
storage.370 The WV Supreme Court agreed, holding that plaintiff had not shown particular and
specific facts for good cause because (1) the Circuit Court did not require or address it on the
record, and (2) plaintiff presented no evidence that her records would not be protected by
safeguards already in place by WVIC and insurance company electronic storage.371

•

After the Circuit court found and addressed good cause in issuing the second MPO in that
case, State Farm and Nationwide objected and presented the same argument.372 This time, the
WV Supreme Court held that (1) the Circuit court on the record established good cause
“through particular and specific fact of plaintiff’s expectations of privacy” and (2) the WV
Supreme Court in Bedell I had only addressed the issue of electronic storage, which “did not
preclude a subsequent protective order complying with the requirements specified in Bedell
I.”373

•

In State Farm v. Marks, defendants again presented this argument, alleging that existing WVIC
regulations were adequate protection for plaintiffs’ medical records.374 The Court rejected the
argument and held that insurers’ compliance with state privacy regulations did not exempt
them from complying with protective orders because this would violate the separation of
powers doctrine by (1) “enlarging” WVIC’s authority beyond its legislative delegation and (2)
“usurp[ing] the exclusive province of the court to regulate discovery in matters over which it
presides.”375 The Court declined to give “preferential treatment and special exemptions from
medical protective orders” and upheld the Circuit court’s combined order affirming the MPOs
in the consolidated cases.376

•

The defendant insurers again argued lack of good cause in Small v. Ramsey.377 The U.S. District
Court held that plaintiff met good cause requirements because (1) there is a privacy interest
and right to protect medical records and control dissemination; (2) insurance companies
intended to disseminate records, removing control over them; (3) the Court was not banning
all use, only limiting to what was needed to comply with state and federal law; (4) a plaintiff
does not lose control over privacy of non-public medical records by virtue of being injured
and involved in litigation.378

•

In our hypothetical, Mary can allege to the Circuit Court that she has an expectation of privacy
in her medical records. If the Court addresses this particular and specific fact and finds good
cause on the record in issuing the appropriate MPO, Mary’s MPO would likely be upheld by
the West Virginia Supreme Court and the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
WV.

Definition of Medical Records
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•

State Farm and Nationwide also attempted to define “medical records” and “medical
information” differently regarding compliance with the destruction and return requirement in
MPOs, presumably to allow them to keep documents containing information taken from
medical records.379 The WV Supreme Court in Bedell II analyzed the Circuit court record and
plain meaning of the terms in the MPO, and found that the Circuit court intended to use the
terms interchangeably.380 In State ex. rel. State Farm v. Marks, the Court declined to define the
terms differently for Nationwide because that was the Circuit Court’s territory and was settled
in Bedell II.381 The US District Court in Small v. Ramsey simply stated that the terms are
synonymous.382 These holdings affirmed the MPO term requiring that all summaries and
copies containing medical records and information be destroyed and returned.

State and Federal Retention Requirements
• WVIC regulations require insurance companies to retain all records related to claims “for the
lesser of: (1) The current calendar year plus five (5) calendar years; (2) From the closing date
of the period of review for the most recent examination by the commissioner; or (3) A period
otherwise specified by statute as the examination cycle for the insurer.383
•

In all of these cases, insurers argued that destruction of “medical records and any documents
containing medical information”384 would interfere with their statutory and regulatory
retention obligations under West Virginia law.385 In Bedell I, the WV Supreme Court held that
a protective order which interferes with retention requirements under the law will not be
upheld.386 The WV Supreme Court upheld the subsequent MPO and denied the insurance
companies’ request.387 The Court in State Farm v. Marks upheld the MPO in that case because
destruction and return of the records was not required until after six years, which was later
than the mandatory retention period.388 The U.S. District Court in Small v. Ramsey found that
the MPO was proper because its six-year retention limit also accommodated statutory and
regulatory requirements.389

•

The insurers also argued that MPO terms limiting retention periods conflicted with statutory
and regulatory obligations under other states’ laws, specifically Illinois and New York. 390 The
WV Supreme Court in Marks held that the MPO at issue allowed for Illinois law because
insurers could request permission to remove records from files, and there was no indication
this would be denied.391 Additionally, the MPO accommodated New York law because its
retention period is 6 years, the period of restriction specified in the order.392 The US District
Court in Small v. Ramsey held that the MPO allowed for compliance with Illinois and New
York law, and a copy of the medical records would be under court seal to request a copy for
compliance after Small received proper notice.393

•

In West Virginia, insurers have also argued that an order to destroy records would interfere
with their compliance with the Medicare Secondary Payer Act, which requires insurance
companies to notify Medicare if claims are paid to a Medicare recipient.394 The WV Supreme
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Court rejected this argument in State Farm v. Marks because the six-year restriction was
adequate to meet this obligation.395 Similarly, the U.S. District Court in Small v. Ramsey upheld
the MPO because determination of plaintiff’s Medicare status would occur at the time any
settlement or judgment was paid; identification and Medicare reimbursements would be paid
then and within the protective order’s six-year time restriction.396
Fraud Detection Obligations and Retention Requirements
• Another argument that insurers have made is that MPOs requiring destruction or return of
medical information would impede statutory and regulatory duties to report suspected fraud
under WVIC regulations.397 In State Farm v. Marks, the WV Supreme Court rejected this
argument and held that (1) the MPO adequately addressed concerns and (2) does not require
destruction or return until after retention requirement periods, and therefore could be met
within the order’s time restriction.398
•

The US District Court in Small v. Ramsey also rejected this argument, holding that (1) an
insurance company must have a reasonable belief fraud has been, is or will be committed, (2)
Executive Order 13181399 restricts judicial authorities from obtaining medical and insurance
records unless there is good cause for investigation, and no good cause was apparent in this
case, and (3) supplying National Insurance Crime Bureau and Insurance Services Office with
medical records is not required by WV or federal law, and is inappropriate because they are
not involved in litigation and could not obtain medical records on their own.400

Burdensome Compliance with Medical Protective Orders
• The insurers also argued that destruction or return of medical records would create an
unreasonable burden on insurance companies because their computer systems could not be
modified to remove pieces of information from files.401 The WV Sup. Ct. in State Farm v. Marks
held this argument was without merit, because computer files can be modified and computer
systems can remove only medical information from files.402 Further, inconvenience or
difficulty does not equal impossibility in complying with this term, and the order was upheld.403
•

In Bedell II, the WV Supreme Court upheld the MPO and also rejected this argument, reasoning
that destruction and return, and certification of destruction, is a well-recognized provision of
medical protective orders in many jurisdictions including West Virginia.404 Further, HIPAA
requires medical protective orders and provisions for the return of information when litigation
ends, and the MPO in this case required nothing more than the same after the statutory and
regulatory retention periods.405 The US District Court in Small v. Ramsey bluntly stated that
“what the insurer’s IT departments created they can modify.”406

Destruction of Business Records to Comply with MPOs
• The WV Supreme Court in Bedell II also addressed the argument that destruction of medical
records, and information contained in documents constitutes destruction of business records
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or attorney-client files.407 The Court again rejected this argument, reasoning that medical info
can be removed and the remainder preserved for business record or attorney files.408 The Court
also reasoned that the second MPO at issue included only “medical records, medical
information, or any copies or summaries thereof;” claims files, business files, attorney-client
files, or other litigation documents would remain intact.409 Further, destruction and
certification is necessary to protect a plaintiff’s privacy interests in medical information. 410
Constitutional Issues
• In Small v. Ramsey, State Farm and Nationwide relied on Sorrell v. IMS Health to argue that their
First Amendment rights would be violated if they were not permitted to disseminate the
medical information provided to it as needed.411 In Sorrell, the state of Vermont passed
legislation to prevent pharmacies from selling “prescriber (physicians) identifying information
to ‘data miners’ without the prescriber’s consent,” who then sold it to manufacturers who then
provided it to others to market certain medications to prescribers.412 The U.S. District Court
rejected this argument and distinguished Sorrell by observing that it applied to pharmaceutical
sale and marketing of prescriber (physician) information and not dissemination of individuals’
private medical records.413 Further, “obtaining [the plaintiff’s] medical records through
discovery within civil action does not constitute speech as contemplated in Sorrell.”414
However, the Court also hinted that restricting dissemination of information obtained outside
a court’s discovery process could be subject to stricter “prior restraint” scrutiny under the First
Amendment.415
•

Additionally, the WV Supreme Court in State Farm v. Marks reasoned that insurers could
communicate information required by law, which would not violate a First Amendment
right.416 The Court then pointed out that the Supreme Court of the United States had denied
certiorari in Bedell II, indicating no Constitutional import with the MPO term restricting access
of the information to only those involved in claim management and litigation.417

•

The insurers also argued that the MPOs’ destruction of records terms violated the
Constitution’s due process and full faith and credit clauses because of their retention and
reporting obligations in West Virginia and other states.418 The U.S. District Court rejected this
argument in Small v. Ramsey, holding that no due process violation existed because the MPO’s
time restriction allowed for compliance with statutory and regulatory obligations.419 Similarly,
the West Virginia Supreme Court in Marks found violation of the full faith and credit clause
did not exist because the MPO’s time restriction permitted compliance with other states’ and
courts’ requirements.420

Many of the issues that arise within the context of medical records may have particular resonance
with individuals and society in general in light of the pandemic.
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Other Issues with Data Privacy and the Pandemic
Due to governments requests for much of the
public to stay at home, non-essential employees have in
many cases been forced to bring their work home with
them. This change provides opportunity for bad actors
seeking to take advantage of home Internet’s weaker
infrastructure and the use of personal devices. The types of
increased risks that have been associated with bad actors
wishing to take advantage of the situation surrounding
COVID-19 include increased likelihood of phishing
attacks, cyber attacks on company networks due to a lack
of IT staff, and a higher likelihood of cyber attacks to
disrupt remote operations.1
With the increased usage of telecommunication
services such as Zoom, Microsoft Teams, and Skype, there
have also been concerns regarding the security of this type
of software. One concern has been “Zoombombing” in
which an unwanted actor interferes in a telecommunication
conference, either to actively disrupt or quietly listen in,
potentially putting confidential information that may be
discussed at risk of being overheard.1 There have also been
questions regarding the data security of using some
telecommunication software, such as Zoom, which has
faced lawsuits for allegedly failing to protect users’ data
from other sites who could use it for marketing or other
purposes.
Outside of businesses, governments have also
been engaging in activity that heightens data security risks.
In particular, there has been a call from governments to
social media companies and telecommunications providers
to track whether or not individuals are utilizing social
distancing guidelines by collecting location data from their
cellphones. 1 In addition, using geolocation data from cell
phones or other devices, the government can track the
locations of individuals and use this information to break
up gatherings and potentially prosecute offenders. In times
of emergency and health pandemics, it is not uncommon
for certain liberties to be restricted in the public interest.
However, such use of technology and the sharing of
information between private companies and the
government raises a number of questions that are at the
heart of the data privacy debate, such as:
• What information is being collected and shared?
• What can the information be used for?
• How long is it kept and is it being stored securely?

G. Data Privacy and the
Pandemic
In many ways, the COVID-19
pandemic has shown a spotlight on many
issues that intersect with data privacy. The
issues involved range from privacy and
contact tracing apps, an increase in cyber
security attacks (since more personnel are
working from home), and the intersection
between social media and surveillance.
However, by far the greatest potential
harm to data privacy is the use of contact
tracing apps.
For instance, the pandemic has
highlighted the use of technology to curtail
the spread of the disease through contact
tracing applications. The type of data
collected with contact tracing apps varies
greatly, depending on the software
developer. For many, contact tracing
applications that use centralized databases
are cause for concern since these systems
provide an opportunity for hackers to
gather data held in a single location.421
Decentralized systems are more popular
due to having less risk; as such, they are
being pushed by companies such as Apple
and Google as they release their application
programming interface (API) to different
countries. How these companies utilize
this technology, for how long, and what
they plan to do with any data gathered is
still unclear. The response by various
countries – to the data privacy implications
of contact tracing apps and related
technology used to address the pandemic –
has also varied significantly. While some
countries, like China, have used contact
tracing apps significantly,422 countries like
the United States hope to keep contact
tracing data limited and as-necessary.423
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1.

COVID-19 Contact Tracing Apps

In the case of the pandemic, contact tracing is being used to alert and monitor people who
have both tested positive for the COVID-19 virus and those they have come into recent contact with
who are now at a higher risk of contracting the virus.424 After a person has tested positive for the virus,
public officials would then reach out to that person in order to monitor their health and instruct them
on how to properly quarantine.425 While contact tracing can be done without the use of technology
(for instance, when teachers keep a roster of where there students sit in each class), the ability to trace
each person’s contact with someone who has tested positive is rendered significantly easier with the
use of technology. For instance, a contact tracing app can use Bluetooth technology to determine an
individual’s location and trace how close they have come to someone who has tested positive.426
Google and Apple have announced that they are developing apps that utilize Bluetooth technology in
order to accomplish this tracing, similar to geolocation tracking technology being utilized to encourage
and enforce social distancing.427
2.

How a Tracing App Works

On May 26, 2020, the first tracing app developed by Google and Apple was released in
Switzerland.428 Switzerland had required the Swiss army and hospital workers, to download the Swiss
COVID App prior to its public rollout.429 The tracing activated by the app is automatic, and is meant
to inform people who both have the app if one of them has become infected with COVID-19.430 This
app utilizes API (application programming interface) software to access permissions within the iPhone
or Android software in order to achieve the tracing. In this app, however, Apple and Google have
“forbidden participants from gathering users' location data, among other restrictions.” 431 The data that
is collected will vary, depending on if a tracing app utilizes a centralized or decentralized database to
gather its data, as illustrated in the flowchart below:
432

As illustrated to the left, if a tracing app utilizes
a centralized database, it is collecting data not only
from the user’s phone but also data from other
phones the user comes into contact with. In a
decentralized model, the phone only provides its
own data to the cloud database and does not serve
as a means to collect data from other phones.
Google and Apple are opting for a decentralized
approach with the API they are currently
offering.433 As one commentator notes, “this aims
to cut the risk of either hackers or the authorities
using the database of who met whom and for how
long for other purposes.”434According to Apple and
Google, “[Twenty-two] countries, as well as some
US states, had requested access to its API.”435
However, other countries are utilizing different API
and competing tracing apps, and not all of them are
voluntary.436 Google and Apple themselves also
intend to avoid an opt-in system eventually,
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avoiding the user needing to download an app by having the contact tracing system built into the
phone itself.437
3.

International Utilization of Tracing Apps

How different countries are utilizing tracing apps has varied immensely. According to the
Israeli government, the use of existing smartphone surveillance technology by Shin Bet, Israel’s
internal security service, assisted in the detection of over 4,000 COVID-19 cases.438 The Australian
government utilized a local app to trace virus cases, and due to fewer participants than expected, is
considering using the decentralized API from Google and Apple.439 European countries are more
cautious about allowing open use of this type of tracing app; many apps have been country-based
because of country-level variations in health privacy laws, trust in government, and regime type.440
China, the epicenter of the first outbreak, has had a much different approach to the utilization
of contact tracing applications. While their internal workings are incredibly similar, many parts of
China are considering utilizing tracing apps beyond the scope of the COVID-19 pandemic.441
The government’s virus-tracking software has been collecting information, including
location data, on people in hundreds of cities across China. But the authorities have set few
limits on how that data can be used. And now, officials in some places are loading their apps
with new features, hoping the software will live on as more than just an emergency measure.
Zhou Jiangyong, the Communist Party secretary of the eastern tech hub of Hangzhou, said
this month that the city’s app should be an “intimate health guardian” for residents, one that
is used often and “loved so much that you cannot bear to part with it,” according to an official
announcement.442
China uses a multitude of apps, where users provide personal information in addition to
information pertaining to a user’s health condition and travel history to enroll in one of the country’s
virus-tracking systems.443 “The software uses this and other data to assign a color code — green, yellow
or red — that indicates whether the holder is an infection risk. Workers posted outside subways,
offices and malls stop anyone without a green code from entering.”444
Talks of expanding this color system are already taking place in Hangzhou, where the original
Chinese contact-tracing app was pioneered.445 There, officials are considering expanding the app to
create a health code, ranking citizens with a “personal health index” on a score of 0–100 – a number
calculated by monitoring how much a person sleeps, how many steps they take, and health habits like
smoking or drinking.446
4.

Contact Tracing Apps in the United States

Currently, tracing apps in the United States have been primarily opt-in, voluntary, and
promoted on a state-by-state basis. In North and South Dakota, both state governors promoted the
use of the “Care19” app.447 This free application does not utilize the Google and Apple API, and
instead was created by the business ProudCrowd.448 Once a user downloads the app, they are assigned
an ID number, and the app caches the location of the person when they reside in a location for at
least ten minutes.449 If a person has tested positive, the Department of Health then asks the user for
consent to share the location history of the user with the state.450 This app relies on Wi-Fi data, cellular
tower data, and GPS in order to track users.451 “Around 29,600 people—approximately 1.5 percent of
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the combined population of both states—have downloaded the app. As of April 2020, only 17,031
people were actively using it.”452
Utah has also utilized a voluntary app developed by the company Twenty called “Healthy
Together,” which “relies on a combination of GPS, WiFi, IP address, cellular location data and
Bluetooth to identify contacts.”453 While North and South Dakota’s app utilizes anonymous location
data, Utah’s does not and has stated that “[p]ublic health officials and a limited number of
development employees with Twenty Holdings, Inc. will have access to your name, phone number,
and location data for COVID-19 tracing purposes only.”454
As a result, the majority of states are opting for a more human based approach to tracking the
spread of COVID-19.455 This may be due, in part, to a large public concern for privacy regarding these
types of contact-tracing applications, as evidenced by a study performed by Baobao Zhang, Sarah
Kreps, and Nina McMurry.456 The study focused on American perceptions of privacy, particularly in
relation to contact-tracing apps by conducting a survey. The results of this survey showed that the
American people were not very receptive to these apps versus other methods of handling the spread
of the virus. “We find widespread reluctance among the public: support for contact tracing apps is
lower than for expanding traditional contact tracing or introducing new measures like temperature
checks and centralized quarantine.”457 The survey was conducted between March 30 and April 1, 2020
with 1,964 participants.458 In this survey, the participants were presented with a variety of policies
regarding COVID-19, with some being more invasive than others, and then were asked about their
support for the policies with which they were presented.459 Another question was presented specifically
regarding contact-tracing applications and the likelihood one would download the app under different
circumstances.460
The results of this survey revealed that only about 30% of the population would likely
download a contact tracing app.461 There was a little variance as to whether or not one would download
the app if it were under a centralized (27%) or decentralized model (34%). Individuals who had contact
with the virus were far more likely to be interested in downloading the app.462 However, the largest
finding as a part of this study was the misunderstanding of technology surrounding these applications:
“most importantly, we uncover considerable degrees of misunderstanding about the technology, with
open-ended [sic] survey responses suggesting that digital contact tracing would entail individual
location tracking by the government, for example. We conclude that a public education campaign
focused on privacy-preserving features must accompany any roll-out of the technology to overcome
misconceptions about its operation.”463
5.

Potential Dangers of Contact-Tracing Apps and Possible Legal Solutions

There are many cybersecurity and privacy questions that remain unanswered as this data is
collected around the world. A large concern is the treasure trove of personal data being gathered by
the government and its possible accessibility to hackers.464 Another concern is the speed in which
these apps are being developed, leaving room for bugs and vulnerabilities. 465 Particularly apps built
with a centralized database prove to be a larger concern than those that are decentralized, as they
create “a single target for hackers who could steal or expose reams of data that could be used to
identify infected people.”466 Besides the worries of bad actors taking advantage of data, another fear
is that allowing this type of mass surveillance opens the door to mass government surveillance of the
public.467
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Trying to provide information that is useful to health providers while also protecting the
privacy and data of users is a difficult balancing act to achieve. There is a push for data that is being
gathered to be anonymous, but some commercial apps actively collect personal data that may be of
use to hackers.468 Some of the questions that arise in this context, as noted by Glenn A. Brown and
Shalin R. Sood, include:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

What information is being shared with the task force?
How is the information being kept secure?
What conditions are being placed on the use of this data?
What are the processes and procedures in place for destroying the data (or
returning it) once it is no longer useful to the task force?
(5) Will the data be used for additional purposes beyond tracking COVID-19 (e.g.,
for law enforcement purposes)?469
6.

Competing Legislative Solutions

In the prior Congressional session, two bills were proposed to Congress – one by Republicans
and one by Democrats – specifically targeting data collection from these tracing apps during the
COVID-19 pandemic.470 The bills would have addressed gaps that have emerged with the use of data
and HIPPA – specifically the fact that the makers of contract tracing apps generally do not fall within
HIPPA’s definition of covered medical providers. The Democratic endorsed bill is titled the Public
Health Emergency Privacy Act.471 The Republican endorsed bill is titled the COVID-19 Consumer
Data Protection Act.472 While both bills aim to focus on the protection of user data, their overall goals
and utilization vary.
The Public Health Emergency Privacy Act473
• The Public Health Emergency Privacy Act aims to build public trust with the contact tracing
apps and encourage their widespread use in order to fight the spread of COVID-19.474 “This
measure sets strict and straightforward privacy protections and promises: your information
will be used to stop the spread of this disease, and no more…Legal safeguards protecting
consumer privacy failed to keep pace with technology, and that lapse is costing us in the fight
against COVID-19,” explained Virginia Senator Richard Blumenthal regarding the proposed
bill.475
As Jessica Davis (reporting for Health IT Security) notes:
To encourage user participation, the bill would give individuals control
over participation, requiring tech companies to provide opt-in consent
and meaningful transparency into privacy and security practices. The
proposal also empowers private and public enforcement that includes
rulemaking from an “expert agency” but also recognizing state
legislation and enforcement. The proposed legislation would mandate
that all data collected through contact tracing apps would be limited to
public health use and prohibit the use of health data for any
discriminatory, unrelated, or intrusive purposes, such as commercial
advertising or efforts to bar access to employment, insurance, and the
like. Further, the bill would prevent potential misuse of health data by
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government agencies with no public health role. The apps would also
be required to provide regular reports on the impact of digital
collection tools on civil rights. If passed, the apps would be required
to employ strengthened data security and integrity protections,
including data minimizations and accuracy, while requiring tech firms
to delete the data once the public health emergency has ended. The
bill would also ensure the protection of voting rights by “prohibiting
conditioning the right to vote based on a medical condition or use of
contact tracing apps.”476
•

The bill has currently been endorsed by a number of privacy stakeholders, with the hope that
it will lay a foundation for protections in the future.477

COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act478
• The goal of the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act legislation is to grant users a say
in how their information is obtained by tracing apps and provide for greater transparency in
the data collection process of such apps.479
As Ms. Davis reports:
The proposal is designed to ensure businesses are held accountable for
any misuse of data collected to fight the COVID-19 pandemic and
would require companies under Federal Trade Commission
jurisdiction to obtain explicit consent from users to collect, process, or
transfer personal health, geolocation, proximity, or device data for
contact tracing. The bill mandates strict privacy disclosures at the point
of collection into how data will be handled, to which companies it will
be transferred, and how long it would be retained. Companies will be
required to establish clear definitions around aggregate and deidentified data and to adopt technical and legal safeguards to protect
consumer data from being reidentified. Further, companies would be
mandated to allow users to opt-out of the collection, processing, or
transfer of their personal health data and other personal information
collected by the apps. The platforms would need to provide
transparency reports to the public that detail data collection activities
related to the pandemic… If passed, the bill would also give state
attorneys general the power to enforce the act.480
•

The bill’s primary focus is the security of individuals’ data and sanctions against businesses
that misuse this data, and the hope that businesses would provide more transparency with the
use of user data.481
No action was taken on either bill.
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VI.

Considerations for West Virginia
In West Virginia [in 2018], a statewide teacher’s strike was partly spurred by the introduction of
Go365, an app used to track steps, sleep and heart rate. Failure to earn a certain number of points
through the system would result in a $500 hike in the employee’s annual insurance deductible. “People
felt really violated,” said Tega Toney, 34, an 11th-grade social-studies teacher in Oak Hill, W.Va.
“It was a Big Brother issue.” The program was later abandoned. 482

In many ways, West Virginia is uniquely poised to address data privacy issues within the state and
take a leadership position within the nation. For instance, while the state currently has little in the way
of broadband access and is ranked low in regard to its residents’ access to technology, this could
provide the opportunity for the state’s legislatures to take a proactive, thoughtful approach to issues
such as data privacy and cybersecurity that are embedded in advancing the technology platform of the
state. To that extent, checking in with residents and industry representatives regarding how they view
data and data privacy provides a unique opportunity for the legislature to take a proactive stance using
qualitative data amassed from conversations with each of these groups. Our discussions with both
highlighted that, particularly with regard to data breaches, there is a cost to both consumers and
businesses.483
A. Policy Landscape
To gather information for this report, we undertook two major steps. First, we conducted a
survey of 500 West Virginians regarding their initial outlook and perspective on issues regarding data
privacy. Then, we followed up with willing participants and conducted a series of focus groups across
the state, to ask more detailed questions from residents regarding their access to data. While the
majority of the pool from the focus groups was drawn from the initial survey pool, we did conduct
two subsequent focus groups (in Morgantown WV) made up entirely of non-survey takers. These
focus groups were unique in that it they were the only focus groups which consisted entirely of
individuals in the under 30 age group.
B. Summary of Initial Survey
The initial survey is what provided the breadth of the answers (quantitative research), while
the subsequent focus groups allowed us to go into more depth with participants (qualitative research).
Thus, the combination of the two allows us to have both breadth and depth.
The initial survey asked a series of questions regarding the resident’s use of technology and
their concern for issues falling within the category of “data privacy.” For instance, one question asked
participants: “do you ever worry about how much information is available about you on the internet?”
A more pointed follow up question asked, “Do you ever worry about your personal information being
collected by companies?” In response, 75% of those polled expressed some concern for companies
using their information with over half of respondents indicating that they worried about it (an
additional 18% of respondents stated that they worried about it “sometimes.”).
In addition:
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•

Over 50% of respondents had personally experienced some sort of data breach (defined as
having their information stolen or compromised).

•

42% of respondents indicated that they had their personal information collected without
their knowledge and consent.

•

41% indicated that they had their information shared without their knowledge or consent.

•

34% of respondents had their personal information stolen (i.e., social security number,
credit card or banking information, and medical information)

•

Nearly a third of respondents had had their email or social networking account
compromised in some way.

In addition, those being polled were generally split regarding whether they trust various categories
of businesses with a slight majority in most categories indicating that they trusted the specific industry.
The one exception was West Virginians’ view of their personal bank. In that instance, 80% of
respondents indicated that they generally trusted their primary bank to some degree.484
Most residents surveyed in West Virginia who were affected by some sort of data breach they
indicated that some remedy was available to them. For instance,
•
•
•
•
•
•

38 % had access to free credit monitoring so that their credit score isn't affected.
31% indicated that they had access to a formal complaint system.
25 % indicated that they had access to compensation in the form of discounts, refunds, or
free services.
25 % indicated that they had access to monetary compensation.
23% indicated that they credit score freezes available.
15 % indicated that they had access to fines from government agencies.485

Survey responses also demonstrate that many residents in West Virginia would like to see some
specific remedy for data privacy harm. For instance, the strongest percentage of remedies that
respondents chose were: (1) fines from government agencies and (2) free credit monitoring. A large
minority (33%) also indicated that they would like to see credit score freezes as part of a system of
remedies. This seems to indicate that many respondents were primarily concerned with identity theft
issues or issues that would negatively affect their credit score.486
Survey results also seem to indicate that, among initial participants, those who were in the under
30 age group were among the least trustful of the various entities surveyed. For instance, only 45% of
people under the age of 30 trusted email providers either a little or a lot – making it the lowest
percentage by age group.487 Similarly, the under 30 age group also displayed the lowest level of trust
for cell phone carriers (48% versus the next highest category – those 65 and over, who registered their
trust level at 51%). Similarly, those in the under 30 age group registered the least amount of trust for
online retailers – coming in at 49% (which was the same level of trust of those aged 65 and over).488
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This low level of trust by this age group may also affect the businesses’ future earning potential.
For instance, according to a 2019 report 81% of consumers have indicated that they would not use a
brand that they did not trust.489
These results stand at odds with the type of responses we saw during our focus group meetings.
For instance, in the Morgantown focus group (which was made up entirely of university students at
either undergraduate or graduate level), the participants were unanimous in their general positive
feelings for technology and those companies that use technology. (see section VI. c for further
information). One possible explanation is that the “under 30 group” may be too broad because 1824-year-olds (who represented the group at the focus group) fall into a generation that has experienced
a different interaction with technology than those between the ages of 24 and 30.
The survey results seem to be on par with other surveys conducted in this area.490 For instance,
a 2019 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found a majority of respondents feel that
“data collection poses more risks than benefits.”491
C. Summaries of Focus Group Sessions
From August 2019 – February 2020, we conducted a series of focus groups to gather further
information from West Virginia residents regarding their views on data privacy. All of the focus
groups met in person, in the following West Virginia counties: Berkeley, Kanawha, Harrison and
Monongalia. In all we conducted five focus group interviews.
As mentioned earlier, the methodology of the focus groups (which occurred over a 90-minute
period) was designed to complement the quantitative research that was compiled from survey results
by supplementing that with qualitative research.492 The interviews proceeded as follows. The
questions began with generalized, open-ended questions designed to solicit the focus group
participants’ views in the most unbiased way. Then we began asking about their views on specific
scenarios in order to clarify and challenge their positions vis-à-vis the research that we had uncovered
to date.
For instance, after requesting background information regarding the occupation and internet
usage of each participant, the first question asked participants “what concerns (if any) do you have
regarding your interaction with technology?” For the more detailed questions, participants were given
specific scenarios and asked their opinions regarding how they would react if confronted with the
situation.
Participants in the Morgantown focus group represented both the residents who fit into the
18 – 24 age group and those who had not previously participated in the survey. In general, their
responses reflected a low level of concern for how their data was being utilized. Instead, many of the
participants discussed the value that they believed that they were obtaining from having companies
access their data.493
Focus Groups Derived from Initial Survey Participants
1.

General topics and discussions for focus group sessions based on survey participants
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After confirming that each focus group participant had significant internet usage to participate
in the focus group, we generally494 proceeded with the same set of questions which delved into the
topic areas and relied on the same general set of questions in the following subject areas: (1) specific
concerns regarding how their data is used; (2) a comparison between their views on privacy in email
versus delivered mail; (3) their views regarding “public v. private” data; (4) corporate transparency; (5)
targeted ads; and (6) collection and use of inaccurate information.
Internet Usage:
• All participants indicated that they access the internet at least once a week using a variety of
devices, with a majority stating that the primary device they use to access the internet are their
phones. Almost all participants explained that they use their phones for multiple purposes (e.g.,
social media, work, etc.).
Concerns:
• Focus group participants expressed a number of concerns surrounding data privacy issues.
Overall, the most widely held concern was corporate vulnerability to cybersecurity attacks.
However, other concerns raised by participants included:
1. Corporations collecting and using their data without consumers’ consent.
2. Corporations using inaccurate data.
3. Corporations sharing consumers’ data with third parties with little information provided
to consumers regarding who has access to their information.
4. Consumers having little knowledge or control regarding how their information is being
used.
Mail vs. Email:
• A majority of participants indicated that they were unaware that their email correspondences
were not protected or secure. The participants all believed that information exchanged via
email should be protected, in the same way as letters arriving in their mailboxes. Three
participants agreed that even if they had nothing to hide, they would be bothered by someone
looking through a letter sent through the US Postal Service.
Public vs Private Data:
• Participants believe that information protected via login should be protected, as use of a login,
two factor authentication, or other security measures fosters the assumption of both security
and privacy. Conversely, information not protected by a login may be sold because there is no
assumption of privacy on the consumer end. One participant explained that unless she is
looking up something, neither companies nor the government should review her
communications. She explained that technology has made it so fewer people communicate in
person, resulting in much of today’s conversations taking place through email, Facebook, and
other services.
Transparency:
• Focus group participants had differing views regarding how transparent corporations need to
be regarding the collection and use of their data. For instance, one participant believed a lack
of transparency in the collection and sale of data was the price to be paid for the internet
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existing. However, he believes this becomes a gray area when this data is used maliciously or
to bombard those who are troubled. His conclusion was that all companies should be required
to be transparent with how they use and sell information; if they cannot be transparent, they
should not be allowed to sell user information.
Targeted Ads:
• There was a decided split regarding corporate use of consumer data to provide targeted ads to
its clients. For instance, some participants were in favor of the practice because they felt it
gave them access to advertisements that aligned with their interests. However, most
participants were uncomfortable with services selling consumer data to third parties for any
purposes, specifically advertising purposes, without their consent.
Insurance and Credit Score:
• Participants were uncomfortable with an insurance company using one’s credit score or
location as a factor in determining their rates. One participant was just concerned with the
idea of using one’s credit score for purposes in which it wasn’t intended (e.g. hiring). He
believes that employers should be restricted in their use of public information without making
the potential employee aware prior to its use. Regarding the use of location in the
determination of insurance qualification, one participant stated that this should not be a factor
unless the area has a high frequency of incidents resulting in vehicular damage.
Personal Information and Health Insurance:
• Participants disagreed with use of this information to determine whether or not one qualifies
for health insurance. One participant equated this to digging through his trash. The same
participant believes that health insurance companies, like life insurance companies, should be
required to come to the individuals house to ask them questions directly to make their
determination.
Data Privacy and Discriminatory & Predatory Practices:
• Participants were universal in their desire to have established prohibitions for predatory tactics
against race, socioeconomic status, etc. They believe that this information is biased and
irrelevant. One participant explained that as a realtor she was required to follow the FHA
guidelines and expects there to be similar guidelines applied to data privacy. She believes the
FHA guidelines could serve as a model for future legislation regarding weblining.
Use of Information:
• Many participants have become resigned to companies having their information. Participants
indicated that they are fine with companies using data for consumer statistics and/or for
improvements in their services. However, participants seemed uneasy with the use of their
data for any other purposes not related to the use of that particular service. Some participants
are bothered by companies using their information to recommend items to them based on
their previous purchase history; one explained that this feels as though the company is trying
to make decisions for her.
Inaccurate Profile Info:
• Participants seemed to be split between stating that they would simply delete their account in
this situation, and stating that they would want their information corrected and to have
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recourse to ensure the situation does not happen again. Several participants indicated that if
they were unable to delete the account, they would then attempt to rid it of the inaccurate
information. One participant stated that she would not be very concerned about correcting
the information because she believes it is better that the company have incorrect information
about her than correct information, unless the information is potentially harmful (e.g.
involving criminal history). Another participant simply stated that she believes it would be her
fault if she failed to read the terms and conditions of the service, even if the terms of service
were silent and updated.
Credit Monitoring:
• Multiple participants indicated that they would like free credit monitoring as a remedy to loss
or misuse of financial information. Participants also found notifications received by credit
monitoring services of strange or fraudulent activity helpful.
Nothing to Hide:
• Several participants feel as though they have “nothing to hide” in regard to their online data
and information. Other participants feel as though even if they have nothing to hide, they
would not like their information available to others without their consent. One participant,
age 29, explained that she is unconcerned about the information available about her on social
media and expects that her internet browsing is being tracked. For instance, some participants
are not bothered by Amazon’s IoT device, Alexa, recording their conversations as they have
“nothing to hide” and are aware that the device listens to their conversations, while others
find Amazon’s practices regarding Alexa to be an invasion of privacy.
Filing a Lawsuit:
• Most participants felt they should have access to remedies in the event of a violation of data
privacy. For those participants who believed that filing a lawsuit was one way to provide a
remedy, a number of different processes and outcomes were discussed. In addition,
participants noted that the sensitivity of the information illegally accessed should be a factor
for calculating damages and for initial notification.
One participant believes the law should ensure the following in order to ease the process of filing
a lawsuit for violations of data privacy:
a. Victims should gain complete, post-breach access to the data impacted.
b. Legal costs should be covered by the responsible party.
c. Part of the typical award should include free credit reports each year as well as daily
credit score notifications.
d. Limitations on length of time and types of information companies may retain.
Factors considered by participants in determining whether or not they would file suit for data privacy
violations include:
• How deeply they were impacted.
• Whether or not they knew the offender personally.
• Level of certainty that they incurred a loss (financial, etc.).
• Alternatives (i.e., settling out of court).
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Remedies:
• Participants all seem to agree that they would like companies who abuse or lose consumer data
to be fined per incident and that the fine should be significant enough to prevent reoccurrence
or limit the data retained by the company. Multiple participants indicated they would have
preferred their situations been handled through prevention, ensuring that it does not happen
to another user again. One participant mentioned that they would like the ability to edit
incorrect personal information about oneself online based on the sensitivity of the
information. Multiple participants state that they would want free credit monitoring and
notifications as an initial step taken by responsible companies. Some participants believe that
if a company repeatedly disregards data privacy laws, criminal charges should be considered,
or the CEO should begin to incur fines based on salary. One participant mentioned that in his
personal experience, he found that it was easier for the individual to abuse his information
than it was for him to have the issue resolved. He was required to provide a certified letter,
DL, SS card, bank statements, and three months for his issue to be resolved. Another
participant mentioned that companies should alert those who have failed to read its terms of
service.
The Morgantown Focus Groups
The Morgantown focus groups study has two specific, distinguishing factors from the previous
focus groups. First, unlike the other focus participants, none of the participants in the Morgantown
groups had participated in the initial survey.495 Additionally, the Morgantown focus group participants
universally fell into the youngest age group of all the participants – with all participants being between
the ages of 18-25.
Internet Usage:
• Participants reported using the internet for approximately 4 to 8 hours each day. The device
used to access the internet seemed to be determined by their dominant online activities.
Participants who reported spending a majority of their time online studying or doing
homework tended to use computers as the primary device to access the internet; these same
participants reported using internet on their phones primarily for social media. Participants
who reported spending a majority of their time on the internet shopping or using social media
tended to use cell phones as their primary device to access the internet.
Concerns:
• Focus group participants indicated concerns about both cybersecurity and privacy. However,
there was a distinct difference between the two groups: the focus group held on February 19th
had participants whose concerns primarily centered around cybersecurity and much less on
other issues related to privacy, while the prioritization of the concerns of the February 26 th
focus group were reversed.
•

Participants of the February 19th focus group indicated hacks and breaches as their primary
concern; these same participants were less concerned about the information collected about
them so long as the information was protected. Participants of the February 26 th focus group
indicated that they were most concerned about the types of information being collected and
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how this information would be used. Participants of this focus group indicated that their
degree of concern was relative to the sensitivity of the information collected.
Mail vs. Email:
• Participants of both focus groups indicated feelings of discomfort at the idea of their physical
mail being read. Both groups indicated that this troubled them more than their emails being
read because their privacy would be invaded by another person rather than a machine.
Participants also indicated that one should not be required to pay additional costs to ensure
the privacy of physical mail.
Public vs Private Data:
• Although not explicitly stated within the focus group transcripts, it seems as though
participants perceive physical mail to be a more private/personal form of correspondence than
emails. Participants felt most uncomfortable with the idea that someone at the post office
would be reading their correspondences.
Transparency:
• Many participants indicated that failing to read the terms and conditions places fault on the
consumer even if the consumer was unaware of what he/she had agreed to. Participants stated
that to combat this, companies should make consumers aware of relinquishing their rights to
privacy by placing this in bold at the top of the terms and conditions.
Data Privacy and Discriminatory & Predatory Practices:
• Regarding the use of algorithms and machine learning, participants believed that this
technology is not yet up to the standards required to make decisions related to identification
of individuals. Rather than being used to make decisions, participants argued that algorithms
and machine learning should be used to assist humans in making decisions.
Inaccurate Profile Info:
• Focus group participants indicated that they would be most concerned if the inaccurate profile
information affected their dating life, job prospects or altered some other aspect of their life
substantially; under these circumstances, participants would be more willing to lodge a formal
complaint. Participants believe the development of an organization similar to the Better
Business Bureau would be beneficial for filing complaints concerning inaccurate data.
Credit Monitoring:
• Credit monitoring was listed as a potential remedy by participants.
Use of Information:
• Participants of the February 19th focus group indicated that they were less concerned about
the collection of their information (e.g., by Google Home). Participants stated that this
information was being collected by other companies and services, so collection did not bother
them- especially if the collection benefitted them through improvement of the algorithm used
by the company or service.
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Nothing to Hide:
• Participants did not indicate that they had “,nothing to hide.” Rather, they indicated that
numerous other services and companies have already collected data about them which makes
them less concerned that this collection of their personal information is taking place. It seems
like participants have just surrendered to having their personal information collected.
Filing a Lawsuit:
• Participants indicated that their decision to file a lawsuit would be dependent on the severity
of the harm that was caused. Participants indicated that in order to file a lawsuit the harm
would have to be substantial and/or life changing. Participants would be more likely to file a
lawsuit if (a) they did not have to pay for legal expenses and (b) the process would be handled
through a state agency and (c) they would receive compensatory damages.
Remedies:
• Participants indicated that companies should explain to the victim how they plan to or have
already improved security measures to ensure the harm does not occur again. Participants also
discussed a tiered system for fines based on the sensitivity of compromised information, with
higher rates for repeat offenders and companies with greater gross revenue. In contrast to the
tiered system, some participants argued that a substantial flat rate fine may be a better deterrent
for companies. Finally, participants also indicated that the victim should receive damages in
the amount that was lost.
Focus Group Recommendations:
At the end of each focus group session, participants were asked to provide their insight regarding
what an “ideal data privacy law would look like.” Below are their recommendations.
1. Restrictions on Data Retention: Participants would like the law to place restrictions on
who is able to retain sensitive data and for how long they may retain the information. The
law should also include specifications for how companies can and can’t get rid of consumer
data.
2. Unlimited Access to Credit Report. Participants are in favor of free credit monitoring and
believe that everyone should have total access to their credit report at all times.
3. Stiff Penalties and/or Fines. Participants all believe that there should be stiff penalties
and/or fines per incident of data misuse or loss. Participants agree that fines should be
large enough to prevent repeat offenses (e.g. 10,000 per incident/per person). The specific
amount of the fine may be based on the company’s revenue or CEO’s salary. Some
participants believe that repeat offenders should be punished through fining corporate
executives a percentage of their income while others believe repeat offenses should receive
criminal penalties.
4. Option to Opt-in/out. Participants would like the option to opt-in or out of the collection
and use of their personal data. Services that do not offer consumers this option should be
prohibited from selling consumer data.

71

5. Public vs. Private Data. Participants indicated that they wanted the law to acknowledge
the difference between public and private data and require companies to handle
information accordingly. Specifically, services that require a log-in, two-factor
authentication, or other security measures should require heightened data privacy on the
premise that there is an assumption of security and confidentiality on the consumer’s end.
6. Personal Ownership and Ability to Correct. Participants want personal ownership of their
data. One participant suggested that there should be a website that houses the entirety of
one’s online information and allows for the correction of incorrect information by the
affected individual.
7. Protection of Emails. Participants would like information exchanged via e-mail to be
protected, just as letters in your mailbox.
8. Prohibition of Prejudicial Ad Targeting. Participants would like the law to prohibit racial
or socioeconomic based targeting. One participant suggested that to prevent this there
should be some form of anonymity on purchase behavior.
Many of these suggestions have been adopted by other legal frameworks.
VII.

Recommendations & Proposed Best Practices
“We all need reminding sometimes that if we are not paying for the product, we are the product.”496

In the two years since this report was first proposed, technology and its attendant data privacy
interests has continued to move forward at a light-speed pace. The amount of data that can be stored
and processed continues to expand rapidly, the way that data can be collected and used has continued
to evolve beyond what early proponents have conceived of, and yet, the law has been slow to catch
up to all of these developments.
When something evolves at such a rapid pace, providing recommendations and thoughts on best
practices is an exercise fraught with peril – for fear that something proposed on a Tuesday will be
rendered obsolete by Friday. And yet, a significant part of this work was initiated to do exactly that:
provide a road map for best practices for legislators, policy makers and businesses – based on feedback
collected by affected communities. So, with much trepidation, we proceed.
Specifically, we arrange our discussion in this area in two parts. First, we provide an overview of
the current methodologies that are being used (or contemplated) as a regulatory framework. Second,
we provide our takeaways regarding what best practices we believe should govern any regulatory
framework. We should state that, in light of these rapid changes to our industry and to our world,
these best practices recommendations should be viewed as general principles that should underlie the
relevant parties as they develop laws, regulations or policies to address these concerns. Providing for
more general principles instead of specific standards or recommendations would allow those who
draft such laws to consider this framework even as the underlying technology continues to change.
Also, to the extent that these principles align with information and recommendations that have been
proposed by others, we try and include all known proposers here.
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A.

The Pros and Cons of Various Regulatory Frameworks

There are many regulatory structures that are already being considered (or have been adopted)
throughout the world. here, we highlight some key regulatory initiatives and discuss their benefits and
drawbacks.
Notice and Consent
What it is: Requires consent at the point of data collection. Data subject has the right to optin and opt-out. The process of opting-out should be just as easy as opting-in.497
Benefits: It is the responsibility of the controller to demonstrate that the data subject
consented to having his or her data processed.498 Individuals have the right to withdraw their
consent at any time without “affect[ing] the lawfulness of processing based on consent before
its withdrawal. Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof.” 499
Drawbacks: Most people don’t read privacy policies and if they do, they usually don’t
understand what they are reading. If they do understand what they are reading, they may not
have enough background knowledge to make an informed decision on the matter.
Providing consent at the point of collection does not give specifics about what happens to
that data once it is collected. What happens when it is sold to third parties? “[T]he original
notice and consent does nothing to limit the downstream uses of that data.”500
Control
What it is: The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) is one example of a Control
framework. It gives the consumer the right to know what personal information is collected
about them and how it is used; the right to delete the personal information companies
collected from them; the right to opt-out from the sale of their personal information to third
parties; and the right to non-discrimination for exercising their rights under the CCPA.501 This
specific legal system gives the consumer control over various stages of the data collection and
use process.
Benefits: You have the right to know what information companies have collected about you
and you have the right to have that personal information deleted by that company and its third
parties.502 Also, because you have the right to non-discrimination, companies cannot deny you
services or their product, charge you a different fee, or treat you any differently because you
exercised your rights under the CCPA.503
Drawbacks: Although you may request to have a business delete your personal information
which they collected from you, as well as have their third parties do the same, many exceptions
allow businesses to keep the information.504 In addition, a business may not be able to
complete your transaction if you ask it to delete or stop selling your personal information and
that information is necessary for the business to complete the transaction.
Accountability (Private Right of Action: Attorney General / Agency Function)
What it is: A private right of action gives an individual whose privacy rights are violated the
right to sue the violating company directly. Federal law does not currently afford a private
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right of action but several states allow for individuals private right of action.505 Currently the
FTC is the government authority tasked with enforcing privacy. If Congress were to create a
new data protection agency, it could address the shortfalls of FTC’s current authority.
Benefits: By setting up a new agency Congress would be “provd[ing] opportunities to create
a structure that is better suited to enforcing privacy, including by maintaining some degree of
stability or independence across presidential administrations.”506
“Without a private right of action, individuals have to rely on federal or state enforcers, like
the FTC, to protect their privacy. While there is some opposition to a private right of action
from companies and policymakers, it would offer several benefits.”507
A new agency could possibly restructure interactions with international privacy and data
protection counterparts, “as such an agency may be better suited to interact with other
international data protection authorities.”508
Drawbacks: One of the largest concerns with creating a new agency is the amount of time it
would take to setup and take to work efficiently.509
Data Privacy Wrappers
What it is: Creates a consent framework around the data use. The framework would create
data “wrappers” describing the type of material contained within the framework without
revealing the details about the content.
Benefits: Data wrappers are created at the instant the data is created. There are rules about
how and when the data can be accessed and used, “essentially acting as a virtual ‘lock’ against
unauthorized use.”510
Drawbacks: The system would require significant details about the processes and types of
uses that users are willing to agree to. Mundie suggests creating a new “agency that would be
responsible for establishing and enforcing such standards on a large scale.”511
Regulating Data Use
What it is: Changing the focus from data collection to data use. Because there is currently so
much information being collected about individuals, it is impossible to keep track of
everything that is being collected and everything that individuals have consented to. Therefore,
the focus must shift to a point of use rather than a point of collection.
Benefits: Give more control to what happens to data once it is collected. Allows individuals
to know how their data is used when it is sold to third parties. The use of an individual’s data
is very important to the individual, regulating data use is a very big benefit.
Drawbacks: Because there is so much data being collected on individuals, it is impossible for
each individual to keep track of each data point individually. Therefore, people can only engage
in “’privacy self-management selectively.’”512
Clarifying the Due Process Standard
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What it is: Clarifying and establishing the due process requirements for digital transaction
surveillance. The government agencies can currently use many different types of digital
surveillance and intelligence methods in today’s environment.
Benefits: The new system would streamline the authorization levels into three: (1) warrant,
(2) Terry Order, or (3) subpoena.
Drawbacks: This system would rely extensively on the court system to examine and interpret
the standard, potentially causing extensive delays for consumers and uncertainties for business.
Consumer Data Identification
What it is: “Legislation could require the creation of a centralized mechanism, such as an
Internet portal, where data brokers can identify themselves, describe their information
collection and use practices, and provide links to access tools and opt outs.”513
Benefits: It is also recommended that Congress consider legislation that would require data
brokers to: “(1) allow consumers to access their own information; (2) allow consumers to
suppress the use of this information; (3) disclose to consumers the data brokers’ sources of
information, so that, if possible, consumers can correct their information at the source; and
(4) disclose any limitations of the opt-out option, such as the fact that close matches of an
individual’s name may continue to appear in search results.”514
Drawbacks: Not all individuals would be interested in accessing their own information. The
older population would most likely have a difficult time with accessing the portal in order to
correct their data/information.
B.

General Principles for Developing a Regulatory Framework

In constructing our recommendations, we have taken a deliberate tact. Rather than providing
specifics for policy recommendations that could easily be rendered irrelevant with the next change in
technology, we have framed our recommendations as “General Principles,” foundational guidelines
that we hope will withstand the transformative nature of technology. To that end, should these
Principles seem too simplistic, we would encourage you to review them within the context of, and be
informed by, all the work that has gone into the research, development and drafting for this project.
In addition, we should note that others (most critically, the participants of our focus groups) have
provided specific recommendations for a data privacy law. We do not re-hash those specifics here.
*****
General Principle #1 - Begin with the End in Mind
Given that issues with technology seem to impact consumers of data privacy to a disproportionate
degree than it does big businesses, the first recommendation would start by considering how any data
privacy policy or law would affect the consumer, the end-user first. Will it place an onerous burden
on the individual? Is it something easy to use and accessible for those affected? So, to that extent,
initiatives that require consumers to scroll through unclear notices without a clear means of opting
out regarding what businesses do with their data, seems unworkable.
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Beginning with the end in mind also seems to favor laws and policies that focus on data use rather
than data collection, since data use is the natural ending point of data collection.
General Principle #2 – Data as a Property Right
Most of the focus group participants discussed in general terms issues surrounding data with a very
specific ownership interest. For these focus group members, the data was theirs and for many focus
group members the general theme was that this information was being taken and used without their
consent. While some of the younger focus group participants didn’t mind sharing their data,
particularly if they felt that they were receiving something in return (such as access to personalized
recommendations), the key to a successful implementation of this rule is to make sure that the
consumer is truly sharing or relinquishing their data of their own free will, instead of being tricked or
deceived into doing it. In addition, framing these issues as property rights can help highlight why
authorities as diverse as the European Union and the WV Supreme Court provide heightened
protection for different types of data – information regarding our medical health is viewed as a
particularly precious resource. As such, we should ascribe a particularly high value to its collection and
use.
General Principle #3 – Create a Centralized Agency
Having a central agency that is tasked with overseeing data privacy has several key advantages. First,
it establishes a central location where consumers, policy makers and industry can turn to regarding
what the definitive standard is for data privacy issues. Second, allowing a government agency to focus
on this issue will provide a depth of expertise at the governmental level that legislators can tap into as
new issues arise. Finally, having a regulatory intermediary would allow the government to move
quicker (through its rulemaking process) than they would otherwise be able to with traditional
legislation. This, in turn, would allow the government to react quickly (or move proactively) to the
current technological issues that implicate a consumer’s data privacy.
General Principle #4 – Don’t Forget the Impact of Machines
As we hope we have shown, the impact of machines and machine-learning algorithms permeates every
aspect of data privacy. As such, a comprehensive legal framework will need to address this head on.
This can be done in one of two ways: either more stringent measurements can be put in place on the
front end to prevent machines from accessing data that can lead to discriminatory decisions, or
remedies can be provided on the back end that would allow individuals to see the information that
has been used in various decisions and allow them to challenge these results. Regardless, the impact
of these formulas needs to be part of the conversation.
General Principle #5 - Consider all the Players
As this white paper has shown, the network of constituents that are involved in data privacy issues is
vast. While many of them (such as Big Tech companies) have garnered significant focus and attention,
many more (such as data brokers) have largely escaped regulatory scrutiny. As such, developing a legal
framework that allows all constituents to be considered is crucial. As a corollary to that, legislatures
and policy makers should take care to make sure that the specific structure of the law accurately
addresses the specific potential impact of each of the players. The same law, for instance, could
provide only minimal access to a consumer’s data to some while allowing more permissive uses to
others.
General Principle #6 – Take Only What You Need
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In addition to examining the who of data privacy, researchers have recommended that policy makers
also examine the what. Specifically, some who write in this area have discussed being guided by the
principle of data minimization.515 Under this framework., companies would only gather information
that is central to their key business.516 This is in contrast to the more expansive collection methods
that have been operating by corporations in the era of big data. Having a more focused structure of
data collection would provide some relief to consumers who are concerned with the level of detail
that corporations have currently amassed about them.
General Principle #7 – Limit the Use of What you Take
One of the big lessons that has been learned in the era of big data is that our uses of information can
evolve at a rate that is directly proportional to our innovation and creativity. Thus, the data we collect
today could be used in unimaginable ways in just a few years’ time. As such, it seems unfair to permit
corporations to continue to use consumers’ information in ways that were originally inconceivable at
the time that permission was granted. Making sure the law reflects this understanding would seem to
be the most equitable solution, particularly in light of the fact that one of the central arguments of
business – that the data captured is central to their business model – would not apply to situations like
this.
General Principle #8 – Make Privacy Easy to Understand
Again and again, research has confirmed that corporate disclosures are rarely read and almost never
understood by consumers. The language is often dense, long-winded and varies significantly from
one corporation to another. But what if we required corporations to disclose privacy issues the same
way that we require food companies to provide nutritional information? This is the approach that
some companies, like Apple, are voluntarily taking. Having a uniform system that could be translated
across companies and industries would be an easy way for consumers to make more informed
decisions.517
General Principle #9 – Let Consumers Have Control
A key part of the work of this white paper was to hear directly from consumers about what they want.
Similarly, a key facet of any legislative progress should be one where consumers have a voice in the
law being shaped, but also have some control of their data at the end. It could be in the form of a Do
Not Trace List (similar to Do Not Call Lists), as has been proposed by researcher Michelle Kraft.518
Or it could be in more nuanced ways that have not yet been considered. But, keeping the focus on
consumers will allow the choice to be retained by the consumers regarding how their data is used.
General Principle #10 – No Need to Reinvent the Wheel519
If nothing else, we hope that this white paper highlights just how much work has already been done
on the issue of data privacy. As such, legislators seeking to develop a data privacy framework can rely
on the successes and failures of their predecessors, adjusting to adapt to the particular needs of the
state.520
VIII.

Conclusion

As we hope this white paper has demonstrated, data privacy issues are intricate, interconnected
and important to understand. Given the predominance of technology to all aspects of our lives,
tackling the regulatory framework might be the single greatest undertaking of this era. Moreover, the
rapidity with which technology is changing makes the issue even more pressing – consider the fact
that most individuals between the ages of 40 and 50 have seen the development, dominance and now
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disuse of a number of technologies: video-cassette tapes, facsimile machines, and computer floppy
disks. There is no reason to assume that this trend will not continue – in fact it will likely accelerate.
As such, developing foundational principles now – before our technology eclipses our moral
regulation of it – will be a crucial legacy for us to leave to future generations.
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APPENDIX A: GLOSSARY OF TERMS
Many of the terms that are used throughout this paper have developed specific meaning to the data privacy world.
Here, RA Cheryl Brown offers a compilation of key definitions.
AI Algorithms – algorithms designed to make decisions by using and combining various types of
data from different sources, analyzing it at very fast speeds, and learning from (in the case f machine
learning algorithms) or acting on any “insights” they “derive” from it.521 AI algorithms and systems
“learn and adapt as they compile information and make decisions.”522 According to Prof. Sam Perl, at
Carnegie Mellon University, this is the process that AI uses:
machines use the historical data to train the algorithm which results in a Trained Model
(this can take hours, days or even weeks. … Now you have a trained Model. You can
provide your Model a new data point (or set of data) and ask your Model to make
choices based upon what it has learned. This is called “inference” and it can often
happen very quickly (and can seem instantaneous). How fast is dependent upon a lot
of factors such as the speed of the computer it is running on and what kind of network
it is running on.523
API (Application Programming Interface) – programming interfaces used by applications to
interact and exchange data with each other.524 Newly written programs can contract to incorporate
and use existing APIs needed to interact and exchange data with other programs. 525 Contact tracing
apps developed by public health agencies use APIs developed by Apple and Google. 526 A user must
“opt-in” to a notification system, after which a random ID for the device is generated by “the
Exposure Notifications System” and Bluetooth is enabled for the exchange of data between phones. 527
The random IDs change every 10-20 minutes to prevent identification or location of the user.528
Enabled phones in the same vicinity “work in the background to exchange” these random IDs via
Bluetooth, even if the contact tracing or Bluetooth apps are not open.529
Clickwrap – serves as an electronic signature by clicking a box or button to agree to terms of service,
end user license agreement, terms and conditions, a privacy policy, or other electronic agreement. 530
Components to make a clickwrap agreement enforceable:
(1) a user must affirmatively accept by clicking agree or accept.
(2) terms of service must be prominently displayed and reasonable.
(3) terms should be easily understood by an average person.
(4) the agreement cannot “exploit unequal bargaining power” under the terms.531 It can require a user’s
acceptance to access or use the service, but cannot be “we take all” but “leave you with nothing;”532
and
(5) “specific consents must be distinguishable from the rest of the document,” and “not bury
controversial terms of an agreement.”533
CRM Programs – Customer Relationship Management software, a central location for customer
interactions and data which is used to improve customer service by allowing access to this data about
customer behavior.534
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Cybersecurity – “The art of protecting networks, devices, and data from unauthorized access or
criminal use and the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.”535
Data analysis – the “process of cleaning, transforming, and modeling data” to discover and extract
useful information on which to base business or other decisions.536
Data Lake – a centralized storage location for raw, unprocessed data, usually cloud-based, providing
one place to save and access it.537
Data Mining – the process that uses large data sets to analyze patterns and predict outcomes using
various software.538 Turning raw data into useful information allows businesses and organizations to
learn about customers and structure marketing, advertising, and other aspects of their businesses.539
Data set – a file containing one or more records to be used by programs or for storage of information
needed by applications or operating systems.540 Data sets can be cataloged, referenced by name, and
organized according to how the sets will be accessed.541
Data Warehouse – storage location for data after processing, the data is processed and then uploaded
into a data warehouse.542
Data wrapper – metadata or other data which is used to mask a set of different data to protect
personally identifiable or other sensitive information.543
The Internet of Things (IoT) – the system of all devices and objects connected to the internet
with the ability to collect and transfer data over a wireless network automatically without human
input.544
Machine readable form – the necessary translation for computer programs to read and process
data.545
Metadata – Supplemental data attached or related to other data, which describe the other data without
revealing its content.546
Privacy Protection Profiles – proposed as a way to regulate usage of personal data, these would be
developed and overseen by third-party intermediaries between consumers and data analyzers,
processors, and other users.547
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4

https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/106/s3188/summary
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APPENDIX D - KEY DEBATES IN THE UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION548
Since early 2020, Trista Campbell, a third-year law student, has been an observer of the Uniform Law Commission’s
draft of the CUPID Act (discussed in Section II). Below, Trista provides an overview of the “key debates” over
various aspects of the ULC’s current draft.
Since early 2020, Trista Campbell, a third-year law student, has been an observer of the Uniform Law Commission’s
draft of the CUPID Act (discussed in Section II). Below, Trista provides an overview of the “key debates” over
various aspects of the ULC’s current draft.
Key Words and Definitions
• Observers have submitted numerous comments pertaining to the Definitions section of the
draft act. The most commonly debated definitions are “de-identified,” “personal data,”
“profiling,” “publicly available information,” and “sensitive data.” Below is a brief review of
the issues relating to each of these keywords and definitions:
•

DE-IDENTIFIED: It has been frequently recommended that the Draft Committee should
follow the guidance of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) regarding the deidentification
of data. The FTC’s three-pronged test requires companies to: “(1) take reasonable measures to
deidentify information; (2) make a public commitment to process data in a deidentified fashion
and not attempt to reidentify data; and (3) contractually prohibit downstream recipients from
reidentifying the data.” (emphasis added). One of the main recommendations of the observers
would be to add the word “reasonably” to require deidentification efforts that are reasonable
in light of the particular circumstances.

•

PERSONAL DATA: There is a debate as to whether “personal data” should be defined
broadly or narrowly. Those who advocate for it to be broadly defined claim that a broad
definition is needed to meaningfully protect privacy and cabin misuse of information. Others
think that the bill currently broadly defines “personal data” and recommends that the
Committee provide a clearer definition. One commenter specifically recommends the
Committee adopt the language used in Washington’s S.B. 6281, Section 3(22)(a), which defines
“personal data” as “any information that is linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or
identifiable natural person.” Other commenters made similar suggestions, primarily that
“personal data” should be linked to an identifiable person and not that which “describes a
particular individual.”

•

PROFILING: While one observer recommends adopting the definition of “profiling” used
in the GDPR (Article 4(4)), another recommends that the ULC should strike the definition
entirely, claiming it is overly broad to cover the necessary processing needed to complete a
transaction. It is also a common recommendation that the language relative to profiling and
automated decision-making should specifically exclude insurance underwriting.

•

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE DATA: Observers have stated that the definition of “publicly
available data” is too narrow and the definition should be struck from the draft in order to
incorporate something more like the scoping definition in Section 3, which includes
information “widely distributed in media.” One commenter claims that “the current approach
goes against the long-standing practice of federal and state Freedom of Information Act
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(“FOIA”) laws and is likely to violate the First Amendment.” “However, there are privacy
implications when unrelated publicly available data is collected, subjected to an algorithm, and
used for profiling or other commercial purposes. This issue has not been resolved by the
committee.” (Issues Memo, May 20, 2020).
•

SENSITIVE DATA: It is a commonality that the definition of “sensitive data” should be
expanded upon to capture the full range of sensitive information protected by existing
legislation and privacy frameworks. The recommended sensitive data to be added include:
social security number, drivers’ license number, account numbers, passwords, data of children
under the age of 16, and precise geolocation information.

Exemptions
• BUSINESS-TO-BUSINESS EXEMPTION: It has been recommended by multiple observers
to exempt all B2B data from the act because businesses share data for legitimate reasons. If
the draft were to unreasonably limit a business’s ability to share data with other businesses,
this could cause harm to consumers.
•

DPPA EXEMPTION: The Drivers Privacy Protection Act (“DPPA”) is a national privacy
statute which protects consumers and their motor vehicle data. It is recommended that the
Draft Act exempt the DPPA in order to meet consumer needs and to protect consumer
expectations. Currently, the CCPA and most other privacy legislation includes this type of
exemption. The exemption in the CCPA states "[t]his title shall not apply to personal
information collected, processed, sold, or disclosed pursuant to the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act of 1994 (18 U.S.C. Sec. 2721 et seq.)."

•

EMPLOYMENT EXEMPTION: “The current draft exempts data collected by an employer
about an employee in the context of the employment relationship. It has been argued this is
too narrow and should extend to other forms of agency relationships.” (Issues Memo).
Observers have suggested that the employment exemption be expanded to cover all types of
“worker” including: agents, contractors, owners, directors, managers, and other non-employee
workers. The Committee can protect consumers and recognize the modern workforce by
exempting "data collected, used, or maintained in an employer-employee relationship, an
employer-applicant relationship, a principal-agent relationship, or other work relationship." It
has also recommended that the employment exemption also include information generated by
employees in the course of performing their jobs, as well as emergency contact info and
beneficiary info provided by the employee within the context of the employment relationship.

•

GLBA EXEMPTION: The current draft carves-out an exemption to financial institutions
which meet the Gram-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) definition of a financial institution. It is a
common suggestion among observers that the exemption be changed to apply “to personal
information collected, processed, sold, or disclosed pursuant to the federal GLBA.” The
exemption should be for the data that is subject to the GLBA as opposed to a certain entity,
because certain non-financial institutions have data that is subject to the GLBA.

Duties
• Most observers of the Draft Act have recommended deleting the Duties section of the draft,
claiming it is unnecessary and adds business risk without any consumer benefit. Instead of
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creating amorphous duty standards, the proposed legislation should clearly define obligations
imposed on businesses that mitigate risks to consumers, while preserving the benefits to
individuals and our economy that result from the responsible use of data. The two most hotly
debated duties currently included within the Draft Act, “affirmative duties” and “duty of
loyalty,” are discussed below.
•

AFFIRMATIVE DUTY: Supporting the inclusion of affirmative duties on controllers in the
Act, specifically the duties of purpose specification, data minimization, transparency, and data
security, will put an obligation on companies to steward the data they collect responsibly. This
obligation must be intact because companies shoulder the responsibility for protecting the
privacy of consumer’ personal data. If not included in the Draft Act, solely granting consumers
rights would effectively place the burden of regulating privacy on the shoulders of every
consumer. This would require the consumer to make informed choices about which rights to
exercise, when to exercise those rights, and with whom. It is recommended that the affirmative
duty remain within the act to alleviate the burden on the consumer.

•

DUTY OF LOYALTY: While there are a few in support of including the “duty of loyalty” in
the Draft Act, those not in support view it as unclear and impractical, recommending that it
be removed. There are currently no leading global privacy standards that incorporate the
concept of a duty of loyalty or any type of fiduciary relationship between the data subject and
the data processor. The inclusion of this duty serves as an impractical, indeterminable
obligation for businesses, and may set-up new causes of action.

Consistency/Uniformity
• There is a consensus among commenters that because the bill encourages each state’s Attorney
General (“AG”) to promulgate his/her own rules, the act will lead to inconsistent standards
across the country. If the act were to include a mandatory coordination mechanism for state
AGs to work jointly on specific cases enforcing uniform law, it would be helpful in keeping
the standards consistent. This would help spread the burden of enforcement across AG
offices, enhancing AG enforcement capabilities and minimizing unintended divergence in
enforcement decisions, while minimizing risk to covered entities facing multiple AG inquiries
on the same matter. Commenters encourage the ULC to remove the act’s broad regulatory
authority to better ensure consistency among state standards for data privacy.
Consumer Protections
• Consumer protections include the rights to access, correct, delete, port, and opt-out of the
processing of personal data. Commenters have come to a consensus that the Committee
should take steps to ensure consumer data privacy enforcement responsibilities are placed
within the purview of state AG offices only, which would lead to more consistent outcomes
for consumers. This enforcement would also allow businesses to allocate funds to developing
processes, procedures, and plans to facilitate compliance with new data privacy requirements.
•

OPT-IN/OPT-OUT: Because digital advertising has been fundamental to the success of the
Internet and digital economy, effective consumer privacy legislation must preserve the core
benefits (providing significant benefits to consumers by connecting them with products and
services that are more relevant to their interests, and providing opportunities for American
businesses large and small to connect with consumers) while enhancing privacy protections.
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It is viewed that the current approach within the Draft Act could impede functions that are
essential to digital advertising. The consumers’ online experiences could be degraded by
inhibiting the transfers of data they have come to expect.
•

Not all observers reject the inclusion of an “opt-out” feature within the Draft Act. Some
believe that consumers' right to opt out of data processing must include the ability to opt out
of processing in furtherance of targeted advertising, and profiling in furtherance of certain
consequential decisions. Those activities raise serious privacy concerns for consumers, and for
that reason, it is recommended that the Committee continue designing the Act's opt out right
to cover both advertising and consequential profiling.

Enforcement
• It is believed that a more nuanced, detailed discussion of the full panoply of enforcement
options (regulatory actions, administrative hearings, alternative dispute resolution, injunctive
relief, rights to cure, actions under consumer protection or UDAP statutes, and other options)
is needed. Because there are a number of ways that private entities use public and private data
to support government administration, it is argued that the requirements of the Draft Act
should also extend to state and local governments. Without these governmental obligations, a
private citizen would not be able to sue for the government misusing their privately obtained
personal data. The liability would stop with the company that may have been forced to share
the data as a part of its business regime.
•

PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION: There is a robust outcry for the removal of the Private
Right of Action (“PRA”) from the Draft Act, claiming that if the PRA remains, the bill will
split enforcement authority between a state’s attorney general and the courts. This dualenforcement regime will introduce even more uncertainty into calculations that businesses
must make. A PRA creates controversy because of the regulatory uncertainty it introduces, the
emphasis it creates on fulfilling technical requirements over more substantial privacy
enhancing investments, and the lack of transparency that results from settlements.

•

A private right of action distracts from the goal of meaningful and real privacy protections
where a knowledgeable agency or regulator ensures that businesses are protecting data. Private
lawsuits could sweep in technical non-compliance items and further erode uniformity. The
current PRA would produce lawsuits without providing commensurate consumer benefits.

Data Privacy Assessments
• Commenters have observed that the required content of the assessments is overly proscriptive
and does not permit sufficient flexibility depending on the nature of the processing, the nature
of the data, and the entities’ assessments. The Committee is urged to consider flexibility in
these requirements and/or delete this Section.
Safe Harbor Provision
• Many commenters are advocating for the addition of a safe harbor provision that encourages
the development of industry-wide codes of conduct to create privacy and security standards.
A self-regulated approach has been suggested because it would constitute compliance with the
privacy regime. This would further eliminate the need for protracted rulemakings and instead
allow regulation at the speed of innovation. This is the approach that has been used with
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success in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) by providing flexibility
and accountability.
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APPENDIX E - LIST OF OTHER CASES AND AUTHORITIES
Since the beginning of the work on this white paper, one of the major tasks that the research assistants have been
working on was to collect and summarize all relevant authorities that may implicate data privacy. Below is a summary
of the work that was done at the hands of the following RAs: Cheryl Brown, Trista Campbell, Jeremy Cook, and
Ashton Meyers.
Resources Section: Relevant Cases
Appendix D List of Authorities and Case Summaries
Statutes
15 U.S.C. §1681 Congressional findings and statement of purpose
(a) Accuracy and fairness of credit reporting
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The banking system is dependent upon fair and accurate credit reporting. Inaccurate
credit reports directly impair the efficiency of the banking system, and unfair credit reporting
methods undermine the public confidence which is essential to the continued functioning of
the banking system.
(2) An elaborate mechanism has been developed for investigating and evaluating the credit
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, and general reputation of consumers.
(3) Consumer reporting agencies have assumed a vital role in assembling and evaluating
consumer credit and other information on consumers.
(4) There is a need to ensure that consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave
responsibilities with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.
(b) Reasonable procedures
It is the purpose of this subchapter to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt
reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel,
insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer,
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
information in accordance with the requirements of this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. §1681a(d)
(d) Consumer Report.—
(1) In general.—The term “consumer report” means any written, oral, or other
communication of any information by a consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s
credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole
or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the consumer’s eligibility
for—
(A)credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;
(B) employment purposes; or
(C) any other purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.
(2) Exclusions.—Except as provided in paragraph (3), the term “consumer report” does not
include—
(A)subject to section 1681s–3 of this title, any—
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(i) report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the
consumer and the person making the report;
(ii) communication of that information among persons related by common ownership or
affiliated by corporate control; or
(iii) communication of other information among persons related by common ownership or
affiliated by corporate control, if it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer
that the information may be communicated among such persons and the consumer is given
the opportunity, before the time that the information is initially communicated, to direct that
such information not be communicated among such persons;
(B)any authorization or approval of a specific extension of credit directly or indirectly by the
issuer of a credit card or similar device;
(C)any report in which a person who has been requested by a third party to make a specific
extension of credit directly or indirectly to a consumer conveys his or her decision with
respect to such request, if the third party advises the consumer of the name and address of
the person to whom the request was made, and such person makes the disclosures to the
consumer required under section 1681m of this title; or
(D)a communication described in subsection (o) or (x).[1]
(3) Restriction on sharing of medical information.—Except for information or any
communication of information disclosed as provided in section 1681b(g)(3) of this title, the
exclusions in paragraph (2) shall not apply with respect to information disclosed to any
person related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if the information
is—
(A)medical information;
(B)an individualized list or description based on the payment transactions of the consumer
for medical products or services; or
(C)an aggregate list of identified consumers based on payment transactions for medical
products or services.
15 U.S.C. § 1681a(k)(1)
(k)Adverse Action.—
(1)Actions included.—The term “adverse action”—
(A)has the same meaning as in section 1691(d)(6) of this title; and
(B)means—
(i)a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or a reduction or other adverse or
unfavorable change in the terms of coverage or amount of, any insurance, existing or applied
for, in connection with the underwriting of insurance;
(ii)a denial of employment or any other decision for employment purposes that adversely
affects any current or prospective employee;
(iii)a denial or cancellation of, an increase in any charge for, or any other adverse or
unfavorable change in the terms of, any license or benefit described in section
1681b(a)(3)(D) of this title; and
(iv)an action taken or determination that is—
(I)made in connection with an application that was made by, or a transaction that was
initiated by, any consumer, or in connection with a review of an account under section
1681b(a)(3)(F)(ii) of this title; and
(II)adverse to the interests of the consumer.
(2)Applicable findings, decisions, commentary, and orders.—
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For purposes of any determination of whether an action is an adverse action under
paragraph (1)(A), all appropriate final findings, decisions, commentary, and orders issued
under section 1691(d)(6) of this title by the Bureau or any court shall apply.
15 U.S.C. §1681e(b)
(b)Accuracy of report
Whenever a consumer reporting agency prepares a consumer report it shall follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy of the information concerning
the individual about whom the report relates.
15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(6)
(d) Reason for adverse action; procedure applicable; “adverse action” defined
(6)For purposes of this subsection, the term “adverse action” means a denial or revocation of
credit, a change in the terms of an existing credit arrangement, or a refusal to grant credit in
substantially the amount or on substantially the terms requested. Such term does not include
a refusal to extend additional credit under an existing credit arrangement where the applicant
is delinquent or otherwise in default, or where such additional credit would exceed a previously
established credit limit.
15 U.S. Code § 6801. Protection of nonpublic personal information
(a)Privacy obligation policy
It is the policy of the Congress that each financial institution has an affirmative and
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and
confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.
(b)Financial institutions safeguards. In furtherance of the policy in subsection (a), each
agency or authority described in section 6805(a) of this title, other than the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection, shall establish appropriate standards for the financial
institutions subject to their jurisdiction relating to administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards—
(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information;
(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such
records; and
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information which
could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.
15 U.S. Code § 6805.Enforcement
(a) In general. Subject to subtitle B of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 [12
U.S.C. 5511 et seq.], this subchapter and the regulations prescribed thereunder shall be
enforced by the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Federal functional regulators,
the State insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission with respect to financial
institutions and other persons subject to their jurisdiction under applicable law, as follows:
(6) Under State insurance law, in the case of any person engaged in providing insurance, by
the applicable State insurance authority of the State in which the person is domiciled, subject
to section 6701 of this title.
15 U.S. Code 6805(a)(6)
(a)In general
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Subject to subtitle B of the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 [12 U.S.C. 5511 et
seq.], this subchapter and the regulations prescribed thereunder shall be enforced by the
Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, the Federal functional regulators, the State
insurance authorities, and the Federal Trade Commission with respect to financial
institutions and other persons subject to their jurisdiction under applicable law, as follows:
(6)Under State insurance law, in the case of any person engaged in providing insurance, by
the applicable State insurance authority of the State in which the person is domiciled, subject
to section 6701 of this title.
18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2016) Definitions
(3)the term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, scientific,
technical, economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans, compilations,
program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures,
programs, or codes, whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in writing if—
(A)the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret; and
(B)the information derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, another
person who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the information;
18 U.S.C. § 1835(a), (b) (2016) Orders to preserve confidentiality
(a)In General.—
In any prosecution or other proceeding under this chapter, the court shall enter such orders
and take such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to preserve the
confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the requirements of the Federal Rules of
Criminal and Civil Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other applicable laws.
An interlocutory appeal by the United States shall lie from a decision or order of a district
court authorizing or directing the disclosure of any trade secret.
(b)Rights of Trade Secret Owners.—
The court may not authorize or direct the disclosure of any information the owner asserts to
be a trade secret unless the court allows the owner the opportunity to file a submission
under seal that describes the interest of the owner in keeping the information confidential.
No submission under seal made under this subsection may be used in a prosecution under
this chapter for any purpose other than those set forth in this section, or otherwise required
by law. The provision of information relating to a trade secret to the United States or the
court in connection with a prosecution under this chapter shall not constitute a waiver of
trade secret protection, and the disclosure of information relating to a trade secret in
connection with a prosecution under this chapter shall not constitute a waiver of trade secret
protection unless the trade secret owner expressly consents to such waiver.
18 U.S.C. § 1833(b) (2016) Exceptions to prohibitions
(b)Immunity From Liability for Confidential Disclosure of a Trade Secret to the
Government or in a Court Filing.—
(1)Immunity.—An individual shall not be held criminally or civilly liable under any Federal
or State trade secret law for the disclosure of a trade secret that—
(A)is made—
(i)in confidence to a Federal, State, or local government official, either directly or indirectly,
or to an attorney; and
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(ii)solely for the purpose of reporting or investigating a suspected violation of law; or
(B)is made in a complaint or other document filed in a lawsuit or other proceeding, if such
filing is made under seal.
(2)Use of trade secret information in anti-retaliation lawsuit.—An individual who files a
lawsuit for retaliation by an employer for reporting a suspected violation of law may disclose
the trade secret to the attorney of the individual and use the trade secret information in the
court proceeding, if the individual—
(A)files any document containing the trade secret under seal; and
(B)does not disclose the trade secret, except pursuant to court order.
(3)Notice.—
(A)In general.—
An employer shall provide notice of the immunity set forth in this subsection in any contract
or agreement with an employee that governs the use of a trade secret or other confidential
information.
(B)Policy document.—
An employer shall be considered to be in compliance with the notice requirement in
subparagraph (A) if the employer provides a cross-reference to a policy document provided
to the employee that sets forth the employer’s reporting policy for a suspected violation of
law.
(C)Non-compliance.—
If an employer does not comply with the notice requirement in subparagraph (A), the
employer may not be awarded exemplary damages or attorney fees under subparagraph (C)
or (D) of section 1836(b)(3) in an action against an employee to whom notice was not
provided.
(D)Applicability.—
This paragraph shall apply to contracts and agreements that are entered into or updated after
the date of enactment of this subsection.
(4)Employee defined.—
For purposes of this subsection, the term “employee” includes any individual performing
work as a contractor or consultant for an employer.
(5)Rule of construction.—
Except as expressly provided for under this subsection, nothing in this subsection shall be
construed to authorize, or limit liability for, an act that is otherwise prohibited by law, such
as the unlawful access of material by unauthorized means.
42 USC § 300jj(9) (2016) 21st Century Cures Act
(9)Interoperability
The term “interoperability”, with respect to health information technology, means such
health information technology that—
(A)enables the secure exchange of electronic health information with, and use of electronic
health information from, other health information technology without special effort on the
part of the user;
(B)allows for complete access, exchange, and use of all electronically accessible health
information for authorized use under applicable State or Federal law; and
(C)does not constitute information blocking as defined in section 300jj–52(a) of this title.
42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(8). Medicare Secondary Payer Act (MSP).
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Insurers are obligated to report claims payments made to any person covered by
Medicare payments for the same claims or injuries, so that the Secretary is able “to
make an appropriate determination concerning coordination of benefits, including
any applicable recovery claim.”
45 CFR § 160.203 (HIPAA) General rule and exceptions.
A standard, requirement, or implementation specification adopted under this subchapter that
is contrary to a provision of State law preempts the provision of State law. This general rule
applies, except if one or more of the following conditions is met:
(a) A determination is made by the Secretary under § 160.204 that the provision of State law:
(1) Is necessary:
(i) To prevent fraud and abuse related to the provision of or payment for health care;
(ii) To ensure appropriate State regulation of insurance and health plans to the extent
expressly authorized by statute or regulation;
(iii) For State reporting on health care delivery or costs; or
(iv) For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health, safety, or welfare,
and, if a standard, requirement, or implementation specification under part 164 of this
subchapter is at issue, if the Secretary determines that the intrusion into privacy is warranted
when balanced against the need to be served; or
(2) Has as its principal purpose the regulation of the manufacture, registration, distribution,
dispensing, or other control of any controlled substances (as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802), or
that is deemed a controlled substance by State law.
(b) The provision of State law relates to the privacy of individually identifiable health
information and is more stringent than a standard, requirement, or implementation
specification adopted under subpart E of part 164 of this subchapter.
(c) The provision of State law, including State procedures established under such law, as
applicable, provides for the reporting of disease or injury, child abuse, birth, or death, or for
the conduct of public health surveillance, investigation, or intervention.
(d) The provision of State law requires a health plan to report, or to provide access to,
information for the purpose of management audits, financial audits, program monitoring
and evaluation, or the licensure or certification of facilities or individuals.
45 CFR 160 For a full version of these provisions combined with 45 CFR 162 and 45 CFR 164(A)
and (E), see Department of Health and Human Services, HIPAA Administrative Simplification
Regulation Text 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, and 164 (Unofficial Version, as amended through March 26,
2013) available at
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/combined/hipaasimplification-201303.pdf?language=es.
45 CFR 162 For a full version of these provisions combined with 45 CFR 162 and 45 CFR 164(A)
and (E), see Department of Health and Human Services, HIPAA Administrative Simplification
Regulation Text 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, and 164 (Unofficial Version, as amended through March 26,
2013) available at
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/combined/hipaasimplification-201303.pdf?language=es.
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45 CFR 164(A), (E) For a full version of these provisions combined with 45 CFR 162 and 45 CFR
164(A) and (E), see Department of Health and Human Services, HIPAA Administrative Simplification
Regulation Text 45 CFR Parts 160, 162, and 164 (Unofficial Version, as amended through March 26,
2013) available at
https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/combined/hipaasimplification-201303.pdf?language=es.
45 C.F.R. 164.512(b)(1)(ii)
(ii) A public health authority or other appropriate government authority authorized by law to
receive reports of child abuse or neglect;
45 C.F.R. §164.514(b)(2(i)(R), (b)(2)(ii)
(b) Implementation specifications: Requirements for de-identification of protected health
information. A covered entity may determine that health information is not individually
identifiable health information only if:
(2)(i) The following identifiers of the individual or of relatives, employers, or
household members of the individual, are removed:
(R) Any other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code, except as
permitted by paragraph (c) of this section; and
(ii) The covered entity does not have actual knowledge that the
information could be used alone or in combination with other
information to identify an individual who is a subject of the
information.
42 U.S.C. 300gg-91(a)(2)
(2)Medical care
The term “medical care” means amounts paid for—
(A)the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or amounts paid for
the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the body,
(B)amounts paid for transportation primarily for and essential to medical care referred to in
subparagraph (A), and
(C)amounts paid for insurance covering medical care referred to in subparagraphs (A) and
(B).
45 C.F.R. 164.502(e)
(e)
(1) Standard: Disclosures to business associates.
(i) A covered entity may disclose protected health information to a business associate and
may allow a business associate to create, receive, maintain, or transmit protected health
information on its behalf, if the covered entity obtains satisfactory assurance that the
business associate will appropriately safeguard the information. A covered entity is not
required to obtain such satisfactory assurances from a business associate that is a
subcontractor.
(ii) A business associate may disclose protected health information to a business associate
that is a subcontractor and may allow the subcontractor to create, receive, maintain, or
transmit protected health information on its behalf, if the business associate obtains
satisfactory assurances, in accordance with § 164.504(e)(1)(i), that the subcontractor will
appropriately safeguard the information.
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(2) Implementation specification: Documentation. The satisfactory assurances required by
paragraph (e)(1) of this section must be documented through a written contract or other
written agreement or arrangement with the business associate that meets the applicable
requirements of § 164.504(e).
45 C.F.R. 164.504(e)
(e)
(1) Standard: Business associate contracts.
(i) The contract or other arrangement required by § 164.502(e)(2) must meet the
requirements of paragraph (e)(2), (e)(3), or (e)(5) of this section, as applicable.
(ii) A covered entity is not in compliance with the standards in § 164.502(e) and this
paragraph, if the covered entity knew of a pattern of activity or practice of the business
associate that constituted a material breach or violation of the business associate's obligation
under the contract or other arrangement, unless the covered entity took reasonable steps to
cure the breach or end the violation, as applicable, and, if such steps were unsuccessful,
terminated the contract or arrangement, if feasible.
(iii) A business associate is not in compliance with the standards in § 164.502(e) and this
paragraph, if the business associate knew of a pattern of activity or practice of a
subcontractor that constituted a material breach or violation of the subcontractor's
obligation under the contract or other arrangement, unless the business associate took
reasonable steps to cure the breach or end the violation, as applicable, and, if such steps
were unsuccessful, terminated the contract or arrangement, if feasible.
(2) Implementation specifications: Business associate contracts. A contract between the
covered entity and a business associate must:
(i) Establish the permitted and required uses and disclosures of protected health information
by the business associate. The contract may not authorize the business associate to use or
further disclose the information in a manner that would violate the requirements of this
subpart, if done by the covered entity, except that:
(A) The contract may permit the business associate to use and disclose protected health
information for the proper management and administration of the business associate, as
provided in paragraph (e)(4) of this section; and
(B) The contract may permit the business associate to provide data aggregation services
relating to the health care operations of the covered entity.
(ii) Provide that the business associate will:
(A) Not use or further disclose the information other than as permitted or required by the
contract or as required by law;
(B) Use appropriate safeguards and comply, where applicable, with subpart C of this part
with respect to electronic protected health information, to prevent use or disclosure of the
information other than as provided for by its contract;
(C) Report to the covered entity any use or disclosure of the information not provided for by
its contract of which it becomes aware, including breaches of unsecured protected health
information as required by § 164.410;
(D) In accordance with § 164.502(e)(1)(ii), ensure that any subcontractors that create,
receive, maintain, or transmit protected health information on behalf of the business
associate agree to the same restrictions and conditions that apply to the business associate
with respect to such information;
(E) Make available protected health information in accordance with § 164.524;
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(F) Make available protected health information for amendment and incorporate any
amendments to protected health information in accordance with § 164.526;
(G) Make available the information required to provide an accounting of disclosures in
accordance with § 164.528;
(H) To the extent the business associate is to carry out a covered entity's obligation under
this subpart, comply with the requirements of this subpart that apply to the covered entity in
the performance of such obligation.
(I) Make its internal practices, books, and records relating to the use and disclosure of
protected health information received from, or created or received by the business associate
on behalf of, the covered entity available to the Secretary for purposes of determining the
covered entity's compliance with this subpart; and
(J) At termination of the contract, if feasible, return or destroy all protected health
information received from, or created or received by the business associate on behalf of, the
covered entity that the business associate still maintains in any form and retain no copies of
such information or, if such return or destruction is not feasible, extend the protections of
the contract to the information and limit further uses and disclosures to those purposes that
make the return or destruction of the information infeasible.
(iii) Authorize termination of the contract by the covered entity, if the covered entity
determines that the business associate has violated a material term of the contract.
(3) Implementation specifications: Other arrangements.
(i) If a covered entity and its business associate are both governmental entities:
(A) The covered entity may comply with this paragraph and § 164.314(a)(1), if applicable, by
entering into a memorandum of understanding with the business associate that contains
terms that accomplish the objectives of paragraph (e)(2) of this section and § 164.314(a)(2),
if applicable.
(B) The covered entity may comply with this paragraph and § 164.314(a)(1), if applicable, if
other law (including regulations adopted by the covered entity or its business associate)
contains requirements applicable to the business associate that accomplish the objectives of
paragraph (e)(2) of this section and § 164.314(a)(2), if applicable.
(ii) If a business associate is required by law to perform a function or activity on behalf of a
covered entity or to provide a service described in the definition of business associate in §
160.103 of this subchapter to a covered entity, such covered entity may disclose protected
health information to the business associate to the extent necessary to comply with the legal
mandate without meeting the requirements of this paragraph and § 164.314(a)(1), if
applicable, provided that the covered entity attempts in good faith to obtain satisfactory
assurances as required by paragraph (e)(2) of this section and § 164.314(a)(1), if applicable,
and, if such attempt fails, documents the attempt and the reasons that such assurances
cannot be obtained.
(iii) The covered entity may omit from its other arrangements the termination authorization
required by paragraph (e)(2)(iii) of this section, if such authorization is inconsistent with the
statutory obligations of the covered entity or its business associate.
(iv) A covered entity may comply with this paragraph and § 164.314(a)(1) if the covered
entity discloses only a limited data set to a business associate for the business associate to
carry out a health care operations function and the covered entity has a data use agreement
with the business associate that complies with §§ 164.514(e)(4) and 164.314(a)(1), if
applicable.
(4) Implementation specifications: Other requirements for contracts and other arrangements.
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(i) The contract or other arrangement between the covered entity and the business associate
may permit the business associate to use the protected health information received by the
business associate in its capacity as a business associate to the covered entity, if necessary:
(A) For the proper management and administration of the business associate; or
(B) To carry out the legal responsibilities of the business associate.
(ii) The contract or other arrangement between the covered entity and the business associate
may permit the business associate to disclose the protected health information received by
the business associate in its capacity as a business associate for the purposes described in
paragraph (e)(4)(i) of this section, if:
(A) The disclosure is required by law; or
(B)(1) The business associate obtains reasonable assurances from the person to whom the
information is disclosed that it will be held confidentially and used or further disclosed only
as required by law or for the purposes for which it was disclosed to the person; and
(2) The person notifies the business associate of any instances of which it is aware in which
the confidentiality of the information has been breached.
(5) Implementation specifications: Business associate contracts with subcontractors. The
requirements of § 164.504(e)(2) through (e)(4) apply to the contract or other arrangement
required by § 164.502(e)(1)(ii) between a business associate and a business associate that is a
subcontractor in the same manner as such requirements apply to contracts or other
arrangements between a covered entity and business associate.
PHS Section 1861(u), 42 U.S.C. 1395x(u) Definitions
(u)Provider of services
The term “provider of services” means a hospital, critical access hospital, skilled nursing
facility, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facility, home health agency, hospice
program, or, for purposes of section 1395f(g) and section 1395n(e) of this title, a fund.
Public Health Service Act (PHS) Section 2791(a)(2)
Repealed. Pub. L. 97–35, title VI, § 683(a), Aug. 13, 1981, 95 Stat. 519
W.V. Code §16-29G-1 Purpose.
(a) The purpose of this article is to create the West Virginia Health Information Network
under the oversight of the Health Care Authority to promote the design, implementation,
operation and maintenance of a fully interoperable statewide network to facilitate public and
private use of health care information in the state.
(b) It is intended that the network be a public-private partnership for the benefit of all of the
citizens of this state.
(c) The network is envisioned to support and facilitate the following types of electronic
transactions or activities:
(1) Automatic drug-drug interaction and allergy alerts;
(2) Automatic preventive medicine alerts;
(3) Electronic access to the results of laboratory, X ray, or other diagnostic examinations;
(4) Disease management;
(5) Disease surveillance and reporting;
(6) Educational offerings for health care providers;
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(7) Health alert system and other applications related to homeland security;
(8) Links to evidence-based medical practice;
(9) Links to patient educational materials;
(10) Medical record information transfer to other providers with the patient's consent;
(11) Physician order entry;
(12) Prescription drug tracking;
(13) Registries for vital statistics, cancer, case management, immunizations and other public
health registries;
(14) Secured electronic consultations between providers and patients;
(15) A single-source insurance credentialing system for health care providers;
(16) Electronic health care claims submission and processing; and
(17) Any other electronic transactions or activities as determined by legislative rules
promulgated pursuant to this article.
(d) The network shall ensure the privacy of patient health care information.
W.Va. Code 33-41-5(a)
A person in the business of insurance having knowledge or a reasonable belief that
fraud or another crime related to the business of insurance is being, will be or has
been committed shall provide to the commissioner the information required by, and
in a manner prescribed by, the commissioner.
WV Code 46A-2A-101 et seq Definitions
As used in this article:
(1) "Breach of the security of a system" means the unauthorized access and acquisition of
unencrypted and unredacted computerized data that compromises the security or
confidentiality of personal information maintained by an individual or entity as part of a
database of personal information regarding multiple individuals and that causes the
individual or entity to reasonably believe that the breach of security has caused or will cause
identity theft or other fraud to any resident of this state. Good faith acquisition of personal
information by an employee or agent of an individual or entity for the purposes of the
individual or the entity is not a breach of the security of the system, provided that the
personal information is not used for a purpose other than a lawful purpose of the individual
or entity or subject to further unauthorized disclosure.
(2) "Entity" includes corporations, business trusts, estates, partnerships, limited partnerships,
limited liability partnerships, limited liability companies, associations, organizations, joint
ventures, governments, governmental subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or any
other legal entity, whether for profit or not for profit.
(3) "Encrypted" means transformation of data through the use of an algorithmic process to
into a form in which there is a low probability of assigning meaning without use of a
confidential process or key or securing the information by another method that renders the
data elements unreadable or unusable.
(4) "Financial institution" has the meaning given that term in Section 6809(3), United States
Code Title 15, as amended.
(5) "Individual" means a natural person.
(6) "Personal information" means the first name or first initial and last name linked to any
one or more of the following data elements that relate to a resident of this state, when the
data elements are neither encrypted nor redacted:
(A) Social security number;
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(B) Driver's license number or state identification card number issued in lieu of a driver's
license; or
(C) Financial account number, or credit card, or debit card number in combination with any
required security code, access code or password that would permit access to a resident's
financial accounts.
The term does not include information that is lawfully obtained from publicly available
information, or from federal, state or local government records lawfully made available to
the general public.
(7) "Notice" means:
(A) Written notice to the postal address in the records of the individual or entity;
(B) Telephonic notice;
(C) Electronic notice, if the notice provided is consistent with the provisions regarding
electronic records and signatures, set forth in Section 7001, United States Code Title 15,
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.
(D) Substitute notice, if the individual or the entity required to provide notice demonstrates
that the cost of providing notice will exceed $50,000 or that the affected class of residents to
be notified exceeds one hundred thousand persons or that the individual or the entity does
not have sufficient contact information or to provide notice as described in paragraph (A),
(B) or (C). Substitute notice consists of any two of the following:
(i) E-mail notice if the individual or the entity has e-mail addresses for the members of the
affected class of residents;
(ii) Conspicuous posting of the notice on the website of the individual or the entity if the
individual or the entity maintains a website; or
(iii) Notice to major statewide media.
(8) "Redact" means alteration or truncation of data such that no more than the last four
digits of a social security number, driver's license number, state identification card number or
account number is accessible as part of the personal information.
WV Code 62-1D-1 Short Title
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "West Virginia Wiretapping and Electronic
Surveillance Act."
W.Va. C.S.R. 114-15- 4.2(b)
For the purpose of examination, analysis and review activities conducted pursuant to
W. Va. Code §33-2-9 or this rule, an insurer or related entity licensed to do business in this
state
shall maintain its books, records and documents in a manner so that the commissioner can
readily ascertain during an examination the insurer's compliance with the insurance laws and
rules of this state, the standards outlined in the NAIC Financial Conditions Examiner
Handbook,
and with the standards outlined in the NAIC Market Regulation Handbook, including, but
not
limited to, company operations and management, policyholder service, marketing, producer
licensing, underwriting, rating, complaint/grievance handling, and claims practices.
a. For an insurer subject to 114CSR51 or 114CSR53, the insurer or related entity
shall, in addition, maintain its books, records, and documents in a manner so that the
practices of
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the entity regarding network adequacy, utilization review, quality assessment and
improvement
and provider credentialing may be ascertained during a market conduct examination.
b. All insurer records within the scope of this rule must be retained for the lesser
of:
1. The current calendar year plus five (5) calendar years;
2. From the closing date of the period of review for the most recent
examination by the commissioner; or
3. A period otherwise specified by statute as the examination cycle for the
insurer.
c. The producer of record shall maintain a file for each policy sold, and the file
shall contain all work papers and written communications in his or her possession pertaining
to
the policy documented therein. These records shall be retained for the current calendar year
plus
additional years as set forth in subdivision b of this subsection.
d. During an examination of the insurer, the insurer shall provide a copy of the
written contract entered into with each third party vendor or service provider as requested
by an
examiner within the time frames set forth in subsection 4.9 of this section.
W. Va. C.S.R. 114-57-15.1
A licensee shall not disclose nonpublic personal health information about a
consumer or customer unless an authorization is obtained from the consumer or customer
whose nonpublic personal health information is sought to be disclosed.
W.Va. C.S.R.114-57-15.2
Nothing in this section shall prohibit, restrict or require an authorization for the
disclosure of nonpublic personal health information by a licensee for the performance of
the following insurance functions by or on behalf of the licensee: claims administration;
claims adjustment and management; detection, investigation or reporting of actual or
potential fraud, misrepresentation or criminal activity; underwriting; policy placement or
issuance; loss control; ratemaking and guaranty fund functions; reinsurance and excess
loss insurance; risk management; case management; disease management; quality
assurance; quality improvement; performance evaluation; provider credentialing
verification; utilization review; peer review activities; actuarial, scientific, medical or
public policy research; grievance procedures; internal administration of compliance,
managerial, and information systems; policyholder service functions; auditing; reporting;
database security; administration of consumer disputes and inquiries; external
accreditation standards; the replacement of a group benefit plan; activities in connection
with a sale, merger, transfer or exchange of all or part of a business or operating unit; any
activity that permits disclosure without authorization pursuant to the federal Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act privacy rules promulgated by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services; disclosure that is required, or is one of the
lawful or appropriate methods, to enforce the licensee’s rights or the rights of other
persons engaged in carrying out a transaction or providing a product or service that a
consumer requests or authorizes; and any activity otherwise permitted by law, required
pursuant to governmental reporting authority, or to comply with legal process. Additional
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insurance functions may be added with the approval of the commissioner to the extent
they are necessary for appropriate performance of insurance functions and are fair and
reasonable to the interest of consumers.
W. Va. C.S.R. 114-62-3.1
Each licensee shall implement a comprehensive written information security
program that includes administrative, technical and physical safeguards for the protection
of customer information. The administrative, technical and physical safeguards included
in the information security program shall be appropriate to the size and complexity of the
licensee and the nature and scope of its activities.
California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) § 1798.125(a) (2018)
(a) (1) A business shall not discriminate against a consumer because the consumer exercised
any of the consumer’s rights under this title, including, but not limited to, by:
(A) Denying goods or services to the consumer.
(B) Charging different prices or rates for goods or services, including through the use of
discounts or other benefits or imposing penalties.
(C) Providing a different level or quality of goods or services to the consumer.
(D) Suggesting that the consumer will receive a different price or rate for goods or services
or a different level or quality of goods or services.
(2) Nothing in this subdivision prohibits a business from charging a consumer a different
price or rate, or from providing a different level or quality of goods or services to the
consumer, if that difference is reasonably related to the value provided to the business by the
consumer’s data.
(b) (1) A business may offer financial incentives, including payments to consumers as
compensation, for the collection of personal information, the sale of personal information,
or the deletion of personal information. A business may also offer a different price, rate,
level, or quality of goods or services to the consumer if that price or difference is directly
related to the value provided to the business by the consumer’s data.
(2) A business that offers any financial incentives pursuant to this subdivision shall notify
consumers of the financial incentives pursuant to Section 1798.130.
(3) A business may enter a consumer into a financial incentive program only if the consumer
gives the business prior opt-in consent pursuant to Section 1798.130 that clearly describes
the material terms of the financial incentive program, and which may be revoked by the
consumer at any time.
(4) A business shall not use financial incentive practices that are unjust, unreasonable,
coercive, or usurious in nature.
(Amended by Stats. 2019, Ch. 757, Sec. 5. (AB 1355) Effective January 1, 2020. Superseded
on January 1, 2023; see amendment by Proposition 24.)
CCPA § 1798.140(o) (2018)
(o) (1) “Personal information” means information that identifies, relates to, describes, is
reasonably capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked, directly or
indirectly, with a particular consumer or household. Personal information includes, but is not
limited to, the following if it identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably capable of being
associated with, or could be reasonably linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular
consumer or household:
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(A) Identifiers such as a real name, alias, postal address, unique personal identifier, online
identifier, internet protocol address, email address, account name, social security number,
driver’s license number, passport number, or other similar identifiers.
(B) Any categories of personal information described in subdivision (e) of Section 1798.80.
(C) Characteristics of protected classifications under California or federal law.
(D) Commercial information, including records of personal property, products or services
purchased, obtained, or considered, or other purchasing or consuming histories or
tendencies.
(E) Biometric information.
(F) Internet or other electronic network activity information, including, but not limited to,
browsing history, search history, and information regarding a consumer’s interaction with an
internet website, application, or advertisement.
(G) Geolocation data.
(H) Audio, electronic, visual, thermal, olfactory, or similar information.
(I) Professional or employment-related information.
(J) Education information, defined as information that is not publicly available personally
identifiable information as defined in the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (20
U.S.C. Sec. 1232g; 34 C.F.R. Part 99).
(K) Inferences drawn from any of the information identified in this subdivision to create a
profile about a consumer reflecting the consumer’s preferences, characteristics, psychological
trends, predispositions, behavior, attitudes, intelligence, abilities, and aptitudes.
(2) “Personal information” does not include publicly available information. For purposes of
this paragraph, “publicly available” means information that is lawfully made available from
federal, state, or local government records. “Publicly available” does not mean biometric
information collected by a business about a consumer without the consumer’s knowledge.
(3) “Personal information” does not include consumer information that is deidentified or
aggregate consumer information.
Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (IBIPA) 740 ILCS 14/1 (2008)
Short title. This Act may be cited as the Biometric Information Privacy Act.
Texas Business and Commerce Code § 503.001 (2011 ??)
(a) In this section, “biometric identifier” means a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint,
or record of hand or face geometry.
(b) A person may not capture a biometric identifier of an individual for a commercial
purpose unless the person:
(1) informs the individual before capturing the biometric identifier; and
(2) receives the individual's consent to capture the biometric identifier.
(c) A person who possesses a biometric identifier of an individual that is captured for a
commercial purpose:
(1) may not sell, lease, or otherwise disclose the biometric identifier to another person
unless:
(A) the individual consents to the disclosure for identification purposes in the event of the
individual's disappearance or death;
(B) the disclosure completes a financial transaction that the individual requested or
authorized;
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(C) the disclosure is required or permitted by a federal statute or by a state statute other than
Chapter 552, Government Code; or
(D) the disclosure is made by or to a law enforcement agency for a law enforcement
purpose in response to a warrant;
(2) shall store, transmit, and protect from disclosure the biometric identifier using
reasonable care and in a manner that is the same as or more protective than the manner in
which the person stores, transmits, and protects any other confidential information the
person possesses; and
(3) shall destroy the biometric identifier within a reasonable time, but not later than the first
anniversary of the date the purpose for collecting the identifier expires, except as provided
by Subsection (c-1).
(c-1) If a biometric identifier of an individual captured for a commercial purpose is used in
connection with an instrument or document that is required by another law to be maintained
for a period longer than the period prescribed by Subsection (c)(3), the person who
possesses the biometric identifier shall destroy the biometric identifier within a reasonable
time, but not later than the first anniversary of the date the instrument or document is no
longer required to be maintained by law.
(c-2) If a biometric identifier captured for a commercial purpose has been collected for
security purposes by an employer, the purpose for collecting the identifier under Subsection
(c)(3) is presumed to expire on termination of the employment relationship.
(d) A person who violates this section is subject to a civil penalty of not more than $25,000
for each violation. The attorney general may bring an action to recover the civil penalty.
(e) This section does not apply to voiceprint data retained by a financial institution or an
affiliate of a financial institution, as those terms are defined by 15 U.S.C. Section 6809 .
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 19.375 RCW Biometric Identifiers (2017)
RCW 19.375.010
Definitions.
The definitions in this section apply throughout this chapter, unless the context clearly
requires otherwise.
(1) "Biometric identifier" means data generated by automatic measurements of an
individual's biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, eye retinas, irises, or
other unique biological patterns or characteristics that is used to identify a specific individual.
"Biometric identifier" does not include a physical or digital photograph, video or audio
recording or data generated therefrom, or information collected, used, or stored for health
care treatment, payment, or operations under the federal health insurance portability and
accountability act of 1996.
(2) "Biometric system" means an automated identification system capable of capturing,
processing, and storing a biometric identifier, comparing the biometric identifier to one or
more references, and matching the biometric identifier to a specific individual.
(3) "Capture" means the process of collecting a biometric identifier from an individual.
(4) "Commercial purpose" means a purpose in furtherance of the sale or disclosure to a third
party of a biometric identifier for the purpose of marketing of goods or services when such
goods or services are unrelated to the initial transaction in which a person first gains
possession of an individual's biometric identifier. "Commercial purpose" does not include a
security or law enforcement purpose.
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(5) "Enroll" means to capture a biometric identifier of an individual, convert it into a
reference template that cannot be reconstructed into the original output image, and store it
in a database that matches the biometric identifier to a specific individual.
(6) "Law enforcement officer" means a law enforcement officer as defined in RCW 9.41.010
or a federal peace officer as defined in RCW 10.93.020.
(7) "Person" means an individual, partnership, corporation, limited liability company,
organization, association, or any other legal or commercial entity, but does not include a
government agency.
(8) "Security purpose" means the purpose of preventing shoplifting, fraud, or any other
misappropriation or theft of a thing of value, including tangible and intangible goods,
services, and other purposes in furtherance of protecting the security or integrity of software,
accounts, applications, online services, or any person.
RCW 19.375.020
Enrollment, disclosure, and retention of biometric identifiers.
(1) A person may not enroll a biometric identifier in a database for a commercial purpose,
without first providing notice, obtaining consent, or providing a mechanism to prevent the
subsequent use of a biometric identifier for a commercial purpose.
(2) Notice is a disclosure, that is not considered affirmative consent, that is given through a
procedure reasonably designed to be readily available to affected individuals. The exact
notice and type of consent required to achieve compliance with subsection (1) of this section
is context-dependent.
(3) Unless consent has been obtained from the individual, a person who has enrolled an
individual's biometric identifier may not sell, lease, or otherwise disclose the biometric
identifier to another person for a commercial purpose unless the disclosure:
(a) Is consistent with subsections (1), (2), and (4) of this section;
(b) Is necessary to provide a product or service subscribed to, requested, or expressly
authorized by the individual;
(c) Is necessary to effect, administer, enforce, or complete a financial transaction that the
individual requested, initiated, or authorized, and the third party to whom the biometric
identifier is disclosed maintains confidentiality of the biometric identifier and does not
further disclose the biometric identifier except as otherwise permitted under this subsection
(3);
(d) Is required or expressly authorized by a federal or state statute, or court order;
(e) Is made to a third party who contractually promises that the biometric identifier will not
be further disclosed and will not be enrolled in a database for a commercial purpose
inconsistent with the notice and consent described in this subsection (3) and subsections (1)
and (2) of this section; or
(f) Is made to prepare for litigation or to respond to or participate in judicial process.
(4) A person who knowingly possesses a biometric identifier of an individual that has been
enrolled for a commercial purpose:
(a) Must take reasonable care to guard against unauthorized access to and acquisition of
biometric identifiers that are in the possession or under the control of the person; and
(b) May retain the biometric identifier no longer than is reasonably necessary to:
(i) Comply with a court order, statute, or public records retention schedule specified under
federal, state, or local law;
(ii) Protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud, criminal activity, claims, security
threats, or liability; and
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(iii) Provide the services for which the biometric identifier was enrolled.
(5) A person who enrolls a biometric identifier of an individual for a commercial purpose or
obtains a biometric identifier of an individual from a third party for a commercial purpose
pursuant to this section may not use or disclose it in a manner that is materially inconsistent
with the terms under which the biometric identifier was originally provided without
obtaining consent for the new terms of use or disclosure.
(6) The limitations on disclosure and retention of biometric identifiers provided in this
section do not apply to disclosure or retention of biometric identifiers that have been
unenrolled.
(7) Nothing in this section requires an entity to provide notice and obtain consent to collect,
capture, or enroll a biometric identifier and store it in a biometric system, or otherwise, in
furtherance of a security purpose.
RCW 19.375.030
Application of consumer protection act.
(1) The legislature finds that the practices covered by this chapter are matters vitally affecting
the public interest for the purpose of applying the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86
RCW. A violation of this chapter is not reasonable in relation to the development and
preservation of business and is an unfair or deceptive act in trade or commerce and an unfair
method of competition for the purpose of applying the consumer protection act, chapter
19.86 RCW.
(2) This chapter may be enforced solely by the attorney general under the consumer
protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW.
RCW 19.375.040
Exclusions.
(1) Nothing in this chapter applies in any manner to a financial institution or an affiliate of a
financial institution that is subject to Title V of the federal Gramm-Leach-Bliley act of 1999
and the rules promulgated thereunder.
(2) Nothing in this chapter applies to activities subject to Title V of the federal health
insurance privacy and portability act of 1996 and the rules promulgated thereunder.
(3) Nothing in this chapter expands or limits the authority of a law enforcement officer
acting within the scope of his or her authority including, but not limited to, the authority of a
state law enforcement officer in executing lawful searches and seizures.
RCW 19.375.900
Finding—Intent—2017 c 299.
The legislature finds that citizens of Washington are increasingly asked to disclose sensitive
biological information that uniquely identifies them for commerce, security, and
convenience. The collection and marketing of biometric information about individuals,
without consent or knowledge of the individual whose data is collected, is of increasing
concern. The legislature intends to require a business that collects and can attribute
biometric data to a specific uniquely identified individual to disclose how it uses that
biometric data, and provide notice to and obtain consent from an individual before enrolling
or changing the use of that individual's biometric identifiers in a database.
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), Art. 2(a) (2016) Material scope
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This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated
means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form
part of a filing system or are intended to form part of a filing system.
GDPR, Art. 2(b) and Recital 16 (2016) Material scope
This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data:
(b) by the Member States when carrying out activities which fall within the scope of Chapter
2 of Title V of the TEU;
Recital 16: This Regulation does not apply to issues of protection of fundamental rights and
freedoms or the free flow of personal data related to activities which fall outside the scope of
Union law, such as activities concerning national security. This Regulation does not apply
to the processing of personal data by the Member States when carrying out activities in
relation to the common foreign and security policy of the Union.
GDPR, Art 4(13) (2016) Definitions
(13) ‘genetic data’ means personal data relating to the inherited or acquired genetic
characteristics of a natural person which give unique information about the physiology or
the health of that natural person and which result, in particular, from an analysis of a
biological sample from the natural person in question;
GDPR, Art. 4(14) (2016) Definitions
(14) ‘biometric data’ means personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating
to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow
or confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or
dactyloscopic data;
GDPR Art. 7 Conditions for Consent
1. Where processing is based on consent, the controller shall be able to demonstrate that the
data subject has consented to processing of his or her personal data.
2. If the data subject’s consent is given in the context of a written declaration which also
concerns other matters, the request for consent shall be presented in a manner which is
clearly distinguishable from the other matters, in an intelligible and easily accessible form,
using clear and plain language. Any part of such a declaration which constitutes an
infringement of this Regulation shall not be binding.
3. The data subject shall have the right to withdraw his or her consent at any time. The
withdrawal of consent shall not affect the lawfulness of processing based on consent before
its withdrawal. 3Prior to giving consent, the data subject shall be informed thereof. It shall
be as easy to withdraw as to give consent.
4. When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be taken of whether,
inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional
on consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of
that contract.
GDPR Art. 9 (2016) Processing of special categories of personal data
1. Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or
philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data,
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biometric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning
health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply if one of the following applies:
(a) the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of those personal data for
one or more specified purposes, except where Union or Member State law provide that the
prohibition referred to in paragraph 1 may not be lifted by the data subject;
(b) processing is necessary for the purposes of carrying out the obligations and exercising
specific rights of the controller or of the data subject in the field of employment and social
security and social protection law in so far as it is authorized by Union or Member State law
or a collective agreement pursuant to Member State law providing for appropriate safeguards
for the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject;
(c) processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another
natural person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent;
(d) processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate
safeguards by a foundation, association or any other not-for-profit body with a political,
philosophical, religious or trade union aim and on condition that the processing relates solely
to the members or to former members of the body or to persons who have regular contact
with it in connection with its purposes and that the personal data are not disclosed outside
that body without the consent of the data subjects;
(e) processing relates to personal data which are manifestly made public by the data subject;
(f) processing is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims or
whenever courts are acting in their judicial capacity;
(g) processing is necessary for reasons of substantial public interest, on the basis of Union or
Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of
the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the
fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject;
(h) processing is necessary for the purposes of preventive or occupational medicine, for the
assessment of the working capacity of the employee, medical diagnosis, the provision of
health or social care or treatment or the management of health or social care systems and
services on the basis of Union or Member State law or pursuant to contract with a health
professional and subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in paragraph 3;
(i) processing is necessary for reasons of public interest in the area of public health, such as
protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of quality
and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices, on the basis of
Union or Member State law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard
the rights and freedoms of the data subject, in particular professional secrecy;
(j) processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical
research purposes or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) based on Union or
Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of
the right to data protection and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the
fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.
3. Personal data referred to in paragraph 1 may be processed for the purposes referred to in
point (h) of paragraph 2 when those data are processed by or under the responsibility of a
professional subject to the obligation of professional secrecy under Union or Member State
law or rules established by national competent bodies or by another person also subject to an
obligation of secrecy under Union or Member State law or rules established by national
competent bodies.
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4. Member States may maintain or introduce further conditions, including limitations, with
regard to the processing of genetic data, biometric data or data concerning health.
GDPR Article 40(2)-40(5) (2016) Codes of conduct
2. Associations and other bodies representing categories of controllers or processors may
prepare codes of conduct, or amend or extend such codes, for the purpose of specifying the
application of this Regulation, such as with regard to:
(a) fair and transparent processing;
(b) the legitimate interests pursued by controllers in specific contexts;
(c) the collection of personal data;
(d) the pseudonymisation of personal data;
(e) the information provided to the public and to data subjects;
(f)the exercise of the rights of data subjects;
(g) the information provided to, and the protection of, children, and the manner in which
the consent of the holders of parental responsibility over children is to be obtained;
(h) the measures and procedures referred to in Articles 24 and 25 and the measures to ensure
security of processing referred to in Article 32;
(i) the notification of personal data breaches to supervisory authorities and the
communication of such personal data breaches to data subjects;
(j) the transfer of personal data to third countries or international organisations; or
(k) out-of-court proceedings and other dispute resolution procedures for resolving disputes
between controllers and data subjects with regard to processing, without prejudice to the
rights of data subjects pursuant to Articles 77 and 79.
3. In addition to adherence by controllers or processors subject to this Regulation, codes of
conduct approved pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Article and having general validity
pursuant to paragraph 9 of this Article may also be adhered to by controllers or processors
that are not subject to this Regulation pursuant to Article 3 in order to provide appropriate
safeguards within the framework of personal data transfers to third countries or international
organisations under the terms referred to in point (e) of Article 46(2). 2Such controllers or
processors shall make binding and enforceable commitments, via contractual or other legally
binding instruments, to apply those appropriate safeguards including with regard to the
rights of data subjects.
4. A code of conduct referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall contain mechanisms
which enable the body referred to in Article 41(1) to carry out the mandatory monitoring of
compliance with its provisions by the controllers or processors which undertake to apply it,
without prejudice to the tasks and powers of supervisory authorities competent pursuant to
Article 55 or 56.
5. Associations and other bodies referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article which intend to
prepare a code of conduct or to amend or extend an existing code shall submit the draft
code, amendment or extension to the supervisory authority which is competent pursuant to
Article 55. 2The supervisory authority shall provide an opinion on whether the draft code,
amendment or extension complies with this Regulation and shall approve that draft code,
amendment or extension if it finds that it provides sufficient appropriate safeguards.
GDPR Article 51(1) (2016)
1. Each Member State shall provide for one or more independent public authorities to be
responsible for monitoring the application of this Regulation, in order to protect the
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fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons in relation to processing and to facilitate
the free flow of personal data within the Union (‘supervisory authority’).
GDPR Art. 53 (2016) General conditions for the members of the supervisory authority
1. Member States shall provide for each member of their supervisory authorities to be
appointed by means of a transparent procedure by:
– their parliament;
– their government;
– their head of State; or
– an independent body entrusted with the appointment under Member State law.
2. Each member shall have the qualifications, experience and skills, in particular in the area
of the protection of personal data, required to perform its duties and exercise its powers.
3. The duties of a member shall end in the event of the expiry of the term of office,
resignation or compulsory retirement, in accordance with the law of the Member State
concerned.
4. A member shall be dismissed only in cases of serious misconduct or if the member no
longer fulfils the conditions required for the performance of the duties.
GDPR Art. 54 (2016) Rules on the establishment of the supervisory authority
1. Each Member State shall provide by law for all of the following:
(a) the establishment of each supervisory authority;
(b) the qualifications and eligibility conditions required to be appointed as member of each
supervisory authority;
(c) the rules and procedures for the appointment of the member or members of each
supervisory authority;
(d) the duration of the term of the member or members of each supervisory authority of no
less than four years, except for the first appointment after 24 May 2016, part of which may
take place for a shorter period where that is necessary to protect the independence of the
supervisory authority by means of a staggered appointment procedure;
(e) whether and, if so, for how many terms the member or members of each supervisory
authority is eligible for reappointment;
(f) the conditions governing the obligations of the member or members and staff of each
supervisory authority, prohibitions on actions, occupations and benefits incompatible
therewith during and after the term of office and rules governing the cessation of
employment.
2. The member or members and the staff of each supervisory authority shall, in accordance
with Union or Member State law, be subject to a duty of professional secrecy both during
and after their term of office, with regard to any confidential information which has come to
their knowledge in the course of the performance of their tasks or exercise of their powers.
During their term of office, that duty of professional secrecy shall in particular apply to
reporting by natural persons of infringements of this Regulation.
GDPR Art. 55 (2016) Competence
1. Each supervisory authority shall be competent for the performance of the tasks assigned
to and the exercise of the powers conferred on it in accordance with this Regulation on the
territory of its own Member State.
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2. Where processing is carried out by public authorities or private bodies acting on the basis
of point (c) or (e) of Article 6(1), the supervisory authority of the Member State concerned
shall be competent. 2In such cases Article 56 does not apply.
3. Supervisory authorities shall not be competent to supervise processing operations of
courts acting in their judicial capacity.
GDPR Art. 56 (2016) Competence of the lead
1. Without prejudice to Article 55, the supervisory authority of the main establishment or of
the single establishment of the controller or processor shall be competent to act as lead
supervisory authority for the cross-border processing carried out by that controller or
processor in accordance with the procedure provided in Article 60.
2. By derogation from paragraph 1, each supervisory authority shall be competent to handle
a complaint lodged with it or a possible infringement of this Regulation, if the subject matter
relates only to an establishment in its Member State or substantially affects data subjects only
in its Member State.
3. In the cases referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, the supervisory authority shall
inform the lead supervisory authority without delay on that matter. 2Within a period of three
weeks after being informed the lead supervisory authority shall decide whether or not it will
handle the case in accordance with the procedure provided in Article 60, taking into account
whether or not there is an establishment of the controller or processor in the Member State
of which the supervisory authority informed it.
4. Where the lead supervisory authority decides to handle the case, the procedure provided
in Article 60 shall apply. 2The supervisory authority which informed the lead supervisory
authority may submit to the lead supervisory authority a draft for a decision. 3The lead
supervisory authority shall take utmost account of that draft when preparing the draft
decision referred to in Article 60(3).
5. Where the lead supervisory authority decides not to handle the case, the supervisory
authority which informed the lead supervisory authority shall handle it according to Articles
61 and 62.
6. The lead supervisory authority shall be the sole interlocutor of the controller or processor
for the cross-border processing carried out by that controller or processor.
GDPR Article 57(1)(a)-(v) (2016) Tasks
1. Without prejudice to other tasks set out under this Regulation, each supervisory authority
shall on its territory:
(a) monitor and enforce the application of this Regulation;
(b) promote public awareness and understanding of the risks, rules, safeguards and rights in
relation to processing. Activities addressed specifically to children shall receive specific
attention;
(c) advise, in accordance with Member State law, the national parliament, the government,
and other institutions and bodies on legislative and administrative measures relating to the
protection of natural persons’ rights and freedoms with regard to processing;
(d) promote the awareness of controllers and processors of their obligations under this
Regulation;
(e) upon request, provide information to any data subject concerning the exercise of their
rights under this Regulation and, if appropriate, cooperate with the supervisory authorities in
other Member States to that end;
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(f) handle complaints lodged by a data subject, or by a body, organisation or association in
accordance with Article 80, and investigate, to the extent appropriate, the subject matter of
the complaint and inform the complainant of the progress and the outcome of the
investigation within a reasonable period, in particular if further investigation or coordination
with another supervisory authority is necessary;
(g) cooperate with, including sharing information and provide mutual assistance to, other
supervisory authorities with a view to ensuring the consistency of application and
enforcement of this Regulation;
(h) conduct investigations on the application of this Regulation, including on the basis of
information received from another supervisory authority or other public authority;
(i) monitor relevant developments, insofar as they have an impact on the protection of
personal data, in particular the development of information and communication
technologies and commercial practices;
(j) adopt standard contractual clauses referred to in Article 28(8) and in point (d) of Article
46(2);
(k) establish and maintain a list in relation to the requirement for data protection impact
assessment pursuant to Article 35(4);
(l) give advice on the processing operations referred to in Article 36(2);
(m) encourage the drawing up of codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40(1) and provide an
opinion and approve such codes of conduct which provide sufficient safeguards, pursuant to
Article 40(5);
(n) encourage the establishment of data protection certification mechanisms and of data
protection seals and marks pursuant to Article 42(1), and approve the criteria of certification
pursuant to Article 42(5);
(o) where applicable, carry out a periodic review of certifications issued in accordance with
Article 42(7);
(p) draft and publish the requirements for accreditation of a body for monitoring codes of
conduct pursuant to Article 41 and of a certification body pursuant to Article 43;
(q) conduct the accreditation of a body for monitoring codes of conduct pursuant to Article
41 and of a certification body pursuant to Article 43;
(r) authorise contractual clauses and provisions referred to in Article 46(3);
(s) approve binding corporate rules pursuant to Article 47;
(t) contribute to the activities of the Board;
(u) keep internal records of infringements of this Regulation and of measures taken in
accordance with Article 58(2); and
(v) fulfil any other tasks related to the protection of personal data.
GDPR Article 58 (2016) Powers
1. Each supervisory authority shall have all of the following investigative powers:
(a) to order the controller and the processor, and, where applicable, the controller’s or the
processor’s representative to provide any information it requires for the performance of its
tasks;
(b) to carry out investigations in the form of data protection audits;
(c) to carry out a review on certifications issued pursuant to Article 42(7);
(d) to notify the controller or the processor of an alleged infringement of this Regulation;
(e) to obtain, from the controller and the processor, access to all personal data and to all
information necessary for the performance of its tasks;
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(f) to obtain access to any premises of the controller and the processor, including to any data
processing equipment and means, in accordance with Union or Member State procedural
law.
2. Each supervisory authority shall have all of the following corrective powers:
(a) to issue warnings to a controller or processor that intended processing operations are
likely to infringe provisions of this Regulation;
(b) to issue reprimands to a controller or a processor where processing operations have
infringed provisions of this Regulation;
(c) to order the controller or the processor to comply with the data subject’s requests to
exercise his or her rights pursuant to this Regulation;
(d) to order the controller or processor to bring processing operations into compliance with
the provisions of this Regulation, where appropriate, in a specified manner and within a
specified period;
(e) to order the controller to communicate a personal data breach to the data subject;
(f) to impose a temporary or definitive limitation including a ban on processing;
(g) to order the rectification or erasure of personal data or restriction of processing pursuant
to Articles 16, 17 and 18 and the notification of such actions to recipients to whom the
personal data have been disclosed pursuant to Article 17(2) and Article 19;
(h) to withdraw a certification or to order the certification body to withdraw a certification
issued pursuant to Articles 42 and 43, or to order the certification body not to issue
certification if the requirements for the certification are not or are no longer met;
(i) to impose an administrative fine pursuant to Article 83, in addition to, or instead of
measures referred to in this paragraph, depending on the circumstances of each individual
case;
(j) to order the suspension of data flows to a recipient in a third country or to an
international organisation.
3. Each supervisory authority shall have all of the following authorisation and advisory
powers:
(a) to advise the controller in accordance with the prior consultation procedure referred to in
Article 36;
(b) to issue, on its own initiative or on request, opinions to the national parliament, the
Member State government or, in accordance with Member State law, to other institutions
and bodies as well as to the public on any issue related to the protection of personal data;
(c) to authorise processing referred to in Article 36(5), if the law of the Member State
requires such prior authorisation;
(d) to issue an opinion and approve draft codes of conduct pursuant to Article 40(5);
(e) to accredit certification bodies pursuant to Article 43
to issue certifications and approve criteria of certification in accordance with Article 42(5);
(f) to adopt standard data protection clauses referred to in Article 28(8) and in point (d) of
Article 46(2);
(g) to authorise contractual clauses referred to in point (a) of Article 46(3);
(h) to authorise administrative arrangements referred to in point (b) of Article 46(3);
(i) to approve binding corporate rules pursuant to Article 47.
4. The exercise of the powers conferred on the supervisory authority pursuant to this Article
shall be subject to appropriate safeguards, including effective judicial remedy and due
process, set out in Union and Member State law in accordance with the Charter.
5. Each Member State shall provide by law that its supervisory authority shall have the
power to bring infringements of this Regulation to the attention of the judicial authorities
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and where appropriate, to commence or engage otherwise in legal proceedings, in order to
enforce the provisions of this Regulation.
6. Each Member State may provide by law that its supervisory authority shall have additional
powers to those referred to in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. 2The exercise of those powers shall not
impair the effective operation of Chapter VII.
GDPR Article 68 (2016) European Data Protection Board
1. The European Data Protection Board (the ‘Board’) is hereby established as a body of the
Union and shall have legal personality.
2. The Board shall be represented by its Chair.
3. The Board shall be composed of the head of one supervisory authority of each Member
State and of the European Data Protection Supervisor, or their respective representatives.
4. Where in a Member State more than one supervisory authority is responsible for
monitoring the application of the provisions pursuant to this Regulation, a joint
representative shall be appointed in accordance with that Member State’s law.
5. The Commission shall have the right to participate in the activities and meetings of the
Board without voting right. 2The Commission shall designate a representative. 3The Chair
of the Board shall communicate to the Commission the activities of the Board.
6. In the cases referred to in Article 65, the European Data Protection Supervisor shall have
voting rights only on decisions which concern principles and rules applicable to the Union
institutions, bodies, offices and agencies which correspond in substance to those of this
Regulation.
GDPR Article 70(1)(a), (b) (2016)
1. The Board shall ensure the consistent application of this Regulation. 2To that end, the
Board shall, on its own initiative or, where relevant, at the request of the Commission, in
particular:
(a) monitor and ensure the correct application of this Regulation in the cases provided for in
Articles 64 and 65 without prejudice to the tasks of national supervisory authorities;
(b) advise the Commission on any issue related to the protection of personal data in the
Union, including on any proposed amendment of this Regulation
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Cases Related to Data Privacy Within Banking and Credit Institutions
Claire Cherry v. Amoco Oil Company (1980)
Plaintiff, Claire Cherry, applied for a gasoline credit card through Amoco Oil Company,
Defendant, and was denied. She claims that her denial was based on her zip code being
located in a predominantly non-white neighborhood. Amoco admitted in Plaintiff’s denial
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letter and during testimony that it uses a scoring system that assigns “low ratings to those zip
code areas in which it has had unfavorable delinquency experience.”5 If the Plaintiff (having
shown the same level of income and other information) had lived in a zip code area rated 3
or above, she would have been granted a credit card by Amoco.6
Plaintiff attempted to show “that the percentage of applicants in various low-rated zip code
areas correlated to the percentage of black population in each of said zip code areas.”7 The
Court ruled that the evidence presented was not enough to make out a prima facie case
because it only showed that all the factors taken into effect as a whole had a tendency “to
reject a disproportionate number of persons living in predominately black areas.”8
The Court ruled that there was “insufficient evidence from which to draw a conclusion as to
whether Amoco’s use of zip code ratings treats otherwise qualified white applicants and
otherwise black applicants in a significantly different manner.”9 Judgement was granted to
the Defendant and Plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.10
Although this case was ruled in favor of the Defendant, it is a significant case that brought
attention to ranking systems used by banking and credit institutions.
Isaac v. Norwest Mortgage (now Wells Fargo) (2002)
Ruth Isaac, Plaintiff, filed suit against Wells Fargo, Defendant, in May of 1999 alleging that
Defendant uses zip codes to segregate potential homebuyers.11 In June 2000, Plaintiff
amended her complaint to add the Association of Community Organizations from Reform
Now (ACORN) as an additional Plaintiff.12 Defendant then moved for summary
judgement.13
Plaintiffs were able to demonstrate that the “Community Calculator,” which was housed on
Wells Fargo’s website, collected zip code information from its customers. It then used that
information to “steer” customers toward “neighborhoods where that person’s race
predominated.”14 The “Community Calculator generated a list of the five ‘best matching
communities’ within 50 miles of the target area, including the area of departure; the
community in which Isaac resides; the community in which approximately 237 ACORN
members reside; and a community in Fort Worth, Texas.15 The Calculator then assigned each
community with a lifestyle indicator – both primary and other.16Plaintiffs were not able to
show that they have standing because they did not show that either “suffered a distinct and
palpable injury as a result of Norwest’s alleged conduct. 17 Defendant’s motion for summary

Cherry v. Amoco Oil Company, 490 F.Supp. 1026 (U.S. Dist. Ct. N. 1980).
Id. at 1028.
7 Id at 1030.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 1031.
10 Id. at 1032.
11 Isaac v. Northwest Mortg. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9354 (N. Dist. Texas 2002).
12 Id at 3.
13 Id. at 4.
14 Hernandez, Eddy, Muchmore, supra, at 1968.
15 Isaac v Norwest Mortg. (2002) at 12.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 26.
5
6

121

judgement was granted because Plaintiff did not show any genuine issue of material fact
pertaining to the standing issue.18
City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2011)
Plaintiffs, City of Memphis and Shelby County, alleged that Defendant, Wells Fargo,
engaged in discriminatory lending practices by targeting African-American homebuyers and
steering them toward loans outside of their financial capacity.19 Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss which was denied. The Court held that Plaintiffs had standing because they alleged
sufficient facts, and Plaintiffs “adequately pled their claim that Wells Fargo’s lending
practices had a disparate impact on African-Americans in Memphis and Shelby County in
violation of the FHA.”20
This significance of this case in our research pertaining to data privacy is the “steering” of
customers to loans that they could not afford. “Wells Fargo gave its employees discretion
about steering customers to products more profitable for Wells Fargo.”21 The company had
software that was designed “to filter loans to make sure that applicants were offered the best
loans for which they qualified, but the filters were regularly evaded and did not work.”22
Cases on Data Privacy IoT and the 4th Amendment
Katz v. United States
The Supreme Court established the reasonable expectation of privacy theory, a two-prong
test to determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. First, the
individual must have “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy. Second, the
court must determine if the “individual’s subjective expectation of privacy is one that society
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”23
Kyllo v. United States
The physical intrusion theory was used in the Kyllo case. The court determined that “[w]here,
as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of
the home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.” 24
Jones v. United States
The Supreme Court applied Justice Harlan’s concurrence in the Katz case in ruling that a
person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy” is violated when a GPS tracking device is
placed on a person’s vehicle in order to track that person’s movements on public streets.25
Riley v. California
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20 Id. at 52.
21 Id. at 6.
22 Id. at 7.
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“Riley involved the Court's first attempt to reconcile smartphone data and Fourth
Amendment doctrine. The case itself asked whether police need a warrant to search a
smartphone incident to arrest.”26 The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that, when a cellphone
is seized due to an incident of arrest, absent exigent circumstances, the government may not
complete a warrantless search on the contents of the cellphone. A warrant must be obtained
prior to a search of the data contained within the cellphone.27
United States v. Adkinson
The Court of Appeals held that a search and seizure does not violate the Fourth
Amendment when (1) a private party provides the data information, unless the private party
is acting as an agent of the government, and (2) the defendant consented to the privacy
policy which allows the private party to collect and share its users’ cell-site location
information.28
Because of the rapid advancement of technology in our world, lawmakers and the courts
must develop laws that protect individuals from privacy and security issues that stem from
technology and the data information trails they leave behind.
Cases related to Algorithms and Discrimination
Lumpkin v. Farmers Group., Inc.
This case involved disparate impact on minority policy holders in insurance pricing, with the
scoring and underwriting algorithm returning higher insurance rates for minorities than for
white policy holders.29 The court interpreted the disparate impact doctrine to require a
showing of “discriminatory effect or impact on members of a class protected by Title
VIII.”30 The court stated that “direct proof of the defendant's discriminatory intent is not
essential, although such evidence may bolster the discrimination claim.”31 Further, “a prima
facie inference of racial discrimination may be drawn where the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class, meets the objective criteria for the service requested, and was denied that
service on the same terms as Caucasians, if statistics show that the majority of the services
provided on those better terms were awarded to Caucasians.”32 The court went on to say
that “to establish a disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must prove that a specific facially
neutral policy or practice created statistical disparities so great as to be functionally
equivalent to intentional discrimination, therefore disadvantaging protected class members.”
Finally, the court pointed out that “the relevant inquiry is whether the policy or practice
specifically identified by the plaintiff has a significantly greater discriminatory impact on
members of a protected class.”33

Guthrie Ferguson, supra, at 573.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 134 S. Ct. (2014).
28 United States v. Adkinson, 916 F.3d 605, 610 (2019).
29 Id. at 9.
30 Id. (citing English Woods Civic Assoc. v. Cincinnati Metro. Hous. Auth., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26389, 33-34
(S.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 2004)).
31 Id (citing Arthur v. Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574-75 (6th Cir. 1986)).
32 Id (citing English Woods, at 34).
33 Id (citing Golden v. Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 963-64 (6th Cir. 2005)).
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Also in Lumpkin, the Court found relevancy and necessity in denying a motion to dismiss by
the Defendants, who argued that Lumpkin “had failed to state a disparate impact claim
because she had not provided any basis -- statistical, anecdotal, or otherwise -- for her
assertion that the Defendants' policies have a disproportionate impact on minorities.”34 The
court found that “in her complaint, Lumpkin has stated that certain undisclosed credit
scoring variables are highly correlated with race and, therefore, that racial minorities as a
group have lower credit scores than Caucasians and are charged higher prices for identical
policies.”35 The court went on to state “because she alleges that the Defendants have never
disclosed the scoring variables, Plaintiff Lumpkin cannot be expected to support this
allegation with concrete facts or statistical data without conducting discovery.”36
Hous. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist.
This case concerned “the use of privately developed algorithms to terminate public school
teachers for ineffective performance.”37 Teachers were evaluated using these algorithms
developed by a private software company and brought suit alleging due process violation. 38
The school district's motion for summary judgment on the teachers' procedural due process
claim was denied; the court found that most teachers represented by the union had “a
constitutionally protected property interest in continued employment during or beyond their
current term,” and that “HISD's value-added appraisal system poses a realistic threat to
deprive plaintiffs of constitutionally protected property interests in employment” because
they were denied access to the computer algorithms and data necessary to verify the accuracy
of their scores.”39 In denying summary judgment, the court pointed out the necessity of
having access to these algorithms by stating, “HISD teachers have no meaningful way to
ensure correct calculation of their EVAAS scores, and as a result are unfairly subject to
mistaken deprivation of constitutionally protected property interests in their jobs.”40
Due process issues and claims arise when the government acts in a way that threatens to
deprive a citizen of a life, liberty, or property interest, requires the affected person be given
notice and opportunity to be heard, and a decision by a neutral decisionmaker.41 To evaluate
the claim, a court “must first consider whether there is sufficient evidence implicating a
protected property right.”42 For example, in Houston Federation of Teachers, Local 2415 v.
Houston Independent School District, an algorithm to assess teacher performance, and evaluate
employment as a result, gave rise to due process issues concerning the teachers’ employment
as a protected property interest.43
Cases Relating to Biometric Data Privacy
In re Facebook Biometric Info Privacy Litig.
Lumpkin at 10.
Id.
36 Id.
37
Hous. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017)..
38 See Id. at 1171-72.
39 Id. at 1173, 1174.
40 Id.
41 See Id. at 1170.
42 Id.
43 See Id.
34
35
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Plaintiffs brought a class-action suit against Facebook in 2016 claiming that their “Tag
Suggestions program collects and stores biometric data in violation of the Illinois Biometric
Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”).44
BIPA requires private entities to provide notice and obtain consent when either "biometric
identifiers or biometric information" are at issue. "Biometric identifiers" include "scan[s] of .
. . face geometry" and "biometric information" includes "any information, regardless of how
it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual's biometric identifier used
to identify an individual." "Biometric identifiers do not include . . . photographs" and
biometric information "does not include information derived from items or procedures
excluded under the definition of biometric identifiers."45
Facebook currently retains the largest collection of biometric data by a private company. It
has claimed to have “practically infinite” amounts of facial recognition data from its users.
This data has helped train Facebook’s facial recognition technology used within its apps.
“One of the inventors of facial recognition technology believes that Facebook’s database
could allow its system to ‘recognize the entire population of earth.”46
In January 2020, Facebook agreed to settle the lawsuit and pay $550 million to Illinois
users.47 Although this was a victory for privacy groups, the “settlement underscored the
importance of strong privacy legislation.”48
Aguilar v. Rexnord, LLC
Plaintiff alleged that his employer “collected and stored” his fingerprints without his
consent, violating the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act. In Rivera v. Google, LLC.,
Plaintiff brough suit against Google’s photo storing application, Google Photos, claiming
privacy issues. Google Photos detects facial images and groups them based on similar facial
features. In both Aguilar and Rivera, Plaintiffs were not successful in bringing their cases
before the Court. The Court ruled in both cases that the Court lacked “subject matter
jurisdiction because Plaintiffs have not suffered concrete injuries for Article III purposes.”49
Legislative Materials
Regarding Examining the Use of Alternative Data in Underwriting and Credit Scoring to Expand Access to Credit:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services Task Force on Financial Technology, 116th Cong. (July
2019) (testimony of Chi Chi Wu, National Consumer Law Center).
Administrative and Executive Materials
Exec. Order No. 13181, 65 FR 81321 (2000). To Protect the Privacy of Protected Health Information in
Oversight Investigations, President Clinton, 2000.
In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 2018 U.S. Dist LEXIS 81044 (N.D. Cal. May 14, 2018)
Id. (internal citations omitted)
46 Pope, supra note 281, at 785.
47 Singer, Natasha and Isaac, Mike, Facebook to Pay $550 Million to Settle Facial Recognition Suit,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/29/technology/facebook-privacy-lawsuit-earnings.html, Jan. 28, 2020.
48 Id.
49 Rivera v. Google, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 3d 998, 33 (Dec. 2018).
44
45
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Generally restricts investigative and prosecutorial authorities’ use of personal health care
information gathered by health oversight authorities in the pursuit of individual criminal
investigation unless a judicial officer has determined there is good cause after weighing the
public interest and the need for disclosure against the potential injury to the patient, the
physician patient relationship, and to the treatment services. [This EO is still in effect
according to the Federal Register.] GET EXACT LANGUAGE
45 C.F.R. 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(B) (“HIPAA).
(ii) In response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process, that is not
accompanied by an order of a court or administrative tribunal, if: The covered entity receives
satisfactory assurance, as described in paragraph (e)(1)(iv) of this section, from the party
seeking the information that reasonable efforts have been made by such party to secure a
qualified protective order that meets the requirements of paragraph (e)(1)(v) of this section.
45 C.F.R. 164.512(e)(1)(v) (“HIPAA”).
(e) Standard: Disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings –
(1) Permitted disclosures. A covered entity may disclose protected health information in the
course of any judicial or administrative proceeding: …
(v) For purposes of paragraph (e)(1) of this section, a qualified protective order means, with
respect to protected health information requested under paragraph (e)(1)(ii) of this section,
an order of a court or of an administrative tribunal or a stipulation by the parties to the
litigation or administrative proceeding that:
(A) Prohibits the parties from using or disclosing the protected health information for any
purpose other than the litigation or proceeding for which such information was requested;
and
(B) Requires the return to the covered entity or destruction of the protected health
information (including all copies made) at the end of the litigation or proceeding.
W.Va. C.S.R. 114-15-4.2(a)
For an insurer subject to 114 CSR 51 or 114 CSR 53, the insurer or related entity shall, in
addition, maintain its books, records, and documents in a manner so that the practices of the
entity regarding network adequacy, utilization review, quality assessment and improvement
and provider credentialing may be ascertained during a market conduct examination.
W.Va. C.S.R. 114-15- 4.2(b)
All insurer records within the scope of this rule must be retained for the lesser of:
1. The current calendar year plus five (5) calendar years;
2. From the closing date of the period of review for the most recent examination by the
commissioner; or
3. A period otherwise specified by statute as the examination cycle for the insurer.
W.Va. C.S.R. 114-15-4.2(c).
The producer of record shall maintain a file for each policy sold, and the file shall contain all
work papers and written communications in his or her possession pertaining to the policy
documented therein. These records shall be retained for the current calendar year plus
additional years as set forth in subdivision b of this subsection.
W. Va. C.S.R. 114-57-15.1
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A licensee shall not disclose nonpublic personal health information about a consumer or
customer unless an authorization is obtained from the consumer or customer whose
nonpublic personal health information is sought to be disclosed.
W. Va. C.S.R. 114-57-15.2.
Nothing in this section shall prohibit, restrict or require an authorization for the disclosure of
nonpublic personal health information by a licensee for the performance of the following
insurance functions by or on behalf of the licensee: claims administration; claims adjustment
and management; detection, investigation or reporting of actual or potential fraud,
misrepresentation or criminal activity; underwriting; policy placement or issuance; loss control;
ratemaking and guaranty fund functions; reinsurance and excess loss insurance; risk
management; case management; disease management; quality assurance; quality improvement;
performance evaluation; provider credentialing verification; utilization review; peer review
activities; actuarial, scientific, medical or public policy research; grievance procedures; internal
administration of compliance, managerial, and information systems; policyholder service
functions; auditing; reporting; database security; administration of consumer disputes and
inquiries; external accreditation standards; the replacement of a group benefit plan; activities
in connection with a sale, merger, transfer or exchange of all or part of a business or operating
unit; any activity that permits disclosure without authorization pursuant to the federal Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act privacy rules promulgated by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services; disclosure that is required, or is one of the lawful
or appropriate methods, to enforce the licensee’s rights or the rights of other persons engaged
in carrying out a transaction or providing a product or service that a consumer requests or
authorizes; and any activity otherwise permitted by law, required pursuant to governmental
reporting authority, or to comply with legal process. Additional insurance functions may be
added with the approval of the commissioner to the extent they are necessary for appropriate
performance of insurance functions and are fair and reasonable to the interest of consumers.
W. Va. C.S.R. 114-62-3.1
Each licensee shall implement a comprehensive written information security program that
includes administrative, technical and physical safeguards for the protection of consumer
information. The …safeguards included in the …program shall be appropriate to the size and
complexity of the licensee and the nature and scope of its activities.
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APPENDIX F - 50 STATE SURVEY MAP
Below is the 50 State Survey Map, which illustrates the comprehensiveness of legislation within each state based on
various factors such as the presence of a breach notification period, data request procedures and ability to opt-out. For
the development of this map, the presence of a factor within a states legislation was designated a point of 1 while the
absence of a given factor was designated zero points. Points were then totaled to develop this map.
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COMPARING

APPENDIX G - A TALE OF TWO POLICIES:
THE DATA PRIVACY POLICIES OF APPLE AND FACEBOOK

RA Jayda Guidry, a recent graduate of West Virginia University, was tasked with examining the privacy statements
of Apple and Facebook to see which one was more comprehensible and accessible to the typical consumer. Below is her
commentary:
“The largest difference I noticed between the two policies was regarding the designation of
personal and non-personal information and how such information is treated. Apple distinguished
between personal and non-personal information throughout its policy, while Facebook never made
this distinction. Because Facebook did not do this, I found it hard to follow the policy from
collection to use of information. Facebook is unclear about its use of the types of information
outlined in its information collected section and when explaining use of information used blanketed
statements about use.
Apple also explained in detail the security measures in place for the protection of user information
during transfer and storage while Facebook did not. Facebook also did not have a child policy or
explain how children’s information is handled, while Apple did. In regard to the sharing of
information, Apple explained how information is to be handled by its partners while Facebook
stated that there were “strict restrictions” in place for third party use of information without
explaining what these strict restrictions were.
Overall, I found Facebook’s privacy statement more difficult to follow and unclear compared to
Apple’s. It was difficult to understand how the different types of information were being used and
there were various things that were left unmentioned such as security measures in place and child
policy.”
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Comparison of Data Privacy Statements: Apple and Facebook
Collection of Information
Information Collected (Apple)…………... Pages 1-3
Personal Information Collected ….….….. Page 1
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